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Figure 1: New Zealand Legion cartoon lamenting the lack of unity between political 
parties. Source: National Opinion 1:4 (21 September 1933): 4. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The Great Depression witnessed an unparalleled explosion of mass conservative mobilisation 
across Australia and New Zealand. Large populist movements sprang into being virtually 
overnight and amassed a collective membership numbering in the hundreds of thousands. At 
the height of their influence they posed a direct challenge to the electoral base of mainstream 
conservative parties. They soon faded away from the political scene and, indeed, from the 
collective memory of Australian and New Zealand society. 
 
This thesis is concerned with four of these movements: the Citizens’ League of South 
Australia, the Australian Citizens’ League of Victoria, the All for Australia League of New 
South Wales, and the New Zealand Legion. The former three arose in Australia in 1931, 
whilst the latter appeared in New Zealand in 1933. These movements combined a populist 
and idealist rhetorical and organisational style with standard conservative social and 
economic ideas. They simultaneously sought new and radical alternatives to party politics 
and class conflict whilst expressing nostalgia for an illusory nineteenth century colonial 
society epitomised by classlessness, limited government, independent politicians, and the 
self-sufficient pioneer. This thesis suggests that, in order to truly understand these 
movements, this inherent contradiction between looking forwards and backwards for political 
inspiration must be embraced rather than ironed out in favour of narrative consistency. It 
argues that the citizens’ movements were a contradictory blend of the reactionary and the 
radical, and that their history, from their origins to their rapid demise, can be best interpreted 
through the lens of this thematic contradiction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The time is ripe for what may be described as a “Citizens’ Movement,” with 
the one definitive objective of making articulate [the] great body of sane 
opinion, illuminated by a reasonable knowledge of affairs, and not clouded by 
class antipathy or doctrinaire prepossessions.1
 
 
So proclaimed a Melbourne Argus editorial on 30 January 1931 entitled ‘A Call to 
Citizenship’. Its author called upon the ‘average citizens’ – those everyday professionals, 
businessmen, tradesmen and wage earners who were ‘divorced from any strong party 
affiliations or sectional interests’ – to shrug off their political apathy and bring their 
knowledge and patriotic effort to bear against the economic woes of the time. These everyday 
citizens, it argued, were the epitome of sane and reasoned opinion, and the only force capable 
of putting the nation’s interests before their own. The Argus contrasted this attitude with the 
‘subversive’ actions of militant trade unionists and the ‘reckless extravagance’ of politicians. 
If these disruptive forces were to be countered, the average citizens would need to unite in ‘a 
powerful, organised presentation of mass opinion ... before it is too late’. Such a ‘Citizens’ 
Movement’, claimed the Argus, would rouse the nation from the economic and political 
doldrums of the Depression through the spirit of cooperation and mutual self-sacrifice.2
 
 
The Argus did not have to wait long to see its vision realised. By the middle of 1931, over 
300,000 Australian men and women had organised into dozens of mass conservative 
movements across the country. In 1933 the phenomenon of mass conservative mobilisation 
reached the shores of New Zealand, encouraging tens of thousands of normally apathetic 
individuals to join the ranks of new political organisations. The aims and methods of these 
                                                     
1 Argus, 30 January 1931, 6. 
2 Ibid. 
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movements varied, but they shared a desire to effect fundamental political, social, and 
economic change through the organised efforts of the everyday citizenry. At the height of 
their influence they became nationally significant bodies, attracting the attention of 
politicians and the media alike, and in some cases they posed a direct challenge to the 
electoral base of mainstream conservative parties. However, they soon faded away from the 
political scene and, indeed, from the collective memory of Australian and New Zealand 
society.  
 
This thesis is concerned with four of these movements: the Citizens’ League of South 
Australia, the Australian Citizens’ League of Victoria, the All for Australia League of New 
South Wales, and the New Zealand Legion. The former three arose in Australia in 1931, 
whilst the latter appeared in New Zealand in 1933. These movements combined a populist 
and idealist rhetorical and organisational style with standard conservative social and 
economic ideas. They simultaneously sought new and radical alternatives to party politics 
and class conflict whilst expressing nostalgia for an illusory nineteenth century colonial 
society epitomised by classlessness, limited government, independent politicians, and the 
self-sufficient pioneer. This thesis suggests that, in order to truly understand these 
movements, this inherent contradiction between looking forwards and backwards for political 
inspiration must be embraced rather than ironed out in favour of narrative consistency. It 
argues that these movements were a contradictory blend of the reactionary and the radical, 
and that their history, from their origins to their rapid demise, can be best interpreted through 
the lens of this thematic contradiction. 
 
These four movements have been chosen for analysis for several reasons. As the following 
section demonstrates, they have received limited coverage in the existing historiography of 
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mass conservative mobilisation in Australia and New Zealand. This scholarship has also 
tended to focus on individual movements rather than the broader phenomenon of mass 
conservative mobilisation. Whilst this has resulted in a number of useful case studies, there 
remains ample room for fresh insight into overarching trends that may further the 
understanding of the phenomenon as a whole. The four movements with which this thesis is 
concerned are well suited for this sort of comparative analysis: they emerged out of very 
similar crises within Australasian conservatism, and they displayed striking ideological and 
structural similarities. This poses several interesting questions: why were these movements so 
similar despite being separated by state and national boundaries? Were they connected 
somehow, or were their similarities merely coincidental? And finally, can their similarities 
assist in explaining how and why they declined? The fact that these movements arose in two 
separate independent nations makes these questions even more worthy of consideration. This 
thesis, which is chiefly a study of the inception and evolution of ideas, addresses these 
questions by examining the reactionary and radical trends upon which these movements 
drew. In brief, it highlights where these ideas came from, how they changed and were 
moulded to meet specific regional and national requirements, and how the attempt to blend 
reactionary and radical ideas ultimately caused the movements’ downfall. 
 
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF MASS CONSERVATIVE MOBILISATION 
Scholarly analyses of mass conservative mobilisation across Australia and New Zealand 
during the Depression can be summarised into two categories – those that attempt to describe 
or interpret all of the movements as part of a broader phenomenon, and those that isolate 
specific movements for discussion. There are only a few studies of the former type, and they 
only cover the Australian movements. These studies generally present mass conservative 
mobilisation as a spontaneous reaction to the Depression with little or no ideological roots. 
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Phyllis Mitchell (nee Peter) contended that the movements represented an amorphous right-
wing backlash against the dire economic and political situation. Their energies quickly 
dissipated due to their lack of a coherent ideology or policy with which to differentiate 
themselves from mainstream conservative parties.3 Peter Loveday argued that the movements 
were the result of a ‘shock’ in Australian politics which ‘provoked party figures and other 
public men to state their political beliefs explicitly and often more dogmatically than usual’. 
Movements espousing this form of ‘anti-political political thought’, he argued, expressed 
their political ambitions in one of two ways: support for an all-party or non-party 
government, or advocating for a form of non-parliamentary dictatorship.4
 
 
Other scholars contend that the phenomenon had roots in the traditions of Australasian 
conservatism. Judith Brett argued that ‘[n]on-party political organisations are a permanent 
presence on the Liberal side of politics in Australia’ that draw on ‘convictions of their moral 
worth based on experience and on deeply held self-understandings.’5 John McCarthy argued 
that the movements drew on the ‘deep-rooted conservatism’ of the nineteenth century that 
questioned the value of representative government and democracy itself. These roots lay in 
‘the Macarthur type squatters, the ideas of the older Wentworth, [and] the government action 
in the strikes of the ‘nineties’.’6
                                                     
3 Phyllis Peter, "Social Aspects of the Depression in New South Wales, 1930-1934" (PhD diss., Australian 
National University, 1964), 268-314. Peter (later Mitchell) focused on four mass movements in New South 
Wales: the All for Australia League, the Riverina Movement, the New Guard, and the Old Guard. 
 Andrew Moore categorised this tradition as ‘Burkean 
conservatism’, arguing that democracy was received with ‘grumbling from the antipodean 
4 Peter Loveday, "Anti-Political Political Thought," Labour History 17 (1969): 121-6. 
5 Judith Brett, Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
102-13. 
6 John McCarthy, "'All for Australia': Some Right Wing Responses to the Depression in New South Wales, 1929-
1932," Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 57:2 (1971): 161-2, 169. See also McCarthy, "A “Law 
and Order” Election: New South Wales, June 1932," Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 60:2 
(1974): 105-16. 
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ancien regime’ in the nineteenth century.7 C. J. Lloyd pointed to several ‘educational’ groups 
that emerged during the 1920s as ‘provid[ing] the basis for the Citizens’ Movement’. Their 
opposition to party politics stemmed from the increasing sophistication of extra-
parliamentary ‘machines’ during the 1920s, which they sought to oppose with a ‘sense of 
unity and purpose’ and a commitment to the conservative dictums of ‘sound finance’.8
 
 
More scholarly work has been produced on individual mass conservative movements, 
including several studies on the four movements with which this thesis is concerned. Broadly 
speaking, these studies have focused on the conservative aspects of the movements’ ideology 
– what Michael Pugh categorised as a form of ‘conservative protest’ – whilst downplaying 
their more radical style and rhetoric. Pugh’s noteworthy thesis on the New Zealand Legion 
viewed it as one of a series of laissez-faire protests against the increasingly interventionist 
policies of conservative governments during the 1920s and 1930s.9 Whilst its criticism of the 
party system of government ‘seem[ed] radical at times’, it was merely a recurrent feature of 
‘individualism’ that arose during times of crisis.10 Len Richardson similarly focused on the 
laissez-faire elements of the Legion’s ideology, whilst Gerald C. Campbell argued that the 
movement only adopted radical ideas when it began receiving criticism from the public 
regarding its lack of a firm policy.11
                                                     
7 Andrew Moore, The Right Road: A History of Right-Wing Politics in Australia  (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 12-14. 
 Likewise, Cathcart’s analysis of the Australian Citizens’ 
8 C. J. Lloyd, "The Formation and Development of the U.A.P., 1929-1937" (PhD diss., Australian National 
University, 1984), 2-3, 17-19, 79, 91-93. See also Brett, Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class, 104-6, 
112-3. 
9 Michael Pugh, "The New Zealand Legion and Conservative Protest in the Great Depression" (MA diss., 
University of Auckland, 1969). 11-42, 144-83, 184-9; Michael Pugh, "The New Zealand Legion, 1932-1935," 
New Zealand Journal of History 5:1 (1971): 49, 68-69. 
10 Pugh, "The New Zealand Legion and Conservative Protest," 76-78; Pugh, "The New Zealand Legion, 1932-
1935," 68-69. 
11 Len Richardson, "Parties and Political Change," in The Oxford History of New Zealand, ed. Geoffrey W. Rice 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), 225; Gerard Campbell, "The New Zealand Legion in Otago, 1933-
1935" (BA Hons diss., University of Otago, 1987), 60-67, 72. 
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League suggested that its sole purpose was ‘mobilizing the non-Labor citizenry’ behind a 
single electoral banner.12
 
 
Several accounts question whether these four movements espoused any original ideas at all. 
P. J. Gibbons argued that the New Zealand Legion was a manifestation of ‘inchoate 
radicalism’ whose range of opinion was ‘limited by the narrowness of the colonial 
experience’.13 Trevor Matthews claimed that the values of the All for Australia League 
represented ‘the coin of Australian conservatism’ rather than an attempt to posit a radical 
alternative. These values were ‘deliberately, and ludicrously, simple’, amounting to little 
more than ‘a set of moral injunctions’.14 Likewise, Mitchell argued that the League’s focus 
on morals rather than policy was the reason for its popular appeal.15 John Lonie contended 
that the Citizens’ League of South Australia was completely unoriginal and merely parroted 
the ‘economic status quo’.16 Its anti-partyism, according to Michael J. Thompson, was simply 
an extension of its commitment to economic orthodoxy that was designed to garner public 
support.17 R. N. Wait suggested that the League focused on simple ideals with ‘strong appeal’ 
such as anti-communism to avoid having to delve deeply into ‘the more intangible economic 
problems’.18
                                                     
12 Michael Cathcart, Defending the National Tuckshop: Australia's Secret Army Intrigue of 1931  (Fitzroy: 
McPhee Gribble, 1988), 158-62; Michael Cathcart, "The White Army of 1931: Origins and Legitimations. The 
League of National Security in Victoria in 1931 and the Means by Which It Was Legitimated" (MA diss., 
Australian National University, 1985). 
 
13 P. J. Gibbons, "The Climate of Opinion," in The Oxford History of New Zealand, ed. Geoffrey W. Rice 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), 328. 
14 Trevor Matthews, "The All for Australia League," in The Great Depression in Australia, ed. Robert Cooksey 
(Canberra: Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, 1970), 136-7, 140-1. 
15 Peter, "Social Aspects of the Depression," 271-8. 
16 John Lonie, "'Good Labor Men' and 'Non-Labor' During the Great Depression in South Australia," Journal of 
the Historical Society of South Australia 2:1 (1976): 36; John Lonie, "Conservatism and Class in South Australia 
During the Depression Years, 1929-34" (MA diss., University of Adelaide, 1973). 
17 Michael J. Thompson, "Government and Depression in South Australia, 1927 to 1934" (MA diss., Flinders 
University, 1972). 174-6.  
18 R. N. Wait, "Reactions to Demonstrations and Riots in Adelaide 1928-1932" (MA diss., University of Adelaide, 
1973). 169-70. 
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In contrast, some studies have suggested that these four movements did develop robust 
platforms. Stephen James argued that the Citizens’ League of South Australia developed 
‘detailed economic, political and social policies’ that evoked ‘the ideologies of liberalism, 
traditional conservatism, nationalism/imperialism and Protestantism’. Whilst the League’s 
extreme individualism led ‘naturally’ to an anti-party mentality, it ultimately served to shore 
up the dominant capitalist ideology of the ruling class.19 In contrast, Geoffrey Robinson 
claimed that the policies of the All for Australia League were designed to provide a ‘centrist’ 
alternative to the mainstream political parties. Like other successful centre parties before it, 
the League’s ‘political entrepreneurship’ allowed it to take advantage of the body of voters 
who had been disaffected by the rightward shift of the Nationalists at the previous election. 
This resulted in ‘a populist revolt against the conservative establishment’, although Robinson 
does not elaborate on what this populism entailed.20
 
 
Whilst the majority of studies locate these four movements within a reactionary conservative 
tradition, a small number consider them to have been more radical in nature. The New 
Zealand Legion, for instance, has often been termed ‘fascist’, ‘quasi-fascist’ and 
‘protofascist’, no doubt influenced by the ‘semi-fascist’ sobriquet originally used by Keith 
Sinclair.21
                                                     
19 Stephen A. James, "God, Mammon and Mussolini: The Ideology and Policy of the Citizens' League of South 
Australia, 1930-1934," Australian Journal of Politics and History 37:1 (1991): 43, 46-47; Stephen A. James, "'The 
Big Hand of Service': The Citizens' League of South Australia, 1930-1934; Origins, Ideology and Policy" (BA Hons 
diss., University of Melbourne, 1986). 
 The three Australian movements have mostly avoided this contentious label, due 
20 Geoffrey Robinson, "The All for Australia League in New South Wales: A Study in Political Entrepreneurship 
and Hegemony," Australian Historical Studies 39:1 (2008): 36-40, 51-52. Rodney Smith also positioned the All 
for Australia League within this ‘centrist’ tradition; see Rodney K. Smith, Against the Machines: Minor Parties 
and Independents in New South Wales, 1910-2006  (Sydney: Federation Press, 2006), 39. 
21 Tony Simpson, The Slump: The Thirties Depression, Its Origins and Aftermath  (Auckland: Penguin Books, 
1990), 67; Tom Brooking, The History of New Zealand  (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004), xxvi; Alexander 
Davidson, Two Models of Welfare: The Origins and Development of the Welfare State in Sweden and New 
Zealand, 1888-1988  (Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1989), 175; Keith Sinclair, A History of New 
Zealand  (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), 245. 
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largely to the existence of a more obvious target – the paramilitaristic and openly fascist-
leaning New Guard, which is discussed in more detail below. Other scholars such as Marinus 
la Rooij and the present author have argued that the Legion was a form of radicalised 
conservatism brought about by a vacuum in New Zealand politics during the Depression.22 
Adam Allington highlighted several areas in which the Legion lay to the right of mainstream 
conservatism, such as its desire to abolish the party system and its strong patriotic 
sentiment.23 Spoonley suggested that it was an early manifestation of right-wing extremism 
brought about by the lack of representation by the mainstream political parties.24 Elizabeth 
Ward argued that it is more useful to examine the Legion’s shared characteristics with 
fascism than whether or not it was fascist.25
 
 
Some scholars have attempted to reconcile these competing ideological strands. In his study 
of the Australian Citizens’ League, Geoff Hewitt argued that it was overwhelmed by the 
juggling act required to balance its non-party ideals with its support for the process of uniting 
the disparate conservative political forces under Joseph Lyons, the dissident former Labor 
Party member, in order to contest the 1931 Federal election. Whilst its leaders sought the 
return of a Federal government committed to economic orthodoxy, overcoming the 
dominance of political machines ‘was equally, if not more, important to their followers’. 
Consequently, the League’s demise ‘was the direct result of its supporter’s [sic.] quandary 
                                                     
22 The terms ‘conservative radicalism’ and ‘conservative radicalisation’ are used by the present author and La 
Rooij respectively; see Matthew Cunningham, "Conservative Protest or Conservative Radicalism? The New 
Zealand Legion in a Comparative Context, 1930-1935," Journal of New Zealand Studies 10 (2011): 139-58; 
Marinus La Rooij, "Political Antisemitism in New Zealand During the Great Depression: A Case Study in the 
Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy" (MA diss., Victoria University of Wellington, 1998), 61-63, 83-86. 
23 Adam Allington, "Gold-Shirts in God's Own? The Extreme Right in New Zealand During the 1930s 
Depression" (BA Hons diss., Victoria University of Wellington, 2009), 5, 37-39, 54-55. 
24 Paul Spoonley, The Politics of Nostalgia: Racism and the Extreme Right in New Zealand  (Palmerston North: 
Dunmore Press, 1987), 54-55. 
25 Elizabeth Ward, "The New Zealand Legion in Manawatu-Wanganui, 1933-1935" (BA Hons diss., Massey 
University, 2011), 47-49. 
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over its increased, and finally total, absorption into machine politics, their alienation and 
division by such a trend, and their inability to prevent it.’26 In contrast, James Watson’s 
discussion of the New Zealand Legion suggested that the professionals who dominated the 
movement introduced radical policies that alienated its more conservative supporters.27
 
 These 
approaches have informed the dual thematic framework of the reactionary and the radical that 
is espoused by this thesis. 
The movements with which this thesis is concerned were only one part of a broader 
phenomenon of mass conservative mobilisation in Australia and New Zealand during the 
Depression. There is a particularly robust historiography of those movements that were 
paramilitaristic in nature. The history of paramilitarism in Australia would be incomplete 
without reference to the many works of Andrew Moore, in particular his seminal work The 
Secret Army and the Premier. Moore provides a detailed account of the emergence of a 
paramilitary tradition in Australia during the interwar years, the roots of which lay in the 
formation of a state-sanctioned ‘farmers’ army’ of strikebreakers in New South Wales in 
1917. After the war, the federal government sought to establish a permanent reserve special 
constabulary along the lines of the American Protective League and the British Supply and 
Transport Organisation. This led to the formation of an organisation dubbed the King and 
Empire Alliance which combined public rallies affirming ‘imperial patriotism and anti-
communism’ with the formation of a secret paramilitary army. Continuing links with the state 
allowed those associated with the Alliance to provide special constables to the Victorian 
                                                     
26 Geoff Hewitt, "The All for Australia League in Melbourne," La Trobe Historical Studies 3 (1972): 9-10, 13-14. 
27 James Watson, "Crisis and Change: Economic Crisis and Technological Change between the World Wars, with 
Special Reference to Christchurch, 1926-36" (PhD diss., University of Canterbury, 1984), 541-544. 
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government during the police strikes of 1923 and the New South Wales government during 
the seamen’s strike of 1925.28
 
  
After several years of quiescence, the paramilitary tradition was revived during the 
Depression under the name of the Old Guard. The key trigger in its formation was the victory 
of dissident Labor leader Jack Lang in the New South Wales elections of October 1930. The 
upper class elite who comprised its membership – wealthy graziers, manufacturers, doctors, 
solicitors, and accountants – feared that Lang’s unorthodox economic policies, in particular 
his desire to suspend interest payments to British holders of State public debt, would lead to 
an economic collapse or even a socialist revolution.29 Whilst its leadership was based in 
Sydney, it also managed to secure substantial rural support by appealing to country values.30 
After the ousting of the Federal Labor party at the end of 1931, the United Australia Party 
under Joseph Lyons passed legislation allowing it to recoup the costs the Federal government 
had incurred by meeting New South Wales’ defaulted interest payments. According to 
Moore, the Federal government came perilously close to enrolling members of the Old Guard 
as special constables in an attempt to recover the state’s tax receipts by force. This was only 
prevented by the intervention of Governor Philip Game, who precipitously sacked Lang on 
13 May 1932.31
 
 
Several scholars have identified a similar paramiltaristic history for a Victorian movement 
known as the League of National Security. John Schauble and Paul James traced the origins 
                                                     
28 Andrew Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier: Conservative Paramilitary Organisations in New South 
Wales, 1930-32  (Kensington: New South Wales University Press, 1989), 12-64; Andrew Moore, ""Send 
Lawyers, Guns and Money": A Study of Conservative Paramilitary Organisations in New South Wales, 1930-
1932; Background and Sequel, 1917-1952 " (PhD diss., La Trobe University, 1982). 
29 Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier, 70-90, 119-20. 
30 Moore, "The Old Guard and "Countrymindedness" During the Great Depression," Journal of Australian 
Studies 27 (1990): 57-62. 
31 Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier, 79-90, 119-20, 162, 165-205. 
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of the League to the ‘White Army’, a force that emerged from the special constabulary 
formed during the Melbourne police strikes of 1923.32 According to Frank Cain, its close ties 
to the Melbourne political and military establishment led intelligence authorities to express a 
‘marked reluctance’ to investigate it.33 The resulting paucity of records makes the League of 
National Security difficult to analyse in detail. Michael Cathcart developed a unique solution 
to this problem. By recording the oral testimonies of hundreds of ex-League members across 
Victoria, he was able to determine a number of conclusions about the conservative worldview 
that motivated them. Cathcart described this worldview as an ‘unwritten constitution’ which 
linked the legitimacy of government to the extent that it upheld historical conservative values 
and traditions. Any perceived betrayal of this contract with the past allowed members of the 
League to rationalise the forceful removal of a democratically elected government.34
 
 Whilst 
Cathcart could be accused of oversimplifying the complex and multi-faceted nature of 
conservatism, his analysis is nevertheless an insightful demonstration of how political 
worldviews dictate what is, and is not, considered to lie within the bounds of acceptable 
political activity.  
Of all the mass conservative movements that arose during the Depression, the New Guard has 
attracted the most scholarly attention. The works of Keith Amos and Andrew Moore provide 
the best general histories of the movement. Like Moore’s account of the Old Guard, Amos 
highlighted the influence of the paramilitary tradition of the previous decade on the New 
Guard, especially on its leader Eric Campbell. According to Amos, Campbell was recruited 
                                                     
32 John Schauble, "Right-Wing Militancy in Australia: The Rise of the League of National Security" (BA Hons 
diss., University of Melbourne, 1979); Paul James, "Armies of the Right: In Defence of Empire and Nation," 
Melbourne Journal of Politics 16 (1984-1985): 87-90; Paul James, "Militarism and Loyalty: Civilian Paramilitary 
Movements in Melbourne During the Interwar Period" (BA Hons diss., University of Melbourne, 1980). A 
newspaper piece may have acted as the inspiration for James’s research – see Richard Hall, "The Secret Army," 
National Times (23-28 January 1978): 12-13. 
33 Frank Cain, The Origins of Political Surveillance in Australia  (Melbourne: Angus & Robertson, 1983), 214. 
34 Cathcart, Defending the National Tuckshop, 9-16, 121-124, 165-180. 
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by Prime Minister Stanley Bruce during the 1925 seamen’s strike to organise a special 
constabulary force of 500 ex-soldiers. A desire to resurrect this force after Jack Lang’s 
election in 1930 brought Campbell into contact with the founding members of the Old Guard, 
whom he agreed to assist.35 Amos argued that Campbell split from the Old Guard out of 
frustration with its secrecy and its unwillingness to take direct action against a 
constitutionally-elected government. Moore countered that Campbell was asked to leave by 
the Old Guard leadership because of his arrogance and vanity.36 It was along this split that 
the New Guard staked its claim to uniqueness by openly courting publicity and threatening to 
act unilaterally against the ‘socialistic’ policies of Jack Lang. As Moore aptly put it, this 
made the New Guard an ‘obstreperous mutation’ of the typically secretive paramilitary 
tradition.37
 
 
At the same time as the paramilitary movements arose in several Australian states, other mass 
conservative movements were mobilising towards the goal of secession, either to form a new 
state or an independent nation. As New Zealand hosted no mass secessionist movements 
during the Depression, both types were limited to Australia. Two ‘new state’ movements 
existed in New South Wales – the New England New State Movement and the Riverina 
Movement. Whilst these two regions called for full statehood within the Australian 
constitution, the Dominion League of Western Australia (and a much smaller Dominion 
League in Tasmania) agitated for complete separation as an independent nation under the 
Commonwealth. 
 
                                                     
35 Keith Amos, The New Guard Movement, 1931-1935  (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1976), 11-12, 
22. 
36 Ibid. 23; Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier, 139-42. 
37 Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier, 137. 
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This thesis is chiefly concerned with any ideological and structural overlaps between the 
citizens’ movements and the secessionist movements, and whether these overlaps prevented 
the citizens’ movements from spreading into Western Australia and the new state regions of 
New South Wales. An important historiographical question, therefore, is whether 
secessionism was the primary motivating factor behind these movements. Ulrich Ellis and 
Don Aitkin suggested that, whilst the new state movements were a rural manifestation of the 
wider conservative protest against Jack Lang, they held a genuine desire to separate from 
New South Wales.38 R. G. Neale agreed that the movements represented deep-seated 
grievances over the lack of public investment in rural development and the ‘failure to solve 
these grievances by means other than separation’. Like Ellis and Aitkin, Neale asserted that 
‘[s]uch movements … flared into vital activity when met by some challenge to the economic 
security of its population.’39 Similar grievances regarding a lack of federal investment in the 
state of Western Australia fuelled the secessionist sentiment of the 1930s, according to 
Thomas Musgrave.40 Edward Watt argued that secessionist sentiment in Western Australia 
was genuine; however, ‘it would have been more difficult to rally the public around this 
specific grievance had there not been a general discontent which could be channelled.’41
                                                     
38 Ulrich Ellis, The Country Party: A Political and Social History of the Party in New South Wales  (Melbourne: F. 
W. Cheshire, 1958), 130-40; Ullrich Ellis, A Pen in Politics (Finished and Published by Max Ellis)  (Charnwood: 
Ginnindera Press, 2007), 173-186; Don Aitkin, The Country Party in New South Wales: A Study of Organisation 
and Survival  (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1972), 31. 
 
Similarly, Harry H. Hiller considered the recurring secessionist sentiment in Western 
Australia to be a periodic assertion of power when other mechanisms for addressing state 
39 R. G. Neale, "New States Movement," The Australian Quarterly 22:3 (1950): 12-13, 20, 22. 
40 Thomas Musgrave, "The Western Australian Secessionist Movement," Macquarie Law Journal 3 (2003): 99-
100, 105-7. 
41 Edward Watt, "Secession in Western Australia," University Studies in Western Australian History 3 (1958): 
82-83, Edward Watt, "Western Separation: The History of the Secession Movement in Western Australia, 1918-
1935" (MA diss., University of Western Australia, 1957). 
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inequities had failed.42
 
 Whilst these authors agreed that the Depression played a role in 
stirring up the population, they stressed that the secessionist sentiment underlying it was 
genuine. 
Other studies have argued that animosity towards the Federal and New South Wales Labor 
governments was the main factor in arousing secessionist sentiment. Lloyd considered the 
New England and Riverina Movements and the Dominion League as little different from 
other mass conservative movements. For example, the Dominion League ‘dominated populist 
sentiment in West Australia, channelling it into resentment against the Commonwealth, and 
away from the anti-party and sane finance preoccupations of the eastern states.’43 Sherry 
Morris claimed that the Depression, and in particular Jack Lang, were the main trigger that 
led to the Riverina Movement, which in turn brought long-running grievances against city 
dominance to the forefront.44 F. R. Beasley argued that most who voted for secession in the 
Western Australian referendum in 1933 did so as a protest against the federal government 
rather than out of a genuine desire to secede.45
 
 These scholars suggest that secessionist 
sentiment was more of a symptom than a cause of these movements. 
The New England and Riverina Movements differed starkly in their approach to the New 
South Wales political establishment, with the latter adopting a populist and combative 
ideological style that was similar to that of the four movements with which this thesis is 
concerned. Aitkin demonstrated that, whilst the New England Movement and the Country 
Party were closely intertwined from the outset, the Riverina Movement formed independently 
                                                     
42 Harry H. Hiller, "Secession in Western Australia: A Continuing Phenomenon?," Australian Quarterly 59:2 
(1987), 231-2. 
43 Lloyd, "The Formation and Development of the U.A.P.," 58-62. 
44 Sherry Morris, Wagga Wagga: A History  (Wagga: The Council of the City of Wagga Wagga, 1999), 178. 
45 F. R. Beasley, "The Secession Movement in Western Australia," The Australian Quarterly 8 (1936): 31-32. 
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of the Party and often clashed with it.46 Similarly, Peter Tuziak argued that the Riverina 
Movement often acted against the wishes of the Country Party, unlike the more closely 
aligned New England Movement.47 Ellis argued that the Riverina Movement was driven by 
‘a fierce crusading ideal and confusion concerning practical objectives’: it believed that it 
would succeed in dealing with the Depression where parliaments, governments and political 
parties had failed.48 James Logan agreed that the fierce anti-party rhetoric of Riverina 
Movement leader Charles Hardy, which was directed against both the Labor and Country 
Parties, provoked the greatest criticism from the New England Movement.49 W. A. Beveridge 
claimed that the ideological vagueness of the Riverina Movement gained it the support of a 
wide variety of people who wanted to ‘do something’ to combat the Depression.50
 
 
The Great Depression also saw a massive surge in interest in monetary reform. Douglas 
social credit was by far the most popular monetary reform ideology during the Depression. 
Despite this fact, the history of social credit in Australasia prior to World War Two has 
attracted little scholarly attention. Baiba Berzins and Richard Brockett provide the only 
analyses of Australian social credit during its formative years in the 1920s, which was 
typically carried out by ‘one-man exponent[s]’ in different parts of the country.51
                                                     
46 Aitkin, The Country Party in New South Wales, 31. 
 Renewed 
interest in social credit during the Depression resulted in the establishment of Douglas social 
47 Peter Tuziak, "Riverina Awake! A History of the Riverina Movement" (BA Hons diss., University of Sydney, 
1990), 63-65. 
48 Ellis, The Country Party, 141; Ellis, A Pen in Politics, 177. 
49 James Logan, "Re-Examining Senator Charles Hardy's Role in Coordinating the Country Protest Movements in 
Nsw in the 1930s," The Page Review 1:2 (2005): 22. 
50 W. A. Beveridge, "The Riverina Movement and Charles Hardy" (BA Hons diss., University of Sydney, 1954), 2-
3, 13, 60. 
51 Richard Brockett, "Douglas Social Credit in Queensland 1929-1939" (BA Hons diss., University of Queensland, 
1993), 15-16. 
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credit associations in each of the state capitals by the end of 1932.52 It was predominantly an 
urban movement until the end of 1934, with fifty-five percent of the Queensland branch 
being comprised of businessmen, professionals, tradesmen and labourers.53 In contrast, Robin 
Clifton demonstrated that the supporters of the Douglas social credit movement in New 
Zealand were rurally based, and were dominated by the Auckland branch of the Farmers’ 
Union from late 1933. Like its Australian counterpart, the Douglas social credit movement 
grew out of regional study circles in the early 1930s before forming a national movement in 
January 1933.54 Clifton also suggested that the dramatic growth of the Douglas social credit 
movement led the New Zealand Legion, one of the movements with which this thesis is 
concerned, to adopt elements of monetary reform into its policy.55 The belief in a secret cabal 
of Jewish financiers became more central to social credit on both sides of the Tasman as the 
thirties progressed.56
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Consideration of the works discussed above suggests that mass conservative movements in 
Australia and New Zealand during the Depression could be usefully categorised as falling 
into four categories: paramilitarist, secessionist, monetary reformist, and what this thesis will 
refer to as the ‘citizens’ movements’. This distinction is intended as a useful heuristic device 
rather than as a rigid taxonomic typology: few movements fell within a single category, and 
some of the ideas they espoused – especially those of the monetary reformists – found a 
                                                     
52 Baiba Berzins, "The Social Credit Movement in Australia to 1940" (MA diss., University of New South Wales, 
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willing home on the left of the political spectrum as well. The New Guard, Old Guard, and 
League of National Security were all distinguishable primarily by their paramilitarism, 
although the latter two preferred secrecy to the openly public and confrontational approach of 
the New Guard. Similarly, the Dominion League of Western Australia and the Riverina and 
New England Movements were all distinguishable by their secessionism despite the differing 
levels of government which they targeted. Douglas social creditors comprised the loudest and 
most numerous of the monetary reformists, although there was a wide variety of individuals 
and movements within this category. 
 
The Citizens’ League of South Australia, the Australian Citizens’ League, the All for 
Australia League, and the New Zealand Legion do not fit neatly within any of the three 
categories described above. They shared the populist and idealistic flavour of the New Guard 
and the Riverina Movement, but they lacked their paramilitaristic and secessionist 
predispositions. Their primary occupation, as they saw it, was to transform the nation’s 
moribund political apparatus by mobilizing the citizenry toward greater democratic 
participation. For ease of reference, this thesis will use the term ‘citizens’ movements’ to 
refer solely to the four movements that are the subject of this study. This is not intended as an 
attempt to enforce artificial labels or divisions upon contemporary participants who would 
not have made such distinctions. Typically speaking, the participants themselves applied the 
term ‘citizens’ movement’ to a wide variety of groups.57
                                                     
57 The broadest use of the term came during a conference of 17 ‘Commonwealth citizens’ movements’ held by 
the Citizens’ League of South Australia in April 1931; see Report of Executive Committee presented at Third 
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for the sake of analytical clarity: by using the term ‘citizens’ movement’ to refer exclusively 
to the Citizens’ League of South Australia, the Australian Citizens’ League, the All for 
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Australia League, and the New Zealand Legion, this thesis can rhetorically differentiate them 
from the broader body of mass conservative mobilisation. In addition, it should be noted that 
the Australian Citizens’ League amalgamated with the All for Australia League on 4 March 
1931 and adopted its name and its platform.58
 
 Nevertheless, this thesis will continue to use 
the term ‘Australian Citizens’ League’ to distinguish the Victorian movement from its New 
South Wales counterpart. This will facilitate the analysis of any differences that remained 
between the two movements despite their nominal merger. 
This thesis approaches the four citizens’ movements from a comparative, and occasionally a 
cross-national, perspective. The distinction between comparative and cross-national analysis 
is drawn from Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor’s analysis: 
 
Comparative history is seemingly concerned with similarities and differences; 
in explaining a given phenomenon, it asks which conditions, or factors, were 
broadly shared, and which were distinctive … [C]ross-national histories 
follow topics beyond national boundaries. They seek to understand reciprocal 
influences, as well as the ways in which the act of transplantation itself 
changes the topic under study.59
 
 
Michael Miller added that the two are ‘complementary rather than competing methods of 
writing multinational history’. However, he argued that cross-national histories ‘reach beyond 
what could be accomplished through comparative history alone’ due to their ability to 
highlight the causative links between the phenomena being compared.60
                                                     
58 Sydney Morning Herald, 5 March 1931, 10. 
 Both can be broadly 
summarised under the heading of trans-national history, a field within the historical discipline 
that seeks to transcend the use of the nation-state as the standard unit for historical analysis. 
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The notion of the ‘Tasman world’ is central to the comparative and cross-national component 
of this thesis. This ‘Australasian’ worldview, which dominated political, cultural and 
economic exchanges between the seven Antipodean colonies in the nineteenth century, has 
been the subject of a resurgence in scholarly interest in recent years.61 Scholars such as 
Donald Denoon, Peter Hempenstall, Philippa Mein Smith, Miles Fairburn, Ian McGibbon and 
Gary Hawke have argued that the ties of this ‘Tasman world’ did not end with the decision of 
the six Australian colonies to federate in 1901; rather, they continued to grow and develop in 
less recognised ways including state experimentation, trade relations, defence policy, people 
movement, and print culture.62 The sharing of working class ideas and strategies across the 
Tasman, and throughout the Anglo world, has been the subject of a particularly robust 
historiography, with one prominent example being the 2008 trans-Tasman issue of Labour 
History.63
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wing ideas and movements, and the scattered subject material of these works reveals that 
there is much fertile ground to be covered.64
 
 Whilst this thesis cannot claim to be truly trans-
national in focus, it does examine where ideas travelled across national boundaries, 
particularly within an imperial and trans-Tasman context. However, its primary focus is 
comparative, and it will assess the similarities, differences, and links between the four 
citizens’ movements and identify the causal relationships between them. 
Despite this trans-Tasman focus, this thesis does not devote equal amounts of space to 
Australia and New Zealand. Rather, space has been roughly divided amongst the four 
citizens’ movements. Since three of the movements were located in Australian states, this has 
resulted in parts of this thesis being heavily weighted towards Australia. However, coverage 
has been more evenly divided between Australia and New Zealand where particular points of 
analysis have revealed crucial national distinctions. Chapters five and six, for example, show 
the unique challenges faced by the Australian and New Zealand citizens’ movements in 
dealing with the contradictions between reactionary and radical ideas. 
 
Whilst this thesis is concerned primarily with the four citizens’ movements outlined above, it 
also explores where these movements intersected with the wider body of mass conservative 
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mobilisation during the Depression. It is particularly concerned with two elements of this 
intersection: the methods by which ideas were shared between different movements and 
regions and, conversely, the factors that prevented the adoption of ideas within specific 
movements and regions. The importance of this subject is reinforced by the geographical 
limitations of the four citizens’ movements themselves: they existed in South Australia, 
Victoria, New South Wales, and New Zealand, yet no citizens’ movements arose in 
Queensland, Tasmania, the Northern Territory, or the Australian Capital Territory. This thesis 
aims to determine why this was the case by comparing the factors that allowed the four 
citizens’ movements to achieve a mass membership. Similarly, this thesis will explore 
whether secessionist movements inhibited the spread of the citizens’ movements into 
Western Australia and rural New South Wales. It will also analyse how the citizens’ 
movements approached the subject of paramilitary preparations, paying particular attention to 
the influence of existing paramilitary movements such as the New Guard. 
 
This thesis has relied heavily on sources produced by, or which report upon, the four citizens’ 
movements themselves. Since attracting a mass membership was one of their core aims, the 
movements produced a large amount of propaganda in the form of pamphlets, booklets, 
circulars, notes to speakers, and letters to newspapers. In the case of the New Zealand Legion 
and the All for Australia League, this ephemeral material culminated in the issuing of official 
platforms.65 In contrast, the Citizens’ League of South Australia did not release its first 
platform until 1932, which was subject to several modifications over the next two years as it 
considered reconstituting itself as an independent ‘Citizens’ Party’.66
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66 Meeting of a Special Sub-Committee appointed to draft proposed policy, 18 January 1932, box 1 item 3; 
Broadcast speech by Mr. W. Queale from Station 5AD, 22 February 1932, box 3 item 27; Minutes of Executive 
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movements were also the subject of regular newspaper coverage, which provides useful 
information concerning meetings, speeches, and the names of important members. This 
combined body of material demonstrates the issues that were of importance to the movements 
and the political-rhetorical style they utilised to express them. It also demonstrates the 
worldview through which they judged the legitimacy of various political beliefs. 
 
Propagandist material, by its very nature, obscures or distorts the truth through the lens of its 
authors’ self-perceptions. Movements such as those under analysis in this thesis could 
carefully and meticulously select and rehearse the image they project without revealing their 
true motivations and influences. Newspaper coverage can provide a counterbalance through 
its use of damaging exposes, but these can be as biased as the uncritical praise that newspaper 
editors often lavished on the citizens’ movements. This thesis will therefore counterbalance 
the movements’ public faces with their internal dynamics and the inherent contradictions they 
sought to contain. Fortunately, samples of internal material have survived for the New 
Zealand Legion and the All for Australia and Australian Citizens’ Leagues. In contrast to 
these partially complete and often peripherally-centred collections, the extensive papers of 
the executive of the Citizens’ League of South Australia were bequeathed to the National 
Library of Australia by the movement’s founder and general secretary, Edward Daniel 
Alexander Bagot, in 1965. The deliberate preservation of these records for public use raises 
the possibility of retrospective editing; however, the occasionally unflattering portrayal of 
Bagot suggests that the collection was not altered before being donated.67
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be further augmented by the records of other mass conservative movements that arose during 
the Depression, as well as those of various right-wing groups that preceded them in earlier 
decades. 
 
Government papers play an important part in assessing the internal dynamics of the citizens’ 
movements. For example, the author utilised the intelligence records of the Commonwealth 
Investigation Branch in Australia and the Defence and Police Departments in New Zealand to 
explore whether any of the citizens’ movements assumed a paramilitary or special 
constabulary function. The papers of conservative politicians Joseph Lyons and John Latham 
also shed light on the role the Australian citizens’ movements played in the formation of the 
United Australia Party. However, as Moore argued, government records should not be treated 
as sacrosanct – politicians have their own agendas, which in this case included redirecting the 
radical energies of the citizens’ movements towards their own electoral ends.68
 
 Despite this 
agenda – or perhaps because of it – Lyons and Latham were very frank when discussing the 
danger that the citizens’ movements posed to the tenuous unity they were building amongst 
non-labour forces. This provides invaluable insight into the relationship between the 
Australian citizens’ movements and the conservative mainstream. 
This ideas-based approach is complemented with a quantitative analysis of the citizens’ 
movements’ geographical distribution and membership. All of the original data used in these 
analyses is preserved in appendices A and B, which are included on the CD inside the back 
cover of this thesis. Geographical data was gathered from a number of sources including 
internal correspondence and distribution lists, official movement pamphlets, and newspaper 
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reports on the inaugural meetings of new branches. There are several shortcomings with this 
data, chief amongst which is that no full, definitive branch list has survived for any of the 
citizens’ movements. This is unsurprising given that they were in a constant state of flux; new 
branches appeared all the time, old branches faded away or were absorbed into others, and 
the level of sustained activity varied dramatically from branch to branch. However, such 
branch lists as have been compiled utilised the most complete source material that could be 
found, and can be taken as reasonably reliable indicators of the geographical distribution of 
each movement. The exception is the New Zealand Legion, for which only a regional list for 
Otago could be found. Any conclusions drawn by this thesis will reflect the limited nature of 
the geographical data on the Legion whilst identifying any common themes amongst the four 
movements that might be extrapolated and applied in the New Zealand context. 
 
The membership analysis has assessed the variables of occupation, age, and military history. 
Pragmatically speaking, these three variables were the easiest to obtain, whereas others such 
as religious affiliation and education proved too elusive or time-consuming to track down. 
Some qualitative information has been found on the religious affiliation and education of 
leading figures in the citizens’ movements, and the dominance of Protestantism amongst 
white individuals of Anglo-Saxon origin in Australia and New Zealand suggests that the 
religious makeup of the movements was fairly homogenous.69
                                                     
69 Ian Breward, "Protestantism in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania to the Present Day," in The Blackwell 
Companion to Protestantism, ed. A. E. McGrath and D. C. Marks (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 232-8. 
 More importantly, the ‘triad’ 
of occupation, age and military history enables detailed conclusions to be drawn regarding 
the structural composition of the citizens’ movements. Occupation and age provide important 
information on whether the movements achieved the cross-class unity they desired, whilst the 
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presence or absence of an ex-serviceman contingent is pertinent given the proximity of the 
events in question to the Great War. 
 
This thesis also utilises both quantitative and qualitative information to draw some tentative 
conclusions regarding gender and the citizens’ movements. Despite women playing a 
significant role within these admittedly male-dominated movements, gender analysis is 
almost entirely absent from the historiography.70
 
 This thesis will compare the ratios of male-
to-female members at the various levels of organisation, the relative ages of women in 
comparison to men, and any special provisions made to encourage female leaders. The ways 
in which women, femininity and gender roles were portrayed by the movements, and the 
rhetoric used by prominent female members, will also be analysed. This analysis will be 
informed by the women’s Empire movements that arose in the late nineteenth century and the 
ways in which liberal women participated in the political process during the first post-
suffrage generation in Australia and New Zealand. It is worth noting that this analysis is 
brief, and that there is much room for fresh research regarding gender and mass conservative 
mobilisation. 
Finally, this thesis attempts to position the citizens’ movements, both ideologically and 
structurally, in relation to broader trends of political thought. Two trends in particular are 
woven throughout this thesis: conservatism and populism. The evolution of conservatism in 
the Australasian context is the subject of chapter one, and serves as a foundation for 
determining the extent to which the citizens’ movements veered away from standard 
reactionary fare towards the radical. Populism, in its broadest sense, can be understood by its 
                                                     
70 The exception is Elizabeth Ward’s brief treatment of women in the New Zealand Legion; see Ward, "The 
New Zealand Legion in Manawatu-Wanganui," 21. 
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etymology – a belief system which stakes its legitimacy upon a real or perceived direct 
relationship with the populace. Its central legitimating factor is ‘the people’, a community or 
‘heartland’ of individuals who, according to Paul Taggart, are considered as constituting a 
unified and homogenous population.71 Arrayed against this unified population are the 
uncaring and compromising political ‘elites’ whose self-serving political tactics have 
alienated them from the people and brought traditional community values under increasing 
threat.72 But populism is about more than gaining (or regaining) control of the political 
apparatus from the insidious ‘other’: it is, as Francisco Panizza argues, ‘a journey of 
sacrifice’ carried out in the face of a looming crisis.73 It possesses ‘the revivalist flavour of a 
movement’ and ‘the tendency for heightened emotions to be framed on a charismatic leader’, 
according to Margaret Canovan.74
 
 Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell have suggested 
the following succinct definition: 
[Populism is] an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people 
against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who were together depicted as 
depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, 
values, prosperity, identity, and voice.75
 
 
The different ways in which this populist tendency manifested within the citizens’ 
movements, and how they contributed to the movements’ radicalism, are explored throughout 
this thesis. Other broader trends, such as fascism and the growth of novel economic theories 
such as proto-Keynesian thought and monetary reform, are also discussed at varying points.  
 
                                                     
71 Paul Taggart, Populism  (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 95. 
72 Margaret Canovan, "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy," Political Studies 47:1 
(1999): 2-16. 
73 Francisco Panizza, Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (London: Verso, 2005), 23. 
74 Canovan, "Trust the People!" 6. 
75 Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, "Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre," in Twenty-First 
Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, ed. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3. 
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CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organised in both a thematic and a chronological fashion. Chapter one examines 
the history of Australasian conservatism from the late nineteenth century until the onset of the 
Depression. It explores the divided nature of this evolving conservatism through the lens of 
economic fractions within the capitalist class. This chapter also examines the rise of ‘non-
party’ political leagues, the key ideas and tropes which they drew upon and the way that they 
evolved over time in response to domestic and international events. Chapter two considers the 
effects of the Depression on this collection of right-wing ideas and movements. It examines 
the ways that mainstream conservatives became radicalised by the economic crisis and 
directed their frustrations against political parties and their extra-parliamentary ‘machines’. 
The rise of alternative economic theories in New Zealand, in particular monetary reformism, 
is also discussed. This chapter concludes by discussing the birth of the four citizens’ 
movements at the apex of this process of conservative radicalisation. 
 
Chapters three and four analyse the elements that distinguished the citizens’ movements from 
other forms of right-wing organisation. It is these chapters that most clearly distinguish the 
approach taken in this thesis from other major studies of the citizens’ movements, in 
particular Pugh’s thesis on the New Zealand Legion. Chapter three discusses the 
organisational and promotional techniques that the citizens’ movements used to generate a 
lasting sense of enthusiasm, engagement and belonging. This culture of mass conservative 
mobilisation was deliberately spread across Australia, and this chapter explores both the 
geographical extent of that spread and the areas in which the citizens’ movement ideology 
failed to take hold. The types of individuals who joined the movements, and their motivations 
for doing so, are also demonstrated in this chapter. Ideology also played a part in securing a 
mass membership, and chapter four analyses the populist blend of reactionary and radical 
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ideals that the citizens’ movements espoused in order to draw upon the widespread 
conservative discontent caused by the Depression. 
 
Populism could only conceal the inherent contradictions between reactionary and radical 
ideals for so long before the fractures came to the surface. Chapters five and six show how 
these fractures became apparent in Australia and New Zealand respectively. In chapter five, 
the relationship between the Australian citizens’ movements and a revitalised mainstream 
conservative opposition party is examined. In particular, it outlines the ways that the 
movements negotiated the divide between anti-party purity and the political expediency that 
was required for them to cooperate with mainstream conservatives in presenting a united 
electoral front. In contrast, chapter six examines the influence of unorthodox economic ideas 
such as proto-Keynesianism and monetary reform on the New Zealand Legion and the 
contradictions that this exposed with the more standard conservative dicta regarding 
economics and the state. In both of these chapters, the role of the differing contradictions in 
the decline of the citizens’ movements is assessed. The conclusion reflects on the significance 
of this mass conservative mobilisation to the understudied history of the right in the Tasman 
world. It suggests that the citizens’ movements played an important transition role in both the 
radical right tradition as well as the consolidation of the post-war mainstream conservative 
factions in the form of the Liberal and National Parties. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CONSTRUCTING THE CITIZEN: THE EVOLUTION OF 
CONSERVATISM AND ‘NON-PARTY’ ORGANISATION IN 
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, 1880-1929 
 
The Constitutional Association aims at setting up in Australia the highest 
standards of citizenship. It appeals particularly to younger men to interest 
themselves in public affairs and thereby to fit themselves for the 
responsibilities of citizenship in a democratic community. It is a political but 
not a partisan body. Its members are encouraged to join and work for political 
organisations. They retain complete political independence, and may work for 
what party they choose ... It is searching for men who will subordinate their 
own personal interests or inclinations to the common welfare, the 
“Commonwealth.”1
 
 
When the conservative discussion group known as the Constitutional Association of New 
South Wales published its membership rules in March 1931, it prefaced them with the above 
overarching statement of purpose. The Association, it argued, was aimed at promoting the 
ideals of good citizenship by encouraging individuals to educate themselves about the 
political process. In order to ensure a well-rounded and unbiased educational experience, the 
Association claimed to provide an impartial, non-party environment where the ‘personal 
interests’ of individuals and political parties would be subordinated to the ‘common welfare’. 
Taken at face value, these words appeared to offer something for everybody – however, 
beneath the apolitical veneer, the Constitutional Association was part of a long-standing 
conservative tradition that presented right-wing ideas on politics, society and the economy as 
unbiased, common sense values that lay outside the realm of political contestation. This 
chapter explores the evolution of that conservative tradition. It outlines the history of 
conservatism in the Tasman world from the late nineteenth century until the onset of the 
                                                     
1 The Constitutional Association of New South Wales (Sydney: W. C. Penfold & Co., 1931), 1. 
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Depression through its ideological and structural changes and the growth of various right-
wing ‘non-party’ leagues that expanded the reach of conservatism beyond the boundaries of 
parliament. This conservative tradition, as subsequent chapters will show, would form the 
ideological foundation upon which the citizens’ movements built. 
 
DEFINING CONSERVATISM IN THE AUSTRALASIAN CONTEXT 
Since this thesis argues that the citizens’ movements were a form of mass conservative 
mobilisation, it requires a definition of conservatism in the Australasian context. However, 
conservatism is a diverse and multi-faceted ideology that is applicable across a wide variety 
of locations, time periods, and historical contexts. If, as its etymology suggests, its aim is to 
‘conserve’ something, the question then emerges as to what behaviours and institutions it is 
intended to conserve. This section approaches the problem in two ways. Firstly, it engages 
with the studies that problematise attempts to apply nineteenth century British understandings 
of the terms ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ directly to the Tasman world. Secondly, it settles on 
a flexible minimum definition of conservatism in order to chart the ways it evolved in 
Australia and New Zealand in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 
Whilst the roots of conservative thought can be traced to the English Restoration period, it 
first evolved into a coherent body of thought largely in response to the wave of anti-
monarchist revolutions that began in the late eighteenth century. As Karl Mannheim put it, 
conservatives subscribed to a society that was hierarchical in nature, where political and 
economic power resided with the monarch and the Church, and the landed gentry provided 
for the lower classes through the customs of noblesse oblige. They believed that individual 
liberties were the inheritance of centuries of gradual constitutional reform, and rejected 
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Lockean notions of social contracts and inalienable rights.2
 
 Edmund Burke, typically 
regarded as one of the founders of British conservatism, believed this respect for tradition 
was a vital check against the radical republicanism that was sweeping Europe at the end of 
the eighteenth century: 
[W]hat is liberty without wisdom and without virtue? It is the greatest of all 
possible evils; for it is folly, vice, and madness, without tuition or restraint. 
Those who know what virtuous liberty is cannot bear to see it disgraced by 
incapable heads on account of their having high-sounding words in their 
mouths.3
 
 
This opposition to the increasing democratisation of political and economic power was 
partially in response to an emerging capitalist class whose growing commercial and industrial 
wealth was perceived as a threat to the landed wealth of the aristocracy.4
 
 Part of this threat 
came from the Liberal Party, which represented an alliance of reformist Whigs and radical 
republicans. The Liberals called for greater personal freedoms, increased or universal male 
suffrage, limited Crown and church authority, and free trade. The term ‘liberalism’ 
subsequently became associated with a wide range of international movements and 
governments in the nineteenth century, particularly in the Western world, which viewed free 
trade and personal liberty as the key to a new egalitarian order. In particular, the doctrine of 
free trade became so pervasive that British conservatives also adopted it in the 1850s. 
Several difficulties arise when attempting to apply these definitions of ‘conservative’ and 
‘liberal’ to the nineteenth century Australasian context. The first is that, unlike Britain, 
Australia and New Zealand were new European settlements that lacked an ancien régime 
                                                     
2 Karl Mannheim, Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. David Kettler et al. (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 102-10. 
3 Edmund Burke, "Reflections on the Revolution in France,"  Constitution Society, 
http://www.constitution.org/eb/rev_fran.htm. 
4 Robert Eccleshall, English Conservatism since the Restoration: An Introduction and Anthology  (Lodon: Unwin 
Hyman, 1990), 79-80. 
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seeking to preserve hereditary or landed power. As Jim McAloon and Kenneth Buckley 
demonstrated, the colonial upper class were typically of humble origins. They had 
accumulated their wealth by arriving fortuitously early in the process of European settlement 
to amass large estates for primary production, or they had provided vital financial and 
marketing services to these burgeoning agricultural enterprises.5 Rather than a Wakefieldian 
cross-class transplantation, the colonial upper class more closely resembled the growing 
middle class that had pushed for electoral reform in Britain in the 1840s. One exception was 
New South Wales which, as Gregory Melleuish highlighted, possessed an ageing generation 
of landed elites by the 1850s who had played a key role in the political foundation of the 
colony.6
 
 
The new Australasian colonies also lacked the commitment to laissez-faire shared by British 
conservatives and liberals. Noel Butlin and Michael Bassett argued that Australasian 
governments were heavily involved in economic activity from the outset of European 
colonisation. This originally served a pragmatic purpose: colonial enterprise was simply too 
underdeveloped, and the accumulation of private capital was too slow, to provide essential 
services to the market. As colonial primary industries expanded, state involvement in the 
economy likewise expanded to incentivise these industries: railways, roads, postal services, 
immigration schemes, communication technologies and port facilities were all developed to 
service primary industry, and public investment in agricultural technologies such as 
fertilisers, pesticides and refrigeration, as well as the virtual state monopoly on the 
expropriation of land from indigenous communities, encouraged the increased cultivation of 
                                                     
5 Jim McAloon, No Idle Rich: The Wealthy in Canterbury and Otago, 1840-1914  (Dunedin: University of Otago 
Press, 2002), 171-82; Ken Buckley, "Primary Accumulation: The Genesis of Australian Capitalism," in Essays in 
the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism, ed. E. L. Wheelwright and Ken Buckley (Brookvale: Australia & 
New Zealand Book Company, 1975), 12-32. 
6 Gregory Melleuish, A Short History of Australian Liberalism  (St Leonards: The Centre for Independent 
Studies, 2001), 1. 
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land by settlers.7 Butlin famously called this ‘colonial socialism’, whilst James Belich used 
the term ‘progressive colonisation’.8
 
 This national development ethos overrode laissez-faire 
tensions between public and private enterprise, so long as the interests of the two converged. 
The label ‘conservative’ was seldom used in nineteenth century Australia and New Zealand. 
Leading politicians and political thinkers of all colours tended to consider themselves 
‘liberals’ or ‘progressives’, reflecting their desire to build what Belich termed ‘better 
Britains’ in the south seas.9 Ownership of these terms became particularly contentious with 
the emergence of two self-styled liberal political factions at the end of the nineteenth century 
– the Deakinite liberals in Victoria, and the New Zealand Liberal Party. These fell broadly 
within the emerging tradition of ‘social liberalism’: they believed the state should play a more 
active role in providing social welfare, mediating class conflict, and redistributing wealth by 
breaking up the vast tracts of land held by graziers and speculators.10
                                                     
7 Noel G. Butlin, Investment in Australian Economic Development, 1861-1900  (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1964); Michael Bassett, The State in New Zealand  (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998). See also 
G. R. Hawke, The Making of New Zealand: An Economic History  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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 Deakinite liberalism 
was also defined by its adherence to protectionism, which had become prominent in Victorian 
politics after the gold rushes as a means by which to provide employment for the colony’s 
8 Noel G. Butlin, "Colonial Socialism in Australia, 1860-1900," in The State and Economic Growth, ed. Hugh 
Aitken (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1959), 26-78; James Belich, Making Peoples: A History of 
the New Zealanders from Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century  (Auckland: Penguin 
Press, 1996), 375. 
9 Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000  (Auckland: 
Penguin Press, 2001). 
10 Tim Rowse, Australian Liberalism and National Character (Melbourne: Kibble Books, 1978); Stuart 
Macintyre, A Colonial Liberalism: The Lost World of Three Victorian Visionaries (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 1991); David Hamer, The New Zealand Liberals: The Years of Power, 1891-1912  (Auckland: Auckland 
University Press, 1988); Keith Sinclair, "The Legislation of the Liberal Party, 1891-1898," in Ends and Means in 
New Zealand Politics, ed. Robert Chapman (Auckland: Dobbie Press, 1961), 11-17; Robert Chapman, "The 
Decline of the Liberals," in Ends and Means in New Zealand Politics, ed. Robert Chapman (Auckland: Dobbie 
Press, 1961), 18-24. According to Marian Sawer, social liberals believed in ‘state intervention that increased 
rather than reduced liberty … [and] that the “real freedom” of the individual could only be achieved through 
identification with a collective will oriented to the common good’. See Marian Sawer, The Ethical State? Social 
Liberalism in Australia  (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003), 57. 
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large population.11 The resurgence of neoliberalism in recent years has further politicised the 
ownership of the ‘liberal’ tradition. Australian academics and commentators such as 
Melleuish and Paul Kelly have sought to reclaim the mantle of liberalism for free trade 
politicians and theorists such as George Reid and Bruce Smith.12 Melleuish is particularly 
critical of Deakinite liberals for having lambasted their free trade opponents as 
‘conservatives’.13
 
 
Despite these difficulties, a convenient minimum definition of conservatism can be found by 
defining it in relation to the status quo. Hayden White’s analysis of the implicit biases and 
subjectivities that underlie the writing of history are useful here. Building upon Mannheim’s 
analysis of ideology, White suggested that conservatives are ‘suspicious of programmatic 
transformations of the status quo’ and ‘inclined to imagine historical evolution as a 
progressive elaboration of the institutional structure that currently prevails, which structure 
they regard as a “utopia”’. Rather than opposing change entirely, conservatives envision it as 
occurring via ‘plantlike gradualizations’ that do not fundamentally alter or challenge the 
‘structural relationships’ upon which society is based.14
                                                     
11 Brett, Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class, 20-21; A. J. Reitsma, Trade Protection in Australia  
(Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1960), 7; W. A. Sinclair, The Process of Economic Development in 
Australia (Melbourne: Cheshire Publishing, 1976), 94-95; Andrew Leigh, "Trade Liberalisation and the 
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Australian Politics, ed. Graeme Duncan (Melbourne: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1978), 54-55. 
 Whilst this may seem to strip the 
term ‘conservative’ of any comparative or analytic value, it is actually an acknowledgement 
that conservatism is neither static nor universal. Rather, it is a sentiment, a framework for 
12 See for example Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty: Power, Politics, and Business in Australia  (St Leonards: 
Allen & Unwin, 1994); Gregory Melleuish, Cultural Liberalism in Australia  (Cambridge: Cambrdge University 
Press, 1995). 
13 Melleuish, A Short History of Australian Liberalism, vii; Melleuish, "Australian Liberalism," in Liberalism and 
the Austranlian Federatio, ed. J. R. Nethercote (Riverwood: Federation Press, 2001), 28-41. 
14 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe  (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1973), 22-25; Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology 
of Knowledge  (New York: Harcourt, 1946), 104. 
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mediating change through the guidelines of tradition, which varies by region, timeframe, and 
above all historical context. 
 
Australasian conservatism in the nineteenth century, then, can be understood emphasizing 
two main concerns: preserving the large landed estates of the upper class from radical land 
reform, and mitigating the effects of the expanding franchise. The question of land reform, 
perhaps the major political issue in the second half of the nineteenth century, was resolved by 
the passing of legislation in each country that was intended to break up large estates for closer 
settlement.15
 
 The question of the franchise, and the potential impact of the radical demands 
that the newly enfranchised might have on the state, had a much more transformative and 
long-lasting effect on conservative ideology in Australasia. 
CONSTRUCTIVE CITIZENSHIP AND ‘NON-PARTY’ POLITICAL LANGUAGE 
Conservatism evolved two intertwined ideas in the late nineteenth century to contain the 
threat posed by the expanding electorate – the ‘citizen’ and ‘non-party’. These two ideas 
became central to how conservatives defined themselves in the first half of the twentieth 
century, and were a vital component of the mass conservative movements that arose during 
the Depression. Intertwined with the development and usage of ‘citizen’ and ‘non-party’ were 
words and phrases like ‘Empire’, ‘nation’, ‘liberty’, and ‘British tradition’. These ideas 
formed part of a political language used by conservatives to present an image of objective 
reality, but which in reality limited the perceptions of its speakers to the bounds of that 
language. They carried implied meaning for those who understood them, and they provided 
                                                     
15 The success of legislation intended to break up the landed estates is debated; see Stuart Macintyre, A 
Concise History of Australia  (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 96-97; Hamer, The New Zealand 
Liberals, 86-94, 102, 142-3; Sinclair, "The Legislation of the Liberal Party, 1891-1898," 13, 15-17; Steven Eldred-
Grigg, "Whatever Happened to the Gentry? The Large Landowners of Ashburton County, 1890-1896," New 
Zealand Journal of History 11:1 (1977): 3-27. 
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the justification for ostracising or delegitimising those who espoused ideas that were deemed 
to lie outside the bounds of conservative opinion. This language also demonstrated the 
perennial behaviour of conservatives as presenting their ideas and policies as ‘national’ and 
‘non-sectional’ in nature, as opposed to the parochial and self-interested beliefs of their 
opponents. This naturalisation of conservative values was an evolving process, which will be 
highlighted throughout this chapter. 
 
The ‘citizen’ is the staple figure in the rhetoric of most conservative parties and leagues 
within the British Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He or she (most 
typically codified by the patriarchal he) is a figure heavily steeped in the values and traditions 
of British society; he is respectable, genteel, and God-fearing, and he possesses a healthy 
respect for British political institutions and the monarchy. He is economically self-reliant and 
individualistic, and he exercises his political franchise with care and consideration. Charitable 
and good-natured, he is always willing to help those less fortunate than himself – provided 
that they are worthy of that help. In that vein, whilst he may grudgingly accept some forms of 
state pensions or unemployment insurance – especially in the colonies, where a certain degree 
of developmental pragmatism is part of the status quo – he shudders at the thought that the 
state might provide succour those who are unwilling to help themselves. But most 
importantly, he recognises that the rights he enjoys as a citizen come with a responsibility to 
protect and uphold those rights, whether at a community, national, or imperial level. It is only 
by fulfilling this unwritten contract that he can assume the mantle of good citizenship. 
 
The importance of the ‘citizen’ to the evolution of conservatism in the Tasman world cannot 
be overstated. Keith McClelland and Sonya Rose argued that the notion of ‘good citizenship’ 
was unconsciously elucidated by conservatives as a means of addressing the potentially 
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transformative powers of the broadening electorate. By extolling the ‘values of good 
citizenship’, in particular regarding the sense of reciprocal responsibilities with the state, they 
hoped to dampen the electoral demands of the newly enfranchised and undercut popular 
support for radical legislative reforms.16 But defining ‘good citizenship’ was not a top-down 
process enforced by an elite tier of conservative politicians and the bourgeoisie. It was an 
organic response by various political and societal forces to the dramatic transformations of 
the fin de siècle, including churches and religious associations, educationalists, imperialists 
and youth organisations.17 Damen Ward demonstrated how the language of 
‘constitutionalism’ was used by settlers and the press in South Australia and New Zealand to 
justify a variety of political positions.18 This language was expressed most often through 
public meetings, which were a significant form of political ceremony inherited from Britain: 
they followed a standard protocol that involved a series of speeches followed by formal 
resolutions and deputations which were used to convey ‘respectable’ public opinion to 
political officials.19 Constitutionalism was ‘the defining language of political reform in mid-
nineteenth century Australia’ according to Mark McKenna, and it drew on such elements as 
‘balanced government, trial by jury, a free Press, responsible government and the right to 
resist arbitrary rule, tyranny, corruption and patronage, and, if necessary, to threaten 
separation in order to achieve the perceived rights of free-born Britons.’20
                                                     
16 Keith McClelland and Sonya Rose, "Citizenship and Empire, 1867 - 1928," in At Home with the Empire: 
Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World, ed. Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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 Judith Brett argued 
that the term ‘citizenship’ was largely captured by non-labour forces during the twentieth 
17 For a good discussion of the fin de siècle, see Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter, ed. Fin De Siècle and Its Legacy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
18 Damen Ward, "Colonial Communication: Creating Settler Public Opinion in Crown Colony South Australia 
and New Zealand," in Imperial Communication: Australia, Britain, and the British Empire C. 1830-50, ed. Simon 
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19 Ibid., 12-21. 
20 Mark McKenna, "A History for Our Time? The Idea of the People in Australian Democracy," History Compass 
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century and imbued with moral as well as political dimensions. A true citizen served the 
national interest first and foremost, rather than the sectional interests of a particular class or 
creed.21
 
 
An important part of this process was the emergence of a wide variety of right-wing leagues 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These leagues provided an outlet for 
exercising political responsibility through participation in voluntary associations.22 The 
importance of voluntary political participation is demonstrated in the failure of the British 
Royal Colonial Institute to achieve a monopoly over imperial propaganda in the nineteenth 
century. The Institute was founded in 1869 as a centre for imperial and colonial studies. In 
1886 it tried, without success, to unite various right-wing leagues into ‘a great central 
institution for Empire study and propaganda.’ John Mackenzie believed that its failure 
‘prevented imperial propaganda from becoming institutionally ossified’.23
 
 However, more 
fundamentally, it also reflected the importance of voluntary participation as a means of 
exercising political and moral individualism. 
The emphasis on voluntary participation was linked to the second trope of ‘non-party’. If a 
good citizen was meant to exercise his political judgment in a reasoned and unbiased way – 
as the tenets of individualism dictated – he required complete independence from rigid or 
coercive organisational structures that imposed collective rules, behaviours, or ideas. Right-
wing leagues provided one mechanism for this independence: they were a space where 
conservatives of like minds could meet and share ideas, and a means by which those ideas 
                                                     
21 Judith Brett, "Retrieving the Partisan History of Australian Citizenship," Australian Journal of Political Science 
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22 Ibid., 431-4. 
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could be communicated to political representatives and the public in the hopes of effecting 
political or cultural change. At the same time, they preserved the participants from the ‘taint’ 
of politics, replete as it was with the connotations of back-room deals, self-serving motives, 
questionable alliances, nepotism, and above all compromise. By positioning themselves as 
‘non-party’, right-wing leagues established a dichotomic language between themselves and 
the world of politics: their motives were clean and pure, whereas politics was full of the 
selfish and the greedy; their methods were voluntaristic and rational, whilst politicians 
squabbled and bickered amongst themselves; and their ideals were classless and nationally-
focused, unlike the sectarian and parochial policies of parties. Non-party leagues also allowed 
conservatives to exercise their political judgment without challenging the status quo; indeed, 
like an unofficial extra-parliamentary arm of the right, they tended to reinforce conservative 
hegemony by promoting the political, economic and moral values of colonial conservatism. 
This allowed right-wing leagues to present themselves as apolitical, regardless of how fluent 
they were in the political language of conservatism. 
 
The large number of pro-Empire leagues that emerged during the height of imperial fervour 
at the turn of the century were of particular significance in Australia and New Zealand. These 
included the Liberty and Property Defence League, the Primrose League, the Imperial 
Federation League, the British Empire League, the League of the Empire, and the Overseas 
Club.24
                                                     
24 For an overview of the various right-wing leagues that arose in Britain at this time, see Mackenzie, 
Propaganda and Empire, 149-158. 
 These leagues utilised several techniques which became standard practice amongst 
future right-wing leagues. Their memberships were typically based on a small coterie of 
dedicated activists surrounded by a larger circle of affiliates and sympathisers. They 
accomplished their goals through a combination of social functions, public education, the 
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widespread circulation of printed and visual propaganda, and parliamentary lobbying. The 
Liberty and Property Defence League, for example, maintained an ongoing correspondence 
with a Sydney gentleman’s group named the ‘Australian Club’, and its publications were 
widely circulated by booksellers in major cities across the Tasman world.25 The New South 
Wales branch of the British Empire League was instrumental in making Empire Day an 
official national holiday in 1905.26 The League of the Empire established branches in 
Tasmania, South Australia and New Zealand by 1904.27 Its main aim was to foster imperial 
sentiment through education, which it did through a series of colonial conferences in London 
from 1907. It also produced a series of textbooks and atlases for use in elementary and 
secondary schools, and established a ‘Comrades Correspondence Branch’ which facilitated 
connections between 30000 students across the Empire.28
 
 
Women’s Empire leagues played an important part in the propagation of imperial sentiment. 
The Victoria League, which was founded in London in April 1901, was the most prominent 
in Australia and New Zealand.29
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branches in most Australian states and major New Zealand cities.30 The process of branch 
formation was given a boost by a tour of the Dominions between 1909 and 1911 by London 
League Secretary Meriel Talbot, who stressed the importance of personal ties in binding the 
Empire together.31 This imperial network was important for fostering mutual hospitality: 
headquarters in London regularly entertained visitors from the colonies and introduced them 
to respectable society, whilst the Antipodean branches welcomed immigrants from Britain 
and assisted their transition to colonial life.32 Lantern slide lectures and British literature were 
also distributed to the colonies, and a penpal scheme between British and colonial children 
was established.33
 
 
Women’s Empire leagues practised what Katie Pickles called ‘female imperialism’. This 
employed the gendered role of women in the promotion of the British Empire through 
‘hospitality and socialising in the ‘private’ female world, to the support of immigration and 
education.’34
 
 Apart from being an example of ‘acceptable’ public activity, Empire leagues 
provided an outlet for the political aspirations of newly enfranchised women that had 
previously been limited to temperance movements. Elizabeth van Heyningen and Pat Merrett 
asserted that: 
The war … offered loyalist women the first real opportunity to engage 
themselves politically and to speak out on public platforms without incurring 
male hostility. Not only was an expression of loyalism acceptable; women 
could argue that they brought special womanly gifts to reinforcing the bonds 
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of Empire and healing the wounds of war. They were the peacemakers who 
could ‘calm the troubled spirits and heal the broken hearts’.35
 
 
This focus on moral authority also allowed such leagues to maintain a non-partisan stance 
whilst implicitly reinforcing conservative political and cultural ideals. As Eliza Riedi argued, 
women’s leagues avoided any overt association with political parties and contentious political 
issues. Instead, they focused their efforts on activities that could be considered extensions of 
the ‘domestic sphere’, including a war fund for widows, orphans and soldiers’ graves in 
South Africa, and affiliating with schools to encourage the adoption of an Empire-centric 
school curriculum.36
 
 
The spread of women’s Empire leagues to Australasia intersected with a domestic 
phenomenon which Marian Simms termed ‘conservative feminism’.37 This was partially a 
continuation of the tradition of the women’s suffrage movement, which aimed to organise the 
political energies of diverse women’s organisations and to educate women about politics, 
leadership and public speaking. Conservative women’s organisations such as temperance 
unions played a significant part in this process.38
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Women’s Non-Party Association and the Australian Women’s National League.39 Women’s 
organisations in New Zealand tended to favour more progressive objectives – such as the 
campaign of the Women’s National Council for equal rights in marriage and employment – 
however the Women’s Christian Temperance Union also included a strong conservative 
strand well into the twentieth century.40
 
 Like the women’s Empire leagues, these groups 
sought to channel the energies of newly enfranchised women into ‘acceptable’ avenues that 
did not overtly challenge the status quo. 
Some of the pro-Empire groups that emerged during this period directed their attention 
toward imperial defence. The earliest of these, the Navy League, was the product of the 
‘naval revival’ between 1889 and 1914 that stressed the importance of a strong British Navy 
as both a symbol of national honour and a guarantor of imperial security. The Navy League 
soon spread to Australia and New Zealand through leading businessmen, farmers and ship 
company owners who were keen to promote imperial sentiment and to preserve the security 
of the imperial waterways upon which their export-driven livelihoods depended.41
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land. It was formed in 1901 in response to the lengthy and expensive Boer War to promote 
compulsory military training.42 The National Service League inspired the formation of 
National Defence Leagues in Australia and New Zealand, and the three movements regularly 
traded correspondence and publications.43
 
 
The various Empire leagues provided one of the key channels for the dispersion of 
conservative ideals. Mackenzie described the British groups as ‘middle-class and elitist’, 
whose function was to provide a vehicle ‘by which the committed elite could establish 
contact among themselves’.44 This was also the case in the Tasman world, where the 
predominantly farming, business and professional membership of the leagues often tended to 
overlap. The inaugural executive of the Canterbury Victoria League in 1910, for example, 
contained several current or previous members of the local Navy League executive, including 
prominent lawyer A. E. G. Rhodes.45 The leagues also cooperated with each other wherever 
possible; the Australian British Empire League was recognised as the representative of the 
Victoria League in New South Wales, and Lady Dixson held prominent positions in both 
organisations.46
 
 The ideological continuity provided by the long-standing and overlapping 
membership of the Empire leagues provided the ideological foundation upon which 
subsequent right-wing movements were built. 
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THE RISE OF ‘POPULAR CONSERVATISM’ 
By providing a venue for conservatives to share ideas, the various right-wing leagues of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were also helping to transform the ideological 
and structural nature of conservatism in Australia and New Zealand. This transformation can 
be broadly understood through David Orwin’s models of ‘patrician’ and ‘popular’ 
conservatism. Orwin argued that nineteenth century patrician conservatives survived by 
aligning their interests with middle class liberals in the defence of individualism and property 
against the growing power of organised labour.47
 
 Whilst Orwin’s image of patrician 
conservatives as a British-inspired landed gentry is somewhat antiquated, the consolidation of 
conservative and liberal tendencies into a two-party system in the early twentieth century is 
still a vital part of understanding the evolution of Australasian conservatism. To 
conservatives and liberals alike, the collectivist ideology of organised labour and its 
parliamentary counterparts seemed to threaten the fundamental nature of society: it 
contradicted the basic tenets of economics by undermining the healthy competition and 
individual self-reliance of the market economy. 
The chief vessel of popular conservatism in New Zealand was the Reform Party. It began as a 
loose coalition of individualist and anti-socialist groups in the 1890s including the Farmers’ 
Union, the Political Reform League, and the Primrose League-inspired National 
Association.48
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Massey was quite comfortable with the developmentalist ethos of the nineteenth century.49 At 
the same time the Liberals were entering a period of protracted decline, and a Reform 
government took power in 1912.50 The 1913 great strike furthered the consolidation of 
conservative forces in New Zealand through the cooperation of the state and private 
employers’ and farmers’ in combating the strikers.51 This cemented Reform’s position as the 
dominant party in New Zealand and discredited the Liberals’ concessions to labour. It also 
hardened the lines between the propertied classes and organised labour, the latter of whom 
began to increasingly redirect their energies towards the nascent Labour Party.52
 
 
The consolidation of popular conservatism in Australia commenced with the fusion of both 
liberal and conservative political parties: Deakin’s Protectionists and George Reid’s Free 
Traders. Prior to their merger, the Protectionists favoured alliances with Labor due to their 
shared commitment to state intervention in the economy to further Australian economic 
interests.53
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‘Fusion’, as it became known, are a subject of debate amongst historians. Judith Brett argued 
that the Protectionists became increasingly alienated by the rigid caucus structure and party 
pledges of Labor, whilst Ian Marsh suggested that the growing electoral dominance of Labor 
drove the Protectionists to ally with Free Trade.54 Peter Loveday offered a number of causes 
of Fusion, including the increasing independence of Labor, the popularity of Free Trade’s 
new anti-socialist brand, the decreasing electoral strength of the Protectionists, and the 
vulnerability of their remaining seats to challenge from both sides.55
 
  
The Protectionists may also have been won over by the impressive campaigning abilities of 
right-wing non-party groups. For example, Margaret Fitzherbert highlighted the role that the 
Australian Women’s National League played in promoting the unified anti-Labor cause.56
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One particular organisation which attracted national attention was the Kyabram Reform 
Movement. It arose in Victoria in 1901 on a wave of middle class dissatisfaction with public 
expenditure by the State government and its failure to reduce the number of politicians after 
Federation. When the State Premier refused to accede to their demands, the Kyabram Reform 
Movement embarked upon a massive membership drive in the hopes that its sheer voting 
power could elect a government more inclined to its ideals. By late 1902 it had over ten 
thousand members and two hundred branches across Victoria, as well as the support of the 
State opposition leader. In October 1902 the opposition won a sweeping victory on the back 
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of this mass support and immediately began reducing the numbers in parliament and the 
salaries of public sector employees.57
 
 The dramatic success of the Kyabram Reform 
Movement had a lasting impact on conservative ideology, and would be remembered by the 
citizens’ movements on both sides of the Tasman thirty years later. 
THE GREAT WAR AND THE GREAT ‘OTHER’ 
The Great War helped to solidify the position of popular conservatism by bolstering the 
forces of the political right. One of the ways in which this occurred was the emergence of 
thousands of new patriotic societies and fundraising clubs on both sides of the Tasman. In 
Australia these included the Adelaide Mayor's Patriotic Fund, the St Kilda Patriotic Society, 
and the Young Workers’ Patriotic Guild. Patriotic societies in New Zealand included the 
Wellington War Relief Association, the Canterbury Patriotic Fund, and the Otago and 
Southland Women’s Patriotic Association.58 Their efforts often overlapped with those of the 
pre-war Empire leagues; for example, the Canterbury branch of the Victoria League sent care 
packages to the front and raised money for the purchase of ambulances and machine guns. 
They also directed their resources into soldier rehabilitation and remembrance.59
 
 
The Great War provided these conservatives with something they had previously lacked – a 
single, powerful, and seemingly pervasive enemy in the form of Germany and its expatriate 
citizens. Whilst pre-war conservatives were not averse to levelling criticism against 
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‘socialistic’ policies or ‘foreign’ elements, the ‘German menace’ assumed a central position 
in a way that previous enemies had not by providing an ‘other’ against which they could 
define themselves. For example, Anti-German Leagues in Australia and New Zealand called 
for a boycott of German shops and goods, the removal of government officials and educators 
of German heritage, and the confiscation of German property.60
 
 The rhetoric expressed at 
their public meetings was often heated and vitriolic: 
I have no patience ... with the public man who sympathises with a German 
because his window has been broken (Wild applause.) When I hear of a man 
doing a thing like that my mind runs back to the murderous fumes of France 
and the diabolical outrages of Belgium. … The Germans don't fight fairly; It’s 
not war they are waging – it’s just an instrument of hell to ruin the civilised 
world (Cheers.)61
 
 
This ideological ‘othering’ became a standard which future conservatives would build upon 
and adapt, as they substituted or incorporated new enemies such as Irish Catholicism and 
Sinn Fein, organised labour, and eventually communism. 
 
A Coalition Government organised New Zealand for the war effort by introducing 
conscription under the Military Service Act 1916. This decision, whilst controversial, avoided 
the polarising conscription debates that divided Australia later in the war and helped to 
solidify popular conservatism. However, New Zealand conservatives were given an 
opportunity to share ideas and techniques by attempting to coordinate the efforts of the 
nation’s multitude of patriotic societies. One of the earliest attempts at coordinating the 
several hundred patriotic societies in New Zealand was a proposal put forth by C. P. Skerrett, 
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a prominent Wellington lawyer (and later a Chief Justice), at a conference in September 
1915. His proposal was ultimately rejected because of a clause that required solvent societies 
to contribute to the funding of insolvent ones.62 A subsequent conference called by the 
Minister of Internal Affairs in February 1916 proved more successful, and a Federation of 
New Zealand Patriotic War Relief Societies was created to provide uniformity in the granting 
of relief funds. Each of its constituent patriotic societies nominated a representative to a 
central Advisory Board, which included L. O. H. Tripp, partner of the law firm Chapman and 
Tripp; J. J. Dougall, Commandant of the Canterbury Citizens’ Defence Corps and a member 
of the Navy League; and J. T. Paul, a right-wing Labour politician and a former commander 
of the National Defence League.63 The Society worked solidly throughout the war, and 
continued to dispense its considerable funds on soldier rehabilitation after the armistice.64
 
 
The campaign for national efficiency in New Zealand also brought like-minded conservatives 
together. This campaign arose out of the Great War’s unprecedented demands on New 
Zealand’s manpower and material reserves. In February 1917 the government appointed a 
National Efficiency Board to consider the means for organising the nation’s industries and 
regulating competing demands for military and industrial manpower.65
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the capital’s harbour facilities.66 He was also a member of the Wellington War Relief 
Association executive alongside Federation delegate L. O. H. Tripp.67 Ferguson’s colleagues 
on the Board included prominent businessmen and politicians such as Thomas Moss and J. H. 
Gunson, as well as Dunedin sheepfarmer and longstanding member of the Victorian and 
Navy Leagues, James Begg.68 By June 1917 the Board had produced a detailed list of 
recommendations to government based on its ranking of New Zealand’s industries in terms of 
their ‘essentiality’.69 However, apart from implementing restrictions on the import, 
manufacture and sale of liquor, the government dismissed the recommendations of the Board. 
As a result its work became increasingly marginalised, and it dissolved shortly after the war 
ended.70
 
 
Despite its lack of impact on government, the National Efficiency Board provided valuable 
experience to its members. It gave them a national stage upon which to develop and hone 
their ideas on the operation and management of New Zealand industries. These ideas in turn 
contributed to a wider conservative dialogue on cultivating a harmonious relationship 
between employers and employees in the interests of national development. Unlike the 
employers’ and farmers’ association of which many of the Board’s members were a part, the 
National Efficiency Board required at least a token effort to balance the interests of capital 
and labour in the interests of a perceived ‘common good’. However, their recommendations 
almost always favoured employers’ interests, as is suggested by the Board’s desire to modify 
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or suspend industrial awards for the duration of the war.71 Linking such recommendations to 
the war effort allowed the Board to disguise them under a smokescreen of the ‘public 
interest’.72
 
 Together, the National Efficiency Board and the Federation of New Zealand 
Patriotic War Relief Societies provided key individuals on the right with the experience, the 
contacts and the ideological repository to form right-wing leagues after the war. 
In Australia, the two conscription referenda of 1916-1917 were a crucial factor in the 
consolidation of popular conservatism and the two-party system. The referenda, and the 
general strike that punctuated them in 1917, exposed several underlying divisions in 
Australian society.73 Opponents of conscription included trade unions, Catholics, socialist 
minorities such as the Industrial Workers of the World, and most of the Labor Party. 
Supporters of conscription included Labor Prime Minister William Hughes and a small 
coterie within the Labor Party, urban businessmen, newspaper proprietors, and the 
Commonwealth Liberal Party.74 Whilst the referenda failed, they drove Hughes and 24 
members of the Federal caucus into a merger with the Commonwealth Liberal Party. The 
resulting ‘Nationalist Party’ solidified the position of popular conservatism as the new status 
quo.75
 
 
The conscription referenda also provided a major galvanising event for the mobilisation of 
mass right-wing leagues in Australia. The Loyalist League, which arose during this time, bore 
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many of the hallmarks of the citizens’ movements that arose during the Depression. The 
origins of the Loyalist League lay in the second referendum, and in particular the role that 
Irish Catholics played in successfully opposing it. Its mastermind was prominent 
manufacturer Herbert Brookes, who had worked closely with Hughes on the two referenda 
and had become intimately familiar with those who opposed conscription – in particular, 
Melbourne Catholic Archbishop Daniel Mannix.76 Shortly after the second conscription 
referendum failed to pass, Brookes began to consider alternate means to combat Mannix and 
his followers. He found fertile ground for his ideas in Melbourne, and in March 1918 several 
patriotic leagues appointed representatives to a combined ‘Citizens’ Loyalist Committee’.77
 
 
The Citizens’ Loyalist Committee drew upon a new rhetorical dichotomy to distinguish 
between itself and the ‘other’: ‘loyalism’ versus ‘disloyalism’. Raymond Evans explored this 
dichotomy in his study of the ‘Red Flag Riots’ in Queensland in 1919. He argued that the 
wartime frustrations and disillusionment of returned soldiers was directed against a perceived 
conspiracy of disloyal forces, which was believed to be the reason why the promises of 
prosperity awaiting them upon their return had been rudely shattered.78
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That there were disloyalists in Australia at all was a source of great consternation for 
conservatives such as Brookes. Surely Australians, who had time and again proved 
themselves of good British stock, were clever enough to see through such ruses as those 
proclaimed by Mannix? The answer, which would become a staple tool for right-wing 
scapegoating in the future, could only be that a small, insidious group was exploiting the 
fears and insecurities of their fellow men with their false doctrines. The Citizens’ Loyalist 
Committee contrasted ‘the growing disloyalty exhibited by Archbishop Mannix and his 
followers’ with ‘the loyal attitude of large numbers of Catholics who have nobly shouldered 
their responsibilities to the Empire.’79
 
 This approach deliberately separated the disloyal 
minority from the ‘noble’ majority whilst expressing hope that the disloyal few would 
certainly be as loyal and decent as their fellow countrymen if the traitorous influence was 
removed. It also demonstrated the shifting nature of the ‘other’: what had once been a 
nebulous Germanic fifth column had been replaced with a specific Australian working class 
threat backed by an international Catholic conspiracy. 
The Citizens’ Loyalist Committee distinguished itself from previous right-wing leagues 
through its use of public ceremony and populist rhetoric. A ‘Loyalist Demonstration’ held on 
9 April in the Melbourne Exhibition Hall, which attracted an audience of 40000, included 
three separate platforms for speakers and the singing of patriotic songs.80
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Government in its ‘suppression of disloyal utterances, demonstrations, and emblems’ whilst 
affirming that ‘the vast majority of Australians are loyal to their country and to the 
Motherland, and would eagerly support the Government in any measures taken against 
traitors’81 The Committee decide to follow up on the success of the demonstration by 
establishing a permanent ‘Loyalist League’, which was launched at a second demonstration 
on 11 October 1918.82
 
 
THE THREAT OF BOLSHEVISM 
The event that had the greatest consolidating effect on popular conservatism in both Australia 
and New Zealand was the Bolshevik Revolution. ‘Bolshevism’ provided a unifying trope 
under which the various forces of disloyalism could be grouped. Reverend T. E. Ruth, a 
leading speaker of the Loyalist League in Victoria, best demonstrated this by linking various 
forces together into a single ‘other’: 
 
[N]o Australian obsessed by Sinn Fein spite or anti-British hate should be 
allowed to befoul the Australian nest with Bolshevik corruption … Sinn 
Feinism or Bolshevism or Prussianism or Suffragetism can only be regarded 
as a stupid excrescence on our Australian life.83
 
 
Fear of Bolshevism was exacerbated by the economic uncertainty of the post-war years. 
Rising unemployment and declining wages caused renewed industrial turmoil: Australia lost 
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more days to strikes in 1919 than in any other year until the 1970s.84 To Australasian 
employers, working class radicalism at home appeared to have been emboldened by the 
success of the Bolshevik Revolution and was threatening the very basis of industrial relations. 
This appeared to be confirmed by the formation of the Australian and New Zealand 
Communist Parties, the adoption of socialisation planks by the Labour Parties, and the 
renewed campaigns of the Industrial Workers of the World and the One Big Union 
movement.85 The conservative press reflected this increasing paranoia through use of buzz 
words like ‘class war’, ‘bourgeoisie’ and the ‘proletariat’.86 As one anxious business 
organisation in New Zealand wrote, ‘[t]here is no question that there exists in this Dominion 
a small minority of persons, supporters of and agitators for, Bolshevik and I.W.W. principles 
and propaganda.’87
 
 
The Bolshevist threat spurred the formation of another mass right-wing organisation that bore 
many similarities to the citizens’ movements. The King and Empire Alliance arose through a 
coalition of loyalist leagues and patriotic societies in Queensland termed the ‘United Loyalist 
Executive’, which participated in a series of xenophobic riots across Brisbane in March 1919 
in response to a civil liberties march by the Trades Hall.88
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Alliance’ in New South Wales. Once again, Australia’s troubles were pinned on ‘a small but 
organised section of the community taking up an attitude distinctly hostile to constituted 
authority, distinctly anti-British, and disloyal in the extreme.’89 Its objects stressed the 
supremacy of Empire, the cultivation of loyalty and the suppression of disloyalty, which it 
proclaimed as values that lay above party and religious differences.90 The Alliance also relied 
on public ceremony and the attraction of a mass membership. By February 1921 it claimed a 
membership of 5300, with an additional 10000 members in affiliated groups.91 Its influence 
proved far greater during a ‘loyalist rally’ it organised in the Sydney Town Hall in response 
to the shredding of a Union Jack on May Day in the Sydney Domain. Attendance was so 
great that over 15000 individuals had to stand outside the hall.92 The following morning, a 
crowd of over 100000 assembled at the Domain and stormed the platforms of the Socialist 
Labor Party, the Communist Party and the returned soldiers section of the Labor Party.93
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Figure 2: The conjoining of ‘Bolshevist savagery’ with ‘German kultur’. Source: Western 
Mail, 20 September 1918, 26. 
 
CONSOLIDATION AND FRACTURES 
As patrician conservatism evolved to become popular conservatism, so too did the way in 
which its ideals were portrayed as natural evolve. Whilst such naturalisation was a perennial 
component of conservatism, popular conservatism made this connection more overt. As its 
core tenets became part of the status quo, conservatives were able to present their ideology as 
serving the ‘national interest’. Those who differed with the status quo were described as 
beholden to special or parochial interests, regardless of whether they were revolutionary 
socialists or labour party members.94
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Cathcart termed an ‘unwritten constitution’ – ‘a body of principle and tradition which can 
never be fully known or articulated, but which defines the grounds upon which political 
activity may legitimately be undertaken’.95
 
 Anything that lay outside the acceptable bounds 
of popular conservative dictum could thus be delegitimised as sectional, disloyal, or 
seditious. The idea of the ‘national interest’ formed one of the pillars of popular conservative 
ideology in Australia and New Zealand during the interwar period, and it would have a strong 
influence on the citizens’ movements during the Depression. 
The League of Good Citizenship, which emerged out of the short-lived Directorate of War 
Propaganda founded by the Federal government in August 1918, demonstrated the 
consolidation of various popular conservative ideas regarding loyalty, anti-communism and 
the ‘national interest’.96
 
 Its objects, which could easily be interchanged for those of the four 
citizens’ movements, bear repeating in full:  
1. To show that the interests of the community as a whole must precede those 
of any individual, party or class, and that this common interest is at the 
present time jeopardised by forces making for disintegration and anarchy. 
2. To create and foster a spirit of national unity. 
3. To work by educational methods towards the realisation of a constructive 
policy based on an orderly progress and repudiating revolutionary excess. 
4. To show the necessity for increased production and to discuss the 
problems of private and public ownership; the relations between capital 
and labour, producers and consumers, and social problems generally in 
such a spirit as to promote a clear, accurate, and sympathetic 
understanding of the nature and value of the services of each section of the 
community. 
5. To pursue these objects on strictly non-party and non-sectarian lines.97
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The League portrayed itself as a vehicle for ‘national unity’, which it believed could be 
achieved despite divisions of class or party. Such unity lay in the realisation that these 
divisions, which were being used by a disloyal few to promote sectional strife, were in fact 
artificial. The needs of opposing forces were not mutually exclusive, and could be reconciled 
to the benefit of all through educative efforts designed to foster class collaboration and 
counter seditious propaganda. Such efforts were promoted as ‘strictly non-party’, removing 
them from the taint of party politics and reinforcing the League’s claim to represent a 
‘common interest’. To reinforce this dichotomy of legitimate and illegitimate values, the 
League released a series of pamphlets directed at a working class audience which contrasted 
‘common sense’ and ‘proved methods’ with the ‘destructive’ and ‘revolutionary’ tactics of 
‘fanatics and dreamers’.98
 
 
Despite the rhetoric of national unity, popular conservatism suffered a number of divisions 
throughout the 1920s. These divisions arose out of the increasingly conflicting interests of 
rural and urban conservatives. In Australia, a lack of rural political representation and the 
continued dominance of manufacturing interests in the Nationalist Party led to the formation 
of a separate Country Party in 1920 which competed for the rural conservative vote.99
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the virtues of agricultural endeavour.100 When the Country Party claimed the balance of 
power in the 1922 election, they forged a coalition with the Nationalists on the proviso that 
Hughes be replaced as Prime Minister by someone more amenable to tariff revision and 
greater government economies. His successor, Stanley Bruce, proved disappointing to rural 
interests. Despite his association with urban business interests, Bruce proved just as 
interventionist – if not more so – than Hughes. His slogan for national reconstruction was 
‘Men, Money and Markets’ – immigrants from Britain to swell the population, capital 
investment in infrastructure through public borrowing, and expanding overseas markets for 
exports.101 One of the pillars of this program was a strengthened tariff policy, with a minor 
preferential concession on British imports.102 By the end of the twenties the average tariff 
rate had almost doubled, and the economists of the ‘Brigden enquiry’ cautiously accepted 
protection as part of the intellectual orthodoxy.103
 
 
In New Zealand, the division between rural and urban conservatives was exposed by the 
policies of the Reform Party. A Country Party was formed by the Auckland branch of the 
Farmers’ Union in the mid-1920s due to its perception that the Reform Party was beginning 
to favour urban business interests over those of primary producers.104
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interventionist policies of the Reform Party. The voluntary Meat and Dairy Export Boards 
established by Massey in the early twenties attracted some criticism from laissez-faire purists. 
His successor as Prime Minister, Gordon Coates, aroused further criticism by introducing 
fixed prices into the Dairy Board in 1926. This led several prominent Reformers and 
businessmen to form a new political party in 1927 with what remained of the Liberals.105 The 
new conservative party, which named itself the United Party, organised urban business 
interests against the ‘socialism’ of the Coates ministry whilst calling for reductions in the size 
and scope of government.106
 
 
TRANS-NATIONAL RIGHT-WING NETWORKS IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD 
The post-war period also saw popular conservatism become increasingly associated with 
laissez-faire rhetoric, in particular as a bulwark against collectivism. At the forefront of this 
were a number of post-war right-wing leagues which were concerned specifically with 
defending capitalism against the forces of Bolshevism and organised labour. Unlike most of 
the broad school of right-wing organisation and agitation that preceded them, these new 
groups explicitly linked the defence of Empire, liberty and British tradition with laissez-faire 
capitalism. To these leagues, collectivism represented a very real and genuine threat; its 
proponents were active and motivated, and its doctrines were dangerously pervasive amongst 
the population. Educating the public in the merits of capitalism was the only means of 
combating this insidious threat. However, despite their focus on anti-communism, these 
groups displayed a marked continuity with their predecessors prior to, and during, the Great 
War: they drew upon existing notions of national interest and the ‘other’, they utilised similar 
organisational and propagandist techniques, and they often involved the same individuals 
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who were involved in previous right-wing movements. By the mid-1920s these anti-
communist leagues had appeared across most of the Anglo world, and had begun to 
coordinate their efforts in a trans-national network of anti-communist propaganda. This 
section analyses the contributions of two leagues in particular to this network – the Sane 
Democracy League of Australia, and the New Zealand Welfare League – along with several 
other right-wing groups that they were directly or indirectly involved in establishing.  
 
The New Zealand Welfare League was founded at a conference in Wellington on 12 March 
1919.107 Most of its leading figures had worked together through the Federation of New 
Zealand Patriotic War Relief Societies, including League founder and first President C. P. 
Skerrett, L. O. H. Tripp and D. McLaren from Wellington, Hope Gibbons from Wanganui, 
and E. H. Williams from Hastings.108 National Efficiency Board member James Begg was a 
vice-president of the League, and his Board colleague J. H. Gunson was an ‘honoured 
protégé’. Begg and Gunson’s connection with the League probably came through National 
Efficiency Board chairman William Ferguson, who worked with Tripp and McLaren on the 
Wellington War Relief Association.109 Other members included Major D. H. Lusk, 
commander of the mounted special constabulary in Auckland during the 1913 Great Strike 
and founder of a short-lived ‘Anti-Party Political League’, and C. M. Olliver, President of the 
Canterbury Progress League.110
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The Sane Democracy League was originally founded in Australia in 1920 as the ‘Commercial 
and Industrial Publicity Bureau’, but was renamed in 1925 when the league was revitalised 
under new leadership.111 Unlike the Welfare League, the founders of the Sane Democracy 
League do not appear to have been part of the pre-war and wartime right-wing in Australia. 
However, it shared the same ideological and geographical space as several prominent right-
wing movements in the immediate post-war period, including the King and Empire Alliance 
and the League of Good Citizenship. One of the leading propagandists of the Sane 
Democracy League, George Waite, was praised by the League of Good Citizenship for his 
‘courageous stand against the enemies of our Empire’ and invited to join their movement in 
‘combating all disloyal propaganda.’112
 
  
The new anti-communist leagues represented the sharp edge of popular conservatism in 
Australia and New Zealand. Whilst the Nationalist and Reform Parties defended conservative 
values from within the party framework, the anti-communist leagues reinforced them from 
outside of it. Their claim to be ‘non-party’ contributed to the naturalisation of the capitalist 
system by presenting it as an inextricable, and therefore apolitical, part of the human 
condition. As the Sane Democracy League stated in the first volume of its journal: 
 
Our system of industry is built upon the constancy of certain conditions of 
human existence, upon the certainty of economic forces which thence arise, 
and upon the fact that these forces act with perfect regularity under changeless 
laws. We can try to redirect these laws against one group or another through 
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bad legislation but in the end we [can] never destroy an economic force any 
more than we destroy a physical force.113
 
 
The capitalist system was portrayed as inherently neutral, and thus equally beneficial to all 
classes within society. This reinforced the popular conservative notion of the ‘national 
interest’, which was both an extension of the idea of ‘non-party’ as well as an attempt to limit 
the range of acceptable political opinion and delegitimise those who lay outside of it. The 
phrase appeared in some form in the objects of most right-wing movements of the period: the 
Welfare League, for example, claimed that it sought to ‘place the National or Community 
interests before those of any Party, Section, or Individual’.114
 
 
Building upon the model of the ‘other’ used by wartime right-wing groups, the leagues 
directed their efforts against what they perceived was a small but dedicated band of 
communist agitators seeking to undermine constitutional authority. The Sane Democracy and 
Welfare Leagues were convinced that the communist enemy was working tirelessly to ‘white-
ant’ social democratic parties, trade unions and working men’s associations in order to extend 
their influence beyond their small circle of fanatics. This distinction between communist 
agitators and the wider body of the working class provided a convenient device with which 
the leagues could reconcile the industrial turmoil of the post-war period with their image of a 
classless society where the interests of employer and employee were conjoined. The working 
class was, under typical circumstances, loyal and patriotic, and negotiations for modest 
improvements in pay and working conditions were ‘just’ and ‘reasonable’. Communist 
agitators had disrupted this natural order by exploiting class hatred and social tension with 
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their insidious propaganda.115
 
 To reinforce this dichotomy, the anti-communist leagues 
expanded the language of opposites: ‘loyalism’ and ‘disloyalism’ were complemented with 
‘sane’ and ‘insane’, ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’, and ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’. This further delegitimised 
the politics of those why lay outside the range of naturalised conservative dictum. 
To combat the efforts of the communist ‘other’, the anti-communist leagues employed the 
low-level propagandist methods utilised by previous right-wing groups. Since this only 
required the services of a small number of dedicated members, this method of organisation 
and influence proved much more long-lasting than the populist style of the mass movements 
that arose in Australia at the end of the war.116 The Sane Democracy League conducted 
public speaking campaigns, wrote countless letters to newspapers, and produced dozens of 
pamphlets. It also presented a radio series in 1926, which included topics such as ‘How to 
Raise Wages in Australia’, ‘Communism & Capitalism – a Contrast in Methods’, and 
‘Production for Profit is Production for Use’.117 The Welfare League relied heavily on 
newspaper contributions: its long-standing Secretary, the mountaineer A. P. Harper, claimed 
that the League perused a package of newspaper clippings from Ilott & Co. every morning for 
‘dangerous propaganda’ and issued responses to any it found. The League also sent weekly 
articles to about sixty newspapers, and claimed a publication rate of ‘60 to 70 percent’.118
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These methods placed a steady stream of anti-communist material before the public 
consciousness which reinforced the language of popular conservatism. 
 
The anti-communist leagues imagined their enemy, and by extension their own struggle, as 
trans-national in nature. The perceived international communist network which they sought to 
combat was supposedly centred on, and rigidly regimented by, Bolshevik forces in Moscow 
using the Third International as their vehicle.119
 
 In contrast, the anti-communist leagues 
described themselves as an organic phenomenon that had arisen independently across 
multiple countries before coordinating their efforts. As the Welfare League put it: 
[I]t is significant that conditions obtaining in this country and which called for 
a strong non-party, national and educative movement, also existed in other 
parts of the Empire, and were met in the same way – by the formation of 
organisations, so like our own that, in all cases, we could exchange 
constitutions without losing our original objectives. This proves that the 
movement which the Welfare League has originated in New Zealand – its 
fight against the forces of disorder – its attempt to place the community and 
national interests before party or section – is the natural outcome of an 
Empire-wide condition of affairs.120
 
 
By the mid-1920s the Welfare and Sane Democracy Leagues were regularly corresponding 
with several anti-communist organisations around the world including the British Economic 
League, the American Vigilant Intelligence Federation and the Constitutional Defence 
League in Shanghai.121
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History 23:4 (1988): 631-55; Mark Hollingsworth and Charles Tremayne, The Economic League: The Silent 
Mccarthyism (London: National Council for Civil Liberties, 1989). 
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the activities of over two dozen anti-communist organisations throughout Europe.122
 
 The 
global connections forged between anti-communist leagues during this period were far more 
substantial and lasting than the informal ties of earlier organisations. 
The methods of the anti-communist leagues served both a combative and an educative 
function: they were designed to counter the communist ‘other’ whilst enlightening the public 
in the merits of capitalism. This educative function was central to conservative notions of 
good citizenship, and it became a vital function amongst other right-wing leagues that arose 
in the 1920s. For example, the Constitutional Association was established in Sydney in May 
1925 to promote discussions of economic, political and constitutional questions. The Empire-
wide waterside strike in August gave the Association added impetus, and Constitutional 
‘Clubs’ soon emerged in Brisbane, Melbourne, and Adelaide.123 In Western Australia an 
‘Argonauts Civic and Political Club’ was founded in May 1925 on the principles of ‘imperial 
unity’, ‘the development of the state upon constitutional lines’, ‘the counter-acting of the 
growth of socialism’, and the ‘freedom and development of the individual’.124 By July 1926 
the Argonauts were running several study groups, a model Parliament, an Information and 
Employment Bureau, as well as several ‘Industrial Groups’ designed to convince workers of 
the dangers of communism.125
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Progress League and Town-Planning Association to form a Wellington Civic League.126 
Whilst the Civic League was nominally ‘independent of all party or sectional control’, its 
activities served political goals: it supported conservative candidates at municipal elections, 
and its secretary David McLaren was also the national organiser of the Welfare League.127
 
 
These various groups would play a crucial role in the emergence of the citizens’ movements 
during the Depression. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the major crises faced by turn-of-the-century conservatism in Australia and New 
Zealand was the expansion of the franchise and the radical demands of the growing 
electorate. In order to survive, conservatives transformed the ageing patrician model of 
conservatism to a more popular, inclusive model that recognised the demands of middle class 
liberals. As a result, by the end of the 1920s there existed a well-established tradition of 
popular conservatism in Australia and New Zealand. The core ideological tenets of this 
tradition were a general commitment to market principles mediated by the nineteenth century 
state developmentalist ethos; the minimisation or outright negation of class difference by 
portraying the interest of employer and employee as conjoined and mutually beneficial; an 
orientation towards Britain, both in terms of patriotic sentiment as well as economic and 
foreign policy; a political and rhetorical style utilising the moralistic language of private 
enterprise, individual self-reliance, and balanced public budgets; and immigration restriction 
designed to preserve the racial and cultural dominance of white Europeans. The hegemonic 
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status of this ideology allowed it to appropriate the label of the ‘national interest’ for itself, 
which in turn allowed its adherents to delegitimise their opponents. 
 
Nevertheless, the rhetoric of popular conservatism concealed within it three economic 
fractions – manufacturing, primary production, and a professional, business and commercial 
fraction. Whilst these fractions were united in their opposition to the demands of organised 
and political labour, their economic interests were sufficiently contradictory to cause tensions 
and splits in the conservative political apparatus on occasion. Manufacturers, for instance, 
broadly believed in individualism and market principles; however, as their industries were 
largely in their infancy, their primary concern was to secure tariff protection against foreign 
competitors. In Australia, this led them to clash with primary producers over the higher costs 
associated with buying Australian-made farming equipment and machinery. In New Zealand 
however, the farming tradition was paramount, and what limited manufacturing interests 
existed were largely tied to the protein boom. But primary producers could hardly claim 
independence of state assistance – much of the nineteenth century ‘colonial socialist’ legacy 
had been directed towards furthering their interests, and small farmers were not averse to 
demanding compulsory pooling and guaranteed prices when it suited them. In contrast, the 
professional, business and commercial fraction, which lacked the kind of tangible goods for 
which the other two fractions sought state protection, found it easier to adhere to the tenets of 
the free market and a limited government. 
 
The wide variety of ‘non-party’ right-wing leagues that appeared across the British Empire 
during this time were a central part of the process of conservative reinvention. They 
encouraged the development of ‘good citizenship’ through respect for political and cultural 
traditions and a reasoned and voluntary participation in the political process. The leagues that 
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emerged during the Great War played an important role in honing the idea of the seditious 
and covert ‘other’. Regardless of whether he or she was a German, an Irish republican, a 
Catholic or a communist, this ‘other’ was inherently ‘disloyal’. This in turn provided the 
ideological backboard against which the notion of the ‘loyal’ citizen could be defined. Most 
of these leagues operated on a low-key, propagandist basis; however, the Australian general 
strike of 1917 provided fuel for a much larger response. The Loyalist League and the King 
and Empire Alliance bore many of the characteristics of the later citizens’ movements. They 
were responses to domestic crises that were influenced by, and borrowed from, the various 
right-wing leagues that preceded them. They rapidly attracted mass appeal through populist 
rhetoric and public ceremony only to decline just as rapidly when the crisis subsided or the 
mass appeal could not be sustained. The model provided by the smaller, propagandist 
movements proved far more long-lived, and it was picked up by a trans-national web of anti-
communist leagues in the post-war period. 
 
The various right-wing leagues that emerged in Australia and New Zealand between 1880 
and 1929 were, for the most part, reactionary rather than radical in nature. Whilst the 
occasionally extreme and populist rhetoric of the wartime movements may have lain on the 
fringes of respectable conservative opinion, it was still part of the milieu of mainstream 
conservatism. Furthermore, the ‘non-party’ nature of these leagues made it possible for them 
to espouse political values without being part of the political machinery itself. This reinforced 
rather than challenged the hegemony of the mainstream conservative political parties of the 
time. However, the Depression would lead to a radicalisation of this right-wing tradition as 
middle class conservatives attempted to find new solutions to the political, social and 
economic troubles of the time. The ideas that they settled upon, as the next chapter will show, 
laid the foundations for a direct and radical challenge to the very political system itself. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FROM REACTIONARY TO RADICAL: THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CITIZENS’ 
MOVEMENTS 
 
Politicians – and we have armies of them – are so busily engaged in snapping 
and snarling at one another like so many dingoes, that they will not allow 
prosperity to come. A commission of a dozen good business men … would 
accomplish more towards re-establishing confidence in Australia, and putting 
business matters on a fair footing than all these place-seeking politicians.1
 
 
When a concerned citizen wrote this letter to the Sydney Morning Herald in March 1931, the 
Great Depression had begun to have an effect in varying degrees across Australia and New 
Zealand. Plummeting export receipts were having a run-on effect across the rest of the 
economy, causing mass unemployment and social dislocation, reduced business confidence, 
and increased exposure of government indebtedness. In that time, many conservatives began 
to dramatically reappraise the kind of political and economic systems in which they were 
prepared to place their faith. This chapter examines the journey of these discontented 
conservatives from the reactionary to the radical. It argues that this process of conservative 
radicalisation drew upon, and extended, the ideas and strategies of the various right-wing 
leagues that arose in previous decades. The common thread in this process, as this chapter 
will demonstrate, was the condemnation of the party system of government – a condemnation 
which occasionally extended to the questioning of democracy itself. This chapter will 
conclude by demonstrating how the four citizens’ movements arose as part of this process of 
conservative radicalisation. 
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MAINSTREAM CONSERVATIVES AND THE DEPRESSION 
The post-war conservative electoral hegemony in Australia was shattered by the victory of 
the Labor Party in the snap election of October 1929. At the time, the nation’s economic 
situation was already far from ideal: export prices had dropped by 30% in the middle of the 
year, and the combined overseas debt of the Federal and State governments totalled £631 
million. Servicing the interest on this debt alone required 40% of export receipts.2 
Unemployment was at its highest point in a decade at 11.1%, and the nation’s trade deficit in 
1929-1930 was two-thirds greater than the average deficit of the previous four years.3 The 
Depression accelerated this downward spiral: export prices continued to plummet, and 
creditors in Britain and the Unites States – so essential to the expansion of public 
infrastructure in the twenties – were unwilling to extend new loans.4 Registered male 
unemployment skyrocketed to 29% in 1932.5
 
 
The Federal Labor government’s response to the Depression was handicapped by a hostile 
Senate and private banking sector. At the onset of the crisis, cabinet’s ability to regulate the 
supply and distribution of money was limited by the lack of a modern central bank. The 
Commonwealth Bank possessed some of the features of a central bank, including the 
authority to issue bank notes, but its independence from government made it difficult for 
cabinet to enact monetary policy in times of crisis. Treasurer E. G. ‘Ted’ Theodore attempted 
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to resolve this problem in April 1930 by introducing a Central Reserve Bank Bill, which 
proposed splitting the Commonwealth Bank into a fully fledged central bank and a private 
commercial trading bank.6 The private banking sector, in particular the Commonwealth 
Bank, opposed the Bill as an unnecessary disruption to the banking sector. Commonwealth 
Bank Chairman Robert Gibson spoke against it before the Nationalist-controlled Senate, 
which ultimately rejected the Bill.7 The Senate also blocked the government’s ‘Grow More 
Wheat’ proposal which offered a guaranteed price to farmers through compulsory pooling.8 
Indeed, the government’s only legislative success during this period was a substantial 
increase in the tariff in April 1930.9
 
 
As a result of this opposition, the government’s policy vacillated between economic 
orthodoxy and proto-Keynesianism. In 1930 the Commonwealth Bank, in agreement with 
Prime Minister James Scullin, invited Sir Otto Niemeyer from the Bank of England to visit 
Australia and advise the government on its finances. Niemeyer recommended a long list of 
austere reforms to ensure Australia’s loan commitments were met, including drastic cuts in 
public expenditure and wages. His proposals were adopted at a conference of State Premiers 
in Melbourne in August 1930, and Scullin spent the next several months in Britain 
negotiating reduced interest payments on Australian debts. The chief supporters of the 
‘Melbourne Agreement’ within cabinet were Joseph Lyons, who assumed the position of 
acting Treasurer in July 1930 when Theodore stepped down to deal with a corruption charge, 
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and acting Prime Minister James Fenton.10 Theodore, who would come to believe that only 
fiscal stimulus or ‘reflation’ would boost the economy out of Depression, was one of its 
opponents. Scullin was persuaded by Theodore’s ideas upon returning to Australia at the 
beginning of 1931, and he reinstated him as Treasurer on 26 January.11 Fenton and Lyons 
immediately resigned from Cabinet in protest and crossed the floor to the opposition benches 
in March 1931 with a small group of Labor supporters.12 Scullin and Theodore took their 
ideas on ‘reflation’ to a second Premier’s conference in Canberra in February, although 
Theodore’s subsequent Fiduciary Notes Bill – which proposed the issuing of £18 million in 
fiduciary notes for an extensive public works program – was blocked by the Senate in 
April.13
 
 
Mainstream conservatives responded to the Federal government’s policies by drawing on the 
standard tropes of deflationary economics. The release of Labor’s first budget in July 1930, 
which included an increase in taxation to fund an additional £1 million in public spending 
over the previous financial year, prompted urban business organisations to hold protest 
meetings in several state capitals.14 The Sydney Chamber of Commerce sent a delegation to 
Canberra representative of ‘all classes of taxpayers’ to convince Scullin to reduce taxes and 
balance the Federal budget.15
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individual liberty and private enterprise.16 Many conservatives drew upon the Kyabram 
Reform Movement, the turn-of-the-century conservative protest organisation in Victoria 
discussed in chapter one, for inspiration. In July the Wheat Producers’ Freedom Association 
decided to launch a ‘new Kyabram’ at a meeting in the South Australian country town of 
Moonta.17 Their enthusiasm quickly waned, due in part to the deflationary agreement reached 
at the Premier’s Conference in August, and the promise of a new Kyabram was not met.18
 
 
However, the memory of Kyabram would remain an important influence on the citizens’ 
movements in both Australia and New Zealand. 
Most conservative ire was directed at Theodore’s credit issuing proposals. Conservatives 
condemned these proposals as ‘inflationary’, arguing that they would devalue the currency 
and destroy the savings of the middle class. In January 1931 an ‘Anti-Inflation League’ was 
founded in Sydney ‘to combat the iniquitous and suicidal doctrine of inflation’.19 Economists 
and bankers were especially critical of Theodore’s proposals. ‘Australia is financially sick’, 
wrote Sir Ernest Wreford of the National Bank, ‘and will not get well by drinking the 
financial champagne of further borrowing or note inflation.’20 A publication titled The 
Menace of Inflation, written by South Australian educator and historian Archibald Grenfell 
Price and sponsored by several economists, sold 30000 copies in its first print run in March 
1931.21
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avoid the ruin which inflation nearly always brings in its train.’22 Imbedded in his criticism of 
inflation were the moral imperatives of thrift and self-reliance. Australians had been ‘spoon-
fed by arbitration, by pensions, and by a dozen socialistic policies, which had temporarily 
sapped the foundations of individualism.’23
 
 
Conservative fears of inflation were matched by a second anxiety-ridden buzzword: 
repudiation. The fear that the Australian Federal and State governments might be unable, or 
refuse, to meet their debt repayments struck at the very core of the sanctity of contract. With 
no central Reserve Bank to adjust monetary policy, it fell to individual politicians and 
citizens to negotiate reduced rates of interest on government bonds. In the closing months of 
1930, acting Treasurer Lyons led a £28 million loan conversion campaign designed to ensure 
that an overseas loan payment due on 15 December was met. The success of this campaign, 
which attracted a significant amount of publicity and patriotic fanfare, made Lyons a 
nationally-recognised figure.24
 
 As later chapters will explore, Lyons’ stand against the Labor 
Party and his methods of courting publicity contributed to his future success as the leader of 
the citizens’ movements and of a reinvigorated conservative opposition. 
The biggest threat of repudiation came from Jack Lang, the leader of the Labor Party in New 
South Wales. Lang had a long history of stirring up conservative ire; in his first term as State 
Premier between 1925 and 1927 he had enacted several reforms deemed radical by 
conservatives, including mandatory workers’ compensation insurance and a 44-hour working 
week. In October 1930 Lang was returned to office on a campaign of restoring public servant 
salaries, increasing child welfare payments, and an extensive public works program. In order 
                                                     
22 A. G. Price, The Menace of Inflation (Adelaide: F. W. Preece & Sons, 1931), 6-10. 
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to pay for this program, he suggested at the conference of State Premiers in February 1931 
that Australia should halt interest payments to British bondholders until the crisis passed.25
 
 
This was the same conference at which Scullin and Theodore had put forth their ‘inflationary’ 
proposals, making it a highly controversial – and also highly ineffectual – gathering. Lang’s 
proposal granted him the dubious honour as the foremost bogeyman in conservative eyes. 
 
Figure 3: A ‘starvation debenture’ lampooning Jack Lang’s ‘repudiationist’ policies. Source: 
Item 50, Mutch papers. 
 
New Zealand was affected by the Depression in the same general fashion as Australia. 
Farming formed the backbone of both economies; almost one third of New Zealanders were 
employed in primary production in the 1920s, and agricultural goods comprised the majority 
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of the country’s exports.26 Like Australia, New Zealand’s economy had already been 
weakened in 1929 by an international fall in export prices, especially in the wool market.27 
The Depression exacerbated the drop, and by 1933 prices had declined by 45% from their 
1929 level. From 1930 businessmen and professionals began to feel the flow-on effects: by 
1933 the volume of imports had decreased by 40%, and prices fell by as much as 12%. Public 
sector wages were cut by between 10% and 20%, and the average private sector wage fell by 
10%. The economy reached its nadir in mid-1933 when the unemployment rate reached 12% 
of the registered workforce.28
 
 
Unlike Australia, New Zealand was governed almost solely by right-wing political parties 
throughout the Depression. In 1929 it was governed by the United Party with the support of 
Labour. As conditions worsened, Prime Minister Joseph Ward found himself in the position 
of being unable to fully meet his election promise of a £70 million spending program – which 
had attracted the Labour Party – or to cut public spending as United supporters demanded. 
Ward’s deteriorating health further immobilised his government, and he resigned in May 
1930 in favour of Finance Minister George Forbes.29
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parties agreed to form a Coalition government in September 1931 which was returned to 
power in the December general election.30
 
 
The Coalition responded to the Depression in two ways: traditional deflationary methods 
designed to lower wages and expenditure, and new departures in respect of unemployment 
and insolvency. The key supporter of deflation was Finance Minister William Downie 
Stewart, the only urban business representative in Cabinet. These methods were epitomised 
by the 1932 National Expenditure Adjustment Act which enforced rigorous public spending 
cuts, decreased pension payments, additional reductions in public service salaries, and the 
removal of compulsory arbitration from the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act.31 
However, despite the Coalition’s desire to effect greater government economies, public debt 
grew as the national income continued to decline. In April 1932 Downie Stewart alarmed 
conservatives when he announced a projected deficit of £8.3 million for the next financial 
year. A specially appointed Economists’ Committee called the budget situation ‘critical’, and 
recommended further budget cuts and the introduction of new taxation.32 Some of these 
measures made their way into the National Expenditure Adjustment Act, and by October the 
Coalition claimed the deficit would be reduced to £1 million by the end of the year.33 Despite 
this reassurance, projected deficit figures continued to float over the following months, and 
were not fully settled until a small surplus was announced with the release of the following 
year’s budget in May 1933.34
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Deflationary methods also contributed to a series of unemployed riots in the first half of 
1932. The most serious riots occurred in Auckland in April during a march of the 
Unemployed Workers Movement and public servants protesting against the second round of 
cuts to their salaries. When the leader of the march was batoned by a policeman, the crowd 
reacted by attacking the police cordon and looting several shopfronts along Queen Street.35 
Conservatives reached with alarm to the events in Auckland; the Wellington Chamber of 
Commerce urged the immediate imprisonment of the leaders of the Communist Party, and the 
Auckland Star called for the formation of a ‘widespread official organisation of citizens … 
free from any suggestion of party politics’.36 The Coalition responded by introducing a Public 
Safety Conservation Bill that would grant the government comprehensive powers to deal with 
future emergencies.37
 
 
The second, more ‘reflationist’ government response tested the boundaries of the established 
developmentalist tradition. The Unemployment Act of 1930 had introduced tax-financed 
(rather than loan-financed) unemployment assistance. This taxation for unemployment relief 
was to be massively expanded by the Coalition, under the rubric of sharing the burden, 
Subsequent policies, such as the 20% reduction in interest rates and rents provided by the 
National Expenditure Adjustment Act, were similarly able to appeal to a perceived equality 
of sacrifice, although the challenge to the sanctity of contract led Downie Stewart to threaten 
resignation. Rural relief in the form of the Mortgages and Tenants Relief Act aroused greater 
concern amongst conservatives, but it was grudgingly accepted as necessary to alleviate the 
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growing insolvency of the farming community.38
 
 State intervention in the economy to 
alleviate the distress of farmers and the unemployed was acceptable provided it fell within the 
bounds of the Australasian developmentalist ethos. 
The cleavage between the primary production and the professional, business and commercial 
fractions of conservatism was further exposed when the government raised the exchange rate 
in January 1933. The chief supporter of the move, Reform leader Gordon Coates, hoped that 
by devaluing the currency from £NZ110:£UK100 to £NZ125:£UK100 the resulting boost in 
farmers’ incomes would flow through to the rest of the economy.39 However, unlike 
mortgage and interest relief, the benefits accrued to farmers by a devalued currency had the 
exact opposite effect on import-dependent businessmen, who accused the government of 
promoting the sectional interests of one fraction of society. The Wellington Chamber of 
Commerce accused the government of ‘violating established banking practice and universally 
recognised economic principles’, with the result that ‘the majority must suffer for the benefit 
of a minority’.40 The move also compounded fears of a budget crisis, with rumours 
circulating that a devalued currency would swell the deficit by an additional £3 million.41
 
 
‘ANTI-POLITICAL POLITICAL THOUGHT’ 
Australasian conservatives responded to this growing perception of crisis in a number of 
ways. Whilst many retained their faith in the existing parliamentary system, a significant 
number began to question its ability to handle the economic crisis. Fascism provided one 
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source of political inspiration for these anxious conservatives. There is a fairly robust 
historiography of the influence of fascism in Australia, although much less so in New 
Zealand. Nevertheless, some tentative extrapolations can be drawn between the two 
countries. For instance, the observation of John McCarthy, Andrew Moore and Roslyn 
Cooper that many Australian conservatives admired fascism’s anti-communism and its 
intense patriotism, and viewed it as a potential solution to class conflict, is likely to have also 
been the case amongst New Zealand conservatives.42 David Bird demonstrated that leading 
Australian political figures such as Robert Menzies and Joseph Lyons expressed a quiet 
admiration for fascism’s unity of purpose, and literary figures such as P. R. ‘Inky’ 
Stephensen became so enamoured with fascism that they were interned during the Second 
World War as potential subversives through their involvement with the Australia First 
Movement.43 However, the understanding of fascism in Australasia was severely limited, and 
if conservatives were occasionally willing to overlook fascist violence and abuses of power, 
left-wing labour and pacifist movments were consistently there to remind them of it.44 
Wilfrid Kent Hughes, the Australian MP who proudly declared himself to be a fascist in 
1933, exemplified this misunderstanding of fascism.45
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Zealand due mainly to the insistence of consulate officials that fascism should act as a shield 
against cultural integration.46
 
 
The danger in political alternatives such as fascism was that they could potentially fragment 
the mainstream conservative electorate and thus strengthen the forces of political labour. This 
posed a dilemma to conservatives who were both anxious for change yet wary of disrupting 
the political status quo. The solution to this dilemma lay in the radicalisation of the well-
established tradition of ‘non-party’ right-wing organisations in Australasia. Rather than 
challenge conservative ideals and policies, they chose instead to lay the blame on the political 
system itself in a fashion that Peter Loveday labelled ‘anti-political political thought’.47 The 
chief proponents of this anti-partyism were ‘non-party’ right-wing leagues, in particular new 
leagues that arose during the Depression or immediately prior to it. One such group was the 
‘Who’s for Australia? League’, which was founded in November 1929 but was rooted in 
theosophy. Geoffrey Robinson has highlighted the influence of the Who’s for Australia 
League on one particular citizens’ movement, the All for Australia League. However, whilst 
he correctly notes that Australian theosophists promoted patriotism and economic 
nationalism, he does not consider the deeper roots of theosophical tradition and how it was 
adapted to the Australian context.48
 
 It is this tradition that made Australian theosophy, and 
the Who’s for Australia League in particular, an ideal vehicle for the kind of idealist and 
populist rhetoric that would later characterise the citizens’ movements. 
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One of the goals of theosophy is to forge a ‘Universal Brotherhood of Humanity’, which 
would appear to be at odds with patriotism and economic nationalism.49 The notion of 
applying theosophist principles to the inculcation of patriotism came from Dr G. S. Arundale, 
a leading figure in the global theosophical movement during the 1920s. Arundale believed 
that the nucleus of a ‘Universal Brotherhood’ lay in the shared heritage of Britain and its 
colonies, in particular Australia and New Zealand. If this spirit of imperial patriotism could 
first be harnessed and refined in one particular colony, Arundale imagined that it might then 
be extended in stages across the British Empire, and eventually across the world.50
 
 
Arundale chose Australia as the laboratory for what he later called his ‘Australian 
experiment’.51 As the General Secretary of the Australian section of the Theosophical 
Society, he demonstrated a keen ability to harness new and existing technologies to promote 
his ideas to a wide audience. In 1926 he founded a ‘Theosophical Broadcasting Station’ 
(2GB).52
 
 He also founded a new Australian theosophical journal, titled Advance! Australia, 
which was aimed at a wider audience than the more traditional Australian Theosophist. The 
new journal drew heavily upon conservative tropes regarding good citizenship and applied 
them to the goal of a universal brotherhood: 
“Advance! Australia” will stand for the promotion of a noble type of 
Australian citizenship, vitally Australian, eagerly conscious of Australia’s 
specific place and part in the building of the future, no less eagerly conscious 
of the wider and equally vital citizenship involved in Australia’s membership 
of the British Commonwealth, and recognising, too, that beyond even this 
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Commonwealth-citizenship there is a World-citizenship, the obligations of 
which may no longer be ignored.53
 
 
Advance! Australia invoked several important ideas in its defence of good citizenship. 
Drawing upon the ANZAC ethos, it argued that ‘the supreme sacrifice of more than a million 
of our comrades in that Great Adventure’ would have been for nothing ‘if we have not 
learned that Peace must continue and perfect the virtues war called forth.’54 This same sense 
of ‘brotherhood’ and ‘sacrifice’ was needed to overcome the problems which contemporary 
society faced, including class conflict, religious tensions, international strife, and party 
politics.55 Advance! Australia urged these warring groups to set aside their parochial 
concerns in favour of ‘the welfare of the community as a whole’, and called for a leader like 
Mussolini who would ‘capture public imagination and array behind him an organised body of 
public opinion in the carrying out of the needed reforms’.56
 
 These ideological tropes, along 
with printed media and radio broadcasting, would become important tools in the arsenal of 
the citizens’ movements. 
The ‘Who’s for Australia? League’ was founded in November 1929 to transform Arundale’s 
experiment into a mass movement.57 Whilst the League never amassed more than 9000 
members, its populist rhetoric was reminiscent of the Loyalist League and the King and 
Empire Alliance that had arisen ten years earlier.58
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Mussolini.59 The League boomed under his leadership, and several dozen business and 
metropolitan branches were established by June 1930.60 This included several branches in 
Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, the latter of which included 
Harold Boas, leader of the defunct Argonauts Civic and Constitutional Club.61 Its widely 
circulated journal continued to spread the rhetoric of national unity, anti-partyism and the 
need for a strong leader, and it produced several pamphlets espousing the same ideals.62 The 
League also encouraged economic nationalism amongst its members, and organised two 
public exhibitions of Australian-manufactured goods.63 This brought it into contact with 
several other economic nationalist groups, including the Advance Australia League in 
Adelaide.64
 
 
Arundale’s ‘Australian experiment’ influenced several young New Zealand theosophists, 
although it was far less successful than in Australia. Tom Naylor, the President of the New 
Zealand section of the World Federation of Young Theosophists, was inspired by Arundale’s 
example and hoped to ‘awaken the patriotic spirit’ of New Zealanders through the use of 
patriotic folklore. He produced an intermittent journal in the late 1920s titled Advance! 
Zealandia, although it proved far less successful than its Australian counterpart.65
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successful was his plan to form a ‘Who’s for Zealandia? League’ modelled off the Who’s for 
Australia? League after Arundale gave a speaking tour of New Zealand in 1930. His lack of 
success was due to the generally more left-leaning nature of New Zealand theosophists, who 
were more inclined to favour monetary reformism over patriotic experiments.66 Naylor noted 
that his ideas had been given the ‘cold shoulder’ from the New Zealand section of the 
Theosophical Society and their journal, Theosophy in New Zealand.67
 
 The prominence of 
monetary reformism in New Zealand, which will be explored later in this chapter, was an 
important factor in the radicalisation of New Zealand conservatives. 
Youth played an important part in the formation of ‘non-party’ right-wing leagues opposing 
the party system of government. Two groups in particular, the Political Reform League of 
South Australia and the New Zealand National Movement, bear comparison. Both were 
founded by men who were, in comparison to the majority of political figures, relatively 
young and inexperienced. The Political Reform League was formed in January 1929 by Keith 
Wilson, a twenty-eight year old solicitor, to provide a voice for young conservatives in the 
South Australian Liberal Federation.68 However, the League also expressed a deep 
dissatisfaction with party politics, and sought a parliament where members could ‘legislate 
for the good of the State as a whole’ rather than being ‘restricted by Caucus or party 
platform’. To accomplish this it proposed simplifying the platform of the Liberal Federation 
to allow candidates to vote according to their conscience.69
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its inexperienced President also suggest an idealistic impatience with the status quo. Indeed, 
Wilson’s first public statement as President was full of phrases such as ‘new blood’, ‘latent 
zeal’, and ‘broad vision’, which he contrasted with the ‘fetter[s]’ and ‘restrictions’ of the 
Liberal Federation.70
 
 
The New Zealand National Movement was a group of Hawkes Bay farmers and disgruntled 
Reform Party members who were frustrated with their Party’s decision to align with the 
United Party rather than develop a bold new policy of its own. They were led by J. D. 
Ormond, a twenty-seven year old sheep farmer who had stood as an Independent for the 
Waipawa seat in the 1931 general election in defiance of the Coalition’s decision to support 
incumbent MPs. After a delegation to the Reform Executive in April 1932 failed to convince 
Coates to adopt a firmer policy, Ormond and his colleagues resolved to ‘reform the Reform 
Party or form a new party’ and that ‘an organisation should be started to support such a 
move.’ A tour of the South Island found widespread support for such an organisation, and an 
inaugural meeting of thirty businessmen and farmers was convened in Palmerston North on 
23 July 1932.71 The new movement sought the ‘eradication of the petty Party spirit’ and the 
introduction of fresh talent into national politics. Ormond told Coates that the Reform 
executive was ‘as much out of touch with the public as the moon is from the earth’, and that 
his movement would gain the support of ‘the moderate minded people’ who held ‘the interest 
of the Country at heart.’72
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Despite professing their disdain for party politics, the Political Reform League and the New 
Zealand National Movement were well versed in the language of political conservatism. The 
League proposed to alleviate Depression conditions by reducing the size of parliament, 
curbing government interference with private enterprise, rationalising government 
administration ‘by seeking the advice of experts’, and encouraging those ‘skilled in 
commerce, science, [and] industry’ to run for parliament.73 The National Movement 
condemned the ‘extravagant and socialistic policy’ of past governments and called for ‘strict 
economy in Govt expenditure’, ‘curtailment of external borrowing’, and the ‘encouragement 
of Private enterprise, personal initiative and thrift’.74 Much like many mainstream 
conservatives, the movements attempted to naturalise these values as apolitical. The League 
claimed that they were ‘for the good of the State as a whole’.75
 
 
Existing right-wing leagues, in particular the anti-communist, propagandist and educative 
groups that arose during the 1920s, also contributed to the spread of anti-party sentiment. 
Indeed, one of the chief consequences of the Depression was that it tore away the thin non-
partisan shield which these leagues used to disguise their conservative ideals regarding 
politics, economics and society. The dramatic fall in export prices in 1929, for example, 
encouraged the Constitutional Association of New South Wales to produce a pamphlet 
supporting the incumbent Nationalist government in the September Federal elections. Prime 
Minister Stanley Bruce’s plan to abolish Federal Arbitration was singularly praised as ‘giving 
industry a fair chance in the interests of the whole people.’76
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abandon its nominally non-partisan stance in favour of an ‘immediate policy’ to combat 
Lang.77 This policy called for balanced budgets, reduced costs of production and distribution, 
greater industrial cooperation, and a firm opposition to inflation and repudiation. Its purpose 
was to bring attention to ‘the urgent necessity for immediate public action’ in order to combat 
‘party strife and vacillating government’.78 Several months later the Association released 
Lang, Lunacy, Loot, a pamphlet condemning Lang’s policies as an attempt to ‘[k]ill private 
enterprise’ and foist socialism upon the state.79 A follow-up pamphlet in 1932 claimed that 
Lang Labor had been infiltrated by Communists plotting ‘a revolutionary conspiracy against 
constitutional government’.80
 
 
 
Figure 4: Anti-Lang cartoon. Source: A recipe for revolution (Sydney: Constitutional 
Association of New South Wales, 1932), 12. 
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The Sane Democracy League was also boosted by its opposition to Lang. The League had 
castigated him as a demagogue and a communist puppet since the mid-1920s, and had 
produced anti-Lang posters during his failed re-election bid in 1927.81 At the time they 
argued that ‘the whole community has been split into groups continually kept in a state of 
hostility by the yapping of the politicians and the operation of the machinery that the 
politicians have created.’82 The League’s criticism of Lang reached unprecedented vitriolic 
heights in 1930, with two entire issues of Sane Democracy being devoted against his 
campaign.83 When Lang won the election in a landslide, the League foretold dire results. 
‘[Bavin’s] was not a party policy nor even a State policy, but an Australian policy,’ wrote 
Sane Democracy of Lang’s opponent.84
 
 This language reinforced the naturalisation of 
conservative values as being in the ‘national interest’ in contrast to the values of organised 
labour. It also demonstrated that, whilst existing right-wing leagues were willing to channel 
popular discontent with the status quo, they did not wish to challenge the position of 
mainstream conservative parties as the political representative of conservative ideals. 
NEW ZEALAND CONSERVATIVES AND MONETARY REFORM 
A distinctive feature of conservative radicalisation in New Zealand was the popularity of 
‘unorthodox’ economic theories. This was a general phenomenon encompassing individuals 
on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, the most prominent example of which 
was the rise of the New Zealand Labour Party. Prominent Labourite and ardent theosophist 
H. G. R. Mason was an example of the left-wing of this phenomenon. Monetary reformists 
subscribed to a multitude of ideas, ranging from revolutionary socialists to those who sought 
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simply to ‘fine-tune’ the capitalist economic system. Conservatives were particularly drawn 
to the latter: they argued that capitalism, as it was currently conceived, had failed due to 
structural deficiencies within the allocation of resources rather than a fundamental flaw in the 
capitalist mode of production. Many monetary reformists attributed these deficiencies to a 
conspiratorial element attached to international finance, which was often heavily imbued with 
anti-Semitism. Monetary reformists remained loyal to the tenets of private property and 
individualism whilst seeking to alter elements of the economic system such as the control and 
distribution of currency.  
 
Whilst Douglas social credit study circles had existed in New Zealand in the 1920s, it was not 
until the publication of Arthur Nelson Field’s The Truth About the Slump in 1931 that 
monetary reform was brought to a popular audience. Field’s work, which laid the blame for 
the Depression on a small clique of prominent Jewish financiers and their families, was well 
received by the New Zealand public and was discussed in parliament by Harry Atmore and 
Bob Semple.85 The number of ‘funny money’ groups, as they were known, subsequently 
proliferated. In October 1932 an attempt was made by one such group, the Stable Money 
League, to unite these various monetary reformers. The resulting Federation of Monetary 
Reform Associations included representatives from 33 different organisations as well as the 
Auckland and Hawkes Bay provincial districts of the Farmers’ Union.86
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The Federation was overshadowed by the formation of a united Douglas social credit 
movement in New Zealand the following January. By mid-1933 there were branches of social 
credit throughout rural New Zealand and in several major cities with a total membership of 
around 4000.87 These various monetary reform movements were able to bring a considerable 
force of public opinion to bear: in 1932-1933 48 separate petitions calling for ‘an enquiry into 
the present monetary system and alternatives thereto’ made their way to parliament, one of 
which had 2700 signatories.88 Bowing to popular pressure, the government established a 
Monetary Commission in 1934, although its mandate did not extend to an evaluation of the 
existing capitalist economic system. The Commission’s most distinguished witness was 
Major C. H. Douglas himself, who was then touring New Zealand courtesy of the Douglas 
social credit movement.89
 
 
The prominence of monetary reformism in New Zealand during the Depression can be 
understood as a form of protest against orthodox economics. In Australia, conservatives could 
direct their frustrations against either the Federal or State Labor governments since 
deflationary economic policy had not been consistently applied by either. Unlike Australia, 
however, New Zealand was governed almost entirely by conservatives throughout the 
Depression, and power was held by a Coalition of the two conservative parties during its 
nadir. Conservative frustration had few other targets except orthodox economics, at least until 
Coates’ currency devaluation in January 1933. As the New Zealand psychologist T. A. 
Hunter argued in 1934, economics had usurped the role of the church as the people’s new 
religion, with ‘[b]uying price, selling price and profit constitut[ing] the new trinity.’ The 
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simple solutions offered by monetary reform, which suggested that a minor tweak or 
alteration in the capitalist system would restore prosperity, acted as an emotional salve for 
these disenchanted conservatives.90
 
 
THE CITIZENS’ LEAGUE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
The journey from reactionary to radical is epitomised in the example of Edward Daniel 
Alexander Bagot, founder of the first citizens’ movement known as the Citizens’ League of 
South Australia. Born on 25 December 1893 at Henley Beach in South Australia to a middle 
class Protestant family, Bagot was educated in England at Framlingham and Lowestoft. He 
served as a Lieutenant in the 1st Australian Wireless Signal Squadron during the Great War 
and ran a series of semi-successful transport services in Mesopotamia and Australia during 
the 1920s.91 His travels made him a popular figure, and in 1929 whilst working as an 
insurance agent in Adelaide he was invited to give a speech to the Constitutional Club on 
emerging markets in the Middle East. At the time, his knowledge of politics was limited to an 
appreciation for sound business practice: his speech criticised high labour costs which made 
Australian exports prohibitively expensive in emerging markets.92 His words evidently 
inspired the Club, for they co-opted him onto the Executive Committee in June 1929.93
 
 
Like many other right-wing leagues of its kind, the Constitutional Club served as an 
incubator for a younger and more radical generation of conservatives during the Depression. 
It began to host public speakers calling for the ‘rationalisation of industry’ and an end to the 
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government’s ‘orgy of expenditure’.94 One guest speaker, leader of the state Country Party 
and member of parliament A. G. Cameron, lambasted party politics as the cause of the 
Depression, and warned that the country was headed for a military dictatorship ‘unless there 
was a cleaning up of the present Parliamentary system.’95 It was within this environment that 
Bagot, like many of his fellow small businessmen of an individualist mindset, anxiously 
sought a solution to the Great Depression. In April 1930 he wrote to an associate in 
Melbourne criticising Scullin’s wheat pool as an ‘attempt at sovietism’. If simultaneous 
protest meetings were organised by the forces of capital in every city, he considered, Scullin 
would be compelled to establish a ‘Supreme Economic Council’ to deal with the 
Depression.96
 
 Shortly after Cameron’s foreboding speech to the Constitutional Club, Bagot 
wrote to the Advertiser openly calling for a dictatorship: 
Surely through the length and breadth of this country, which produced such 
outstanding personalities in time of war, the individual exists who is able and 
willing to take command in time of peace, one strong enough to cut the 
shackles of party politics, to displace those useless politicians both Liberal and 
Labour who have allowed the country to drift into insolvency by their sheer 
ineptitude[.] 
 
Such a dictator, Bagot continued, would need to be ‘a big man in business leadership’ who 
would remove the government from all forms of enterprise, abolish arbitration, revise tariffs 
and bounties, and replace State parliaments with ‘small Councils of efficient operatives well 
paid for their services’.97
 
 
As Depression conditions worsened, Bagot became driven by a sense of urgency. In a 
September 1930 address to ‘the younger generation of political thinkers’ in the Political 
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Reform League, he stressed the need to ‘act and to act immediately if we are to avert one of 
the biggest crashes that Australia has ever seen’. The crisis, he stated, was twofold; political, 
in the sense that democracy had become subservient to ‘party politics’ and ‘partisan 
platforms’; and financial, due to the ‘insidious onslaught of political power upon commercial 
fields’: 
 
It is not an uncommon occurrence for a country to be faced with a serious 
political crisis or a financial panic independently of each other, but when both 
happen together the blow is so staggering that for a while we are numbed by 
its strength and thus dazed, are inclined to let others find a remedy while we 
do nothing. In other words we are inclined to say “Isn’t it appalling? 
Something will have to be done soon” instead of saying “Isn’t it appalling; 
something must be done now [emphasis in original].” 
 
The urgent need to do something to avoid a pending crisis was reinforced by the failure of 
earlier responses. A meeting of businessmen in July 1930, Bagot noted, had ‘passed 
resolutions and sent a few gentlemen to Canberra who achieved little’, and the Kyabram 
movement founded at Moonta earlier that year ‘no longer moves’. The time had come, he 
concluded, to ‘show our politicians … that there is a section of the public – a long suffering 
section indeed – that has nearly reached the limit of its endurance – that now cries halt!’98
 
 
Bagot decided to follow through on his pledge to do something by forming a new protest 
movement. One of his techniques involved drawing on the knowledge and expertise of 
existing right-wing organisations. Throughout September 1930, he utilised the connections of 
the South Australian Constitutional Club to approach several such organisations with a view 
to organising a combined demonstration against ‘the criminal procrastination of the Federal 
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Government’.99 His proposal was well received, and a meeting was held at Balfour’s Café on 
3 October 1930 to organise the demonstration. Present at the meeting were 35 ‘members and 
friends’ of the Constitutional Club, including Keith Wilson and C. L. Abbott from the 
Political Reform League and A. L. Langsford from the Wheat Producers’ Freedom 
Association. Those present resolved to hold the demonstration in the Adelaide Town Hall on 
14 October, and to form a permanent organisation to follow up on the demonstration.100 An 
Executive Committee of ten was appointed, including Langsford as country organiser, Abbott 
as Town Hall meeting planner, and several members of the Constitutional Club.101 The newly 
formed Citizens’ League also absorbed an existing right-wing organisation known as the 
Empire Loyalty League, and it agreed to cooperate with the South Australian Proportional 
Representation Group, the Advance Australia League, and the South Australian branch of the 
Women’s Non-Party Association.102
 
 These organisations connected the Citizens’ League to 
the right-wing ideological tradition that preceded it. 
THE AUSTRALIAN CITIZENS’ LEAGUE 
The formation of a citizens’ movement in Victoria was partially influenced by the Citizens’ 
League of South Australia, which resolved in January 1931 that Bagot should help establish 
one there.103
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 However, Bagot’s experiences in Melbourne demonstrated the nuanced nature 
of conservative discontent, in particular regarding fractions within the capitalist class. Whilst 
Bagot was well-received by the Melbourne Constitutional Club, his relationship with a group 
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of influential businessmen named the Citizens’ Committee was more strained. The Citizens’ 
Committee had been formed in December 1930 to assist Lyons with his £28 million loan 
conversion campaign, and included prominent members of Victoria’s conservative elite such 
as H. D. Luxton (Mayor of Melbourne), R. W. Knox (Chairman of the National Union), and 
Kingsley Henderson (partner at the architectural firm A. & K. Henderson).104 The Committee 
was also associated with ‘the Group of Six’, a small clique of conservative politicians and 
professionals including Robert Menzies (President of the Victorian Young Nationalists 
Organisation) and Staniforth Ricketson (stockbroker at J. B. Were & Sons) who sought to 
woo Lyons and his followers away from the Labor Party.105
 
 
Bagot viewed the Citizens’ Committee as a potential ally in forming a Victorian Citizens’ 
League, and he attended their final meeting in January 1931. After hearing a brief speech by 
Bagot on the work that had been done so far in South Australia, the Citizens’ Committee 
agreed in principle to work with the Melbourne Constitutional Club in forming a citizens’ 
movement in Victoria. There were, however, two potentially divisive issues. The Citizens’ 
Committee was too associated with conservative party politics for Bagot’s liking, so Bagot 
recommended that the Committee support Constitutional Club secretary P. W. Powell for 
leadership of the new movement instead.106
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Paul’s Cathedral. Bagot had ‘a long interview’ with Lee Neil in which he stressed ‘the 
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absolute necessity for bringing in from the outset all classes of the community and making it 
a real Citizens’ movement’, which Lee Neil agreed with. The two eventually agreed to leave 
the matter of leadership in the hands of a committee from which a chairman would be elected 
at each meeting.107
 
 
A second and ultimately more divisive issue arose over whether the Victorian or South 
Australian citizens’ movements would take the lead on the national stage. Bagot envisioned 
the new Victorian movement as a mirror of his own, and requested that it adopt the name and 
badge of the Citizens’ League of South Australia.108 Whilst the Melbourne Constitutional 
Club was happy with this plan, the Citizens’ Committee wanted to form an entirely new 
movement named the ‘Australian Citizens’ League’ that would then spread to Sydney and 
Brisbane, rather than accepting ‘the extension of a League already formed’.109 The 
Committee won the argument, and Bagot left Melbourne with little else beyond a vague 
promise of cooperation.110 Even this was not forthcoming, as the Citizens’ Committee was 
keen to demonstrate its independence from the South Australian movement. In a statement 
released on 31 January 1931, Henderson said that the new Victorian citizens’ movement 
would be a continuation of the work of the Citizens’ Committee.111 The announcement took 
Bagot by surprise, who had been trying to contact Knox for an update on the movement’s 
progress.112
 
 The eventual reply from Knox emphasized his disdain for Bagot: 
Apparently you do not get copies of the Melbourne “Argus”; otherwise, you 
would have seen, almost daily, accounts of the Citizens’ Movement which was 
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brought before the notice of the public last week very forcibly by a strong 
“leader” … The movement is making in every way satisfactory progress.113
 
 
The League was subsequently launched at a Melbourne Town Hall meeting on 19 February. 
 
The schisms between the two citizens’ movements reflected the cleavage between middle and 
upper class conservatives. Members of the Citizens’ Committee came from the upper 
echelons of Melbourne society, and had close ties to the National Federation of Victoria. 
Bagot, in contrast, was a political newcomer from the professional middle class. Whilst he 
shared their desire to uphold orthodox economic values, his fiery rhetoric and his virulent 
anti-partyism made him a wild card with the potential to split the conservative vote. The 
desire to encourage conservative unity was of particular concern in January 1931 because the 
openly ‘inflationist’ Theodore had just been re-appointed as Treasurer. The reluctance of the 
Citizens’ Committee to follow Bagot or the Melbourne Constitutional Club also stemmed 
from the role they had played in securing the conversion loan. Citizens’ Committee members 
had, in their eyes, defended the nation’s honour from the stain of repudiation through their 
‘patriotic and painstaking efforts’.114 Therefore, when the Australian Citizens’ League was 
founded in Victoria, its leaders were keen to stress that it was a continuation of the Citizens’ 
Committee rather than a branch of the Citizens’ League of South Australia.115
 
 Class and 
political allegiance would continue to influence the Australian Citizens’ League, and will be 
further explored in chapter five. 
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THE ALL FOR AUSTRALIA LEAGUE 
Unlike the Australian Citizens’ League, the All for Australia League arose independently of 
the Citizens’ League of South Australia. One of its early influences was a rural protest 
movement named the Producers’ Advisory Council, which emerged from the ‘financial 
panic’ that followed Lang’s electoral victory in October 1930. Its key instigators were 
Graziers’ Association President F. H. Tout and former M. P. for Gwydir C. L. A. Abbott, 
who met several times to discuss ‘what could be done to prevent a smash’. Abbott suggested 
that the Country Party Central Council set up a meeting of various primary producer, 
business and manufacturing organisations, and at a widely attended meeting on 4 December 
1930 it was decided to form a pressure group that would organise protest meetings 
throughout the New South Wales countryside calling for lowered costs of production through 
drastic government economies, tariff reductions and the abolition of arbitration.116 Its early 
activities gathered significant public attention, and in January 1931 it addressed a total of 
40000 people at 40 meetings.117 Abbott’s efforts impressed several Sydney businessmen, 
including R. A. Malloch of farming equipment manufacturer Dangar, Gedye & Malloch and 
Deputy Chairman of Associated Newspapers Sydney Snow. Abbott explained what the 
Council had done in the country and ‘suggested they should try to do the same in Sydney’.118
 
 
At the same time that this was occurring, a group of Sydney Rotarians including Alex J. 
Gibson (consulting engineer with Julius Gibson & Poole) and Norman Keysor (managing 
director of General Industries) held discussions on the deteriorating economic situation. After 
meeting with the leaders of several business and manufacturers’ organisations, a conference 
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was convened in the Sydney Chamber of Commerce on 28 January 1931. As was the case 
with the Citizens’ League of South Australia, the attendees at this inaugural conference were 
associated with a number of current and former right-wing groups: A. E. Heath from the 
Constitutional Association and the Producers’ Advisory Council; Sir Henry Braddon, whose 
long list of organisational affiliations included the Sane Democracy League and the King and 
Empire Alliance; Malloch and Snow, who had recently spoken with Abbott about the 
Producers’ Advisory Council; and Major-General H. G. Bennett, brother of Who’s For 
Australia? League President A. E. Bennett.119 These individuals later formed the nucleus of 
the first State Council of the All for Australia League, and coopted A. E. Bennett from the 
Who’s For Australia? League and O. D. A. Oberg from the Sane Democracy League and the 
Constitutional Association.120 The new movement was launched at a public meeting in the 
Killara Memorial Hall on 12 February 1931. The Citizens’ League of South Australia does 
not appear to have been involved in the establishment of the All for Australia League, 
although Bagot maintained a regular correspondence with the Constitutional Association of 
New South Wales.121
 
 
THE NEW ZEALAND LEGION 
The emergence of a citizens’ movement in New Zealand was influenced by right-wing 
organisations on both sides of the Tasman. However, despite the striking similarities between 
the citizens’ movements in Australia and New Zealand, there do not appear to have been any 
direct connections between the movements themselves or their leaders. Nevertheless, many 
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prominent figures in the citizens’ movements had business and professional interests in both 
countries, and this trans-Tasman view of business and economics may have extended to a 
similar appreciation of politics. New Zealand employers’ and farmers’ organisations were 
certainly aware of the deteriorating financial situation in Australia in 1931, and they stressed 
the need for drastic action to prevent the same thing from happening in New Zealand. In his 
speech to the annual dominion conference of the Farmers’ Union in July 1931, President W. 
J. Polson stated that New Zealand would ‘be faced with the precise financial problems which 
confront New South Wales’ unless rural and urban interests cooperated in cutting production 
costs. One attendee at the conference suggested that New Zealand should follow the 
Australian example in reducing interest rates on government bonds.122 When New Zealand 
was at its lowest economic point in 1933, members of the Associated Chambers of 
Commerce claimed that the Australian economy had begun to improve since the new 
conservative government had started implementing policies that incentivised private 
industry.123
 
 
Newspapers and magazines kept New Zealanders abreast of events transpiring in Australia 
during the Depression. The entire June 1931 issue of the New Zealand Financial Times was 
devoted to the economic situation in Australia, paying particular attention to the 
Commonwealth Bank’s attempts to counter the Scullin government’s initiatives. It also noted 
with approval the formation of ‘citizen groups’ such as the All for Australia League, whose 
badge was reproduced on the front cover with the slogan ‘Loyal Australians Prepare to 
Uphold Australia’s Honour’.124
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the trans-Tasman cables from Auckland and Wellington both originated in Sydney, which 
allowed news items from Australia and the wider British Empire to be reprinted in New 
Zealand. The growth of the citizens’ movements in Australia was covered throughout 1931, 
with newspapers noting favourably their call for national unity in the face of party strife. One 
reporter expressed incredulity that party politicians might prevent a similar unity from being 
achieved in New Zealand: 
 
Can it be that just as the friends of good government in Australia are uniting, 
regardless of party, to save the country, our own leaders will resist the call to 
national unity and aggravate the common danger by maintaining the artificial 
division of the party system[?]125
 
 
The All for Australia League attracted the majority of this press attention, due perhaps to the 
geographical proximity of New South Wales and the historical ties it shared with New 
Zealand. New South Wales was also the site of the most heated divisions during the 
Depression: Jack Lang’s party held power there until May 1932, which provided a convenient 
rhetorical opposite to the values that the citizens’ movements espoused.126
 
 At the very least, 
this suggests that many New Zealanders were aware of the Australian citizens’ movements. 
The paramilitary New Guard had a more direct influence on the New Zealand Legion. The 
combative rhetoric of its leader Eric Campbell, combined with its violent clashes with 
unemployed and communist meetings across Sydney in the summer of 1931-1932, were 
regularly covered by the New Zealand press. However, it was the antics of a mounted New 
Guardsman named Francis De Groot at the Sydney Harbour Bridge opening ceremony in 
March 1932 that attracted the most attention.127
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virtually overnight: he received fan mail from several New Zealanders, including a school 
boy in Canterbury who attended a fancy dress ball in a De Groot costume.128 A promotional 
video containing statements from himself and Eric Campbell was screened before feature 
films at the St James Theatre in Wellington and was met with applause.129  The opening of 
the Haupiri Bridge in Kopara was disrupted by an ‘amateur “De Groot”’ who ‘galloped up on 
a horse and, with a dramatic sweep of a stick, severed the ribbon across the bridge’.130 This 
positive reception soured after May 1932 when a police investigation revealed the New 
Guard’s secret plans to launch a coup against the state government.131 By the end of 1932 the 
movement had begun adopting the trappings of fascism, which further tarnished its reputation 
in New Zealand.132
 
 
The declining popularity of the New Guard coincided with the birth of the New Zealand 
Legion. As with the Australian citizens’ movements, the Legion emerged from the tradition 
of right-wing agitation that preceded it. By November 1932 the New Zealand National 
Movement was all but defunct, and its organiser, a Waipukurau sheepfarmer named J. R. V. 
Sherston, began canvassing leading conservative and right-wing figures across the country 
who he believed might be interested in forming a new movement. The first individual he 
approached was Arthur Nelson Field, the prominent monetary reformer from Nelson. Apart 
from being knowledgeable regarding monetary reform, Field was also well placed to inform 
Sherston of developments overseas. He had received orders from hundreds of foreign 
publishers and individuals for his work, and his Australian correspondents kept him well 
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informed of events occurring across the Tasman, including those involving the New 
Guard.133 However, Field and Sherton held different views on how a new movement should 
be constituted, so the two men agreed to part ways.134 Sherston then met with Sir Andrew 
Russell, a New Zealand general during the First World War and a long time acquaintance of 
Sherston’s. Russell was associated with several right-wing organisations, including the 
National Defence League and the Returned Services Association, and he had a particular 
interest in monetary reform.135 The two men met in January 1933, and Russell agreed 
wholeheartedly with Sherston’s ideas. ‘[W]e need a fresh start’, he recorded in his diary, 
‘doing away with party government, not quite socialism nor yet fascism, rather a 
combination.’136
 
 Russell later became Chairman of the Hawkes Bay Division of the New 
Zealand Legion. 
Sherston also met with several Wellington businessmen and professionals in January 1933. 
One of these was a urologist named Robert Campbell Begg, who had recently become 
renowned for his election to the Wellington Hospital Board as a candidate for the Wellington 
Civic League, the body formed by the anti-communist Welfare League in 1921. Begg’s 
campaign was based on his belief that hospital administration was heavily politicised, 
haphazard and inefficient, and required self-sacrificing and non-partisan leadership if it were 
to become more economic and sustainable.137
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leadership or committee member role since 1929.138 He was also the younger brother of 
Dunedin sheepfarmer James Begg, who was a long-standing member of the Victoria and 
Navy Leagues and a founding member of the Welfare League in 1919. When he met with 
Sherston, Begg had already been considering how his successful rationalisation of the 
Wellington Hospital Board might be extended to local and central government across New 
Zealand.139
 
 
It was around this time that tenuous links were established between the New Guard and the 
New Zealand Legion. During a stopover in Fremantle on 19 January 1933 on his way to 
Europe for business, Campbell mentioned that the New Guard had established ties with a 
‘strong body in New Zealand’.140 This may have been hyperbole considering Campbell 
boasted in the same breath that the New Guard had 250000 members and active branches in 
every Australian state, but it is interesting that his claim coincided with the formative 
discussions of the New Zealand Legion in January 1933. His announcement led a New 
Zealand Labour MP to ask the Minister of Justice in February whether he had any 
information regarding a local branch of the New Guard, and ‘what steps he proposed to take 
to suppress it’. The Minister replied that he no information that such an organisation 
existed.141 Upon reaching Europe Campbell met with British Union of Fascists leader Oswald 
Mosley, and the two established a ‘New Empire Union’ with Campbell empowered to speak 
for the New Guard in Australia and South Africa as well as an unnamed organisation in New 
Zealand.142
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In 1968 Campbell recalled that someone in New Zealand had contacted him during the 
Depression seeking advice on organisation. Whilst he could no longer remember who made 
the inquiry, he recalled that ‘[t]here was no discussion of policy … [as] there was a similarity 
between our objectives that made comment unnecessary.’143 Since the New Guard was well 
and truly dead by the 1960s and Campbell was no longer in the public spotlight, there was far 
less reason for him to exaggerate his international connections than there had been in 1933. 
Michael Pugh suggested that it was Hugh McLean Campbell, the Reform MP for Hawkes 
Bay, who made contact with the New Guard leader. This assumption appears to have been 
based on Pugh’s mistaken belief that Hugh was Eric Campbell’s Uncle, which Pugh seems to 
have gathered from an article in the New Zealand Observer.144 However, Eric Campbell’s 
first cousin (once removed) was Sir Andrew Russell, and it was possible that the Hawkes Bay 
sheepfarmer contacted Campbell after being canvassed by Sherston in January 1933.145
 
 It 
may also have been Sherston himself: if he had discussed his proposed organisation with 
prominent New Zealand personalities such as Russell, Field and Begg, he may also have 
sought the advice of right-wing luminaries in Australia. 
A key figure in the transfer of New Guard ideas to New Zealand was journalist and author 
Will Lawson. Born in Durham, England in 1876, Lawson’s family migrated to New Zealand 
in 1880 and settled in Brisbane four years later. After working for several years as a clerk he 
embarked on a lifelong career as a writer, which saw him travel back and forth across the 
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Tasman almost thirty times throughout his life.146 He was working for the Evening News in 
Sydney when the Depression hit, and his fellow reporters wrote several approving articles 
about the formation of the All for Australia League in February 1931.147 After the News 
merged with the Sun in March he commenced full-time work in the Sydney office of the New 
Zealand-based Mount Cook Tourist Company, until it closed in April and requested that he 
relocate to the head office in Wellington. When the company folded at the end of 1931 he 
moved to Auckland where he worked as a publicity man for a flax company and wrote 
occasional pieces for local newspapers.148
 
 Lawson was working as a freelance writer for the 
New Zealand Observer in Auckland during the unemployed riots of April 1932. His 
experiences led him to write fondly about the way that the New Guard had dealt with the 
unemployed in Sydney: 
From a mere handful of carefully picked men, whose loyalty to high 
Australian ideals was undoubted, it has grown into a body composed of many 
thousands of patriots of the highest calibre. By its silent work, as well as its 
spectacular posing, it undoubtedly saved Australian cities from disturbances 
such as those which have occurred in Auckland. 
 
Whilst Lawson incorrectly claimed that the New Guard had been formed by the All for 
Australia League, he argued that a similar body should be formed in New Zealand ‘while the 
Soviet propaganda is stirring the people in one direction or another.’149
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celebrations.150 He was hired as the editor for the movement’s new journal, National 
Opinion, where he worked alongside Begg in the Legion’s head office in Kelvin Chambers, 
Wellington. It is quite possible that, in the close confines of the Legion’s office, Lawson and 
Begg held many conversations about policy. Lawson’s editorials were amongst some of the 
fieriest articles published in National Opinion.151
 
 
The New Zealand Legion was launched by Begg at a conference of businessmen and farmers 
organised by the Wellington Civic League on 8 February 1933. Begg was chosen to lead the 
new movement, and a Committee was empowered to establish branches across the country.152 
The Committee included two of Begg’s associates from the Civic League, a fellow member 
of the Wellington Rotary Club, and Sherston from the New Zealand National Movement.153 
Many of the founders of the National Movement also became prominent members of the 
Legion.154
 
 The cooption of members from a variety of existing right-wing organisations, 
combined with the influence of the New Guard, demonstrated the connections between the 
New Zealand Legion and the radicalised conservative tradition that arose during the 
Depression across Australasia. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Great Depression had a significant impact on economic and political life in Australia and 
New Zealand. Plummeting export receipts, increased public debt, rising unemployment and 
social instability combined to generate a sense of crisis amongst the populace. As conditions 
worsened, some conservatives began to question the ability of the existing political 
machinery to handle the crisis. Their search for alternative solutions, both domestic and 
foreign, carried them in often unorthodox and radical directions. Some conservatives looked 
favourably on the sense of order and purpose that fascism had apparently created in Italy, 
whilst others sought to correct the perceived failures of the capitalist system through a variety 
of reforms to the control and distribution of currency. This ‘monetary reformism’ was 
particularly popular in New Zealand: with the government nominally following orthodox 
economic policies, disenchanted conservatives were more likely to turn to unorthodox 
economics as a form of protest. Chapter six will demonstrate the effect this monetary 
reformism had on the New Zealand Legion as opposed to the three Australian citizens’ 
movements. 
 
The most significant ideological development during the Depression was the emergence of a 
form of ‘anti-political political thought’. This type of thought laid the blame for the crisis at 
the feet of party politicians and the extra-parliamentary ‘machines’ that had been constructed 
around the mainstream political parties since the turn of the century. It drew primarily upon 
the right-wing tradition that had developed in Australia and New Zealand since the 1880s, in 
particular the anti-communist, propagandist and educational leagues that had appeared in the 
1920s. Existing leagues, as well as new groups characterised by youth and political idealism, 
participated in this process. What resulted was a blend of ‘non-party’, reactionary pro-
capitalist conservative ideals with a radical form of ‘anti-partyism’ directed towards the 
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supposedly sectional interests of contemporary political parties. The fact that most of these 
groups still supported, or were at least ambivalent towards, mainstream conservative parties 
forestalled any tension that might have arisen between these reactionary and radical ideas. 
 
The four citizens’ movements were a manifestation of this process of conservative 
radicalisation. By recruiting the ideas and the individuals associated with existing right-wing 
organisations, they thoroughly grounded themselves in both the reactionary conservative 
worldview that dominated the right-wing spectrum of Australasian politics as well as the 
radical tradition that had emerged during the Depression. What distinguished the citizens’ 
movements, as the next chapter will show, was a commitment to large-scale, populist-style 
mobilisation rather than the low-level propagandist methods commonly favoured by right-
wing organisations over the previous decade. Furthermore, as subsequent chapters will show, 
the citizens’ movements were far less able or willing to maintain the balance between 
reactionary and radical ideas than their predecessors. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A CALL TO ARMS: THE POPULIST CULTURE OF MASS 
CONSERVATIVE MOBILISATION 
 
[I]n no time a dissident body sprung up, calling itself the All For Australia 
movement. Members wore a disc in their lapels inscribed “A.F.A.” One 
morning on the crowded Mosman ferry a dozen or so of these appeared, not 
even provoking curiousity. The following morning there were twenty or thirty. 
They began to proliferate. By the end of the week a majority of the passengers 
were wearing them. The same thing was going on in every middle class suburb 
in Sydney.1
 
 
Upon recalling the dramatic rise of the All for Australia League in later years, one 
Sydneysider retold the above anecdote. In the course of a single week, according to this 
anecdote, a practice arose amongst League members that involved the wearing of badges as 
an identifying symbol. This practice became so common that by the end of that week, more 
people were wearing badges than not. Equally important, however, was the fact that this 
practice did not even provoke curiousity amongst bystanders. The badge, it appeared, held 
implicit meanings and connotations that were widely known and accepted by wearers and 
non-wearers alike – so widely that they did not require comment. This chapter explores how 
this rapid proliferation of meaning occurred. It suggests that one of the crucial ingredients in 
securing a mass following was the ability of a citizens’ movement to channel the discontent 
that many conservatives experienced during the Depression with populist promotional and 
organisational techniques that encouraged a lasting sense of enthusiasm, engagement and 
belonging. These techniques will be used to compare the four successful citizens’ movements 
with other movements that failed to gather popular support. The types of individuals who 
were attracted to the movements, and their motivations, are also analysed in this chapter. 
                                                     
1 Exercise Book titled ‘Politics; UAP; AFA’, folder 4, H. M. Storey papers, MS 8539, NLA, 25. 
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ATTAINING MASS MEMBERSHIPS 
The previous chapter showed how Edward Daniel Alexander Bagot, the leading figure in the 
Citizens’ League of South Australia, was influenced by the phenomenon of conservative 
radicalisation that occurred during the Depression. Through his position in the Citizens’ 
League, Bagot also became one of the key influences on the spread of mass conservative 
mobilisation throughout Australia during the Depression. His primary concern was to avoid 
the loss of momentum that had crippled previous protests, such as the abortive Kyabram-
inspired movement at Moonta earlier in 1930. At the inaugural meeting of the Citizens’ 
League on 3 October, Bagot introduced a successful resolution that the attendees should 
‘form a permanent body of citizens to follow up this protest with further concerted action.’2
 
 
This resolution embodied the style of protest that Bagot had been increasingly drawn towards 
during his period of political radicalisation: it was pervasive, in that it would unite a large 
body of decent, right-minded citizens; and it was sustained, in that it would maintain its 
enthusiasm through continued action. Such a body would pressure government not through 
delegations or low-level propaganda, but through the sheer weight of mass public opinion 
and, if necessary, through directed voting power. This method of protest became the standard 
modus operandi of the citizens’ movements and of other forms of mass conservative 
mobilisation during the Depression. 
The citizens’ movements used several tools in their drive to attain mass memberships, 
including public ceremony, organisation, symbolism and mass media. Public ceremony 
played an important role in attracting new recruits and maintaining enthusiasm amongst 
existing members. In particular, mass meetings or ‘monster rallies’ provided a stage for the 
citizens’ movements to promote their ideas to a wide audience. Whilst the ‘public meeting’ 
                                                     
2 Minutes of Inaugural Meeting, 3 October 1930, box 1 item 1, CLSA papers. 
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had been a standard form of colonial political participation since the nineteenth century, the 
citizens’ movements meetings were distinguished by their sheer size: attendees typically 
numbered in the thousands, which required many to stand or queue outside. This was not 
uncommon on the left – Jack Lang’s populist oratory was renowned for attracting large 
audiences – but was relatively novel on the right. The inaugural meeting of the Citizens’ 
League of South Australia packed out the Adelaide Town Hall, with those unable to obtain a 
seat lining the walls, aisles, and ‘even the organ galleries’; the inaugural Australian Citizens’ 
League meeting at the Melbourne Town Hall attracted over 3000 people, with a similar 
number being turned away at the door.3 Attendance was so high at the inaugural All for 
Australia League meeting at Killara Memorial Hall that loudspeakers were set up outside the 
venue to cater for the overflow.4
 
 These mass meetings represented an attempt to consciously 
portray the overwhelming size and scope of the citizens’ movements. Since the movements 
viewed themselves as the voice of the silent majority, they were keen to demonstrate, as often 
and in as many ways as possible, the sheer weight of numbers that they claimed to represent. 
                                                     
3 Register News-Pictorial, 15 October 1930, 3; Advertiser, 20 February 1931, 14. 
4 Sydney Morning Herald, 13 February 1931, 11. 
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Figure 5: The Citizens’ League of South Australia’s ‘membership thermometer’. Source: 
Register, 25 November 1930, 28. 
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Figure 6: Inaugural meeting of the Citizens’ League of South Australia at the Adelaide 
Town Hall. Source: Register, 16 October 1930, 13. 
 
The mass meeting also provided a means for the citizens’ movements to engage directly with 
their membership. Advertisements for meetings, which were published and distributed as 
widely as possible, used emotive and personal language to appeal directly to the reader. In 
figure 7, the Citizens’ League of South Australia linked the fate of the nation with that of the 
individual: it was only by taking action – by joining the Citizens’ League – that financial 
order would be restored. General platitudes and a lack of specific or controversial policies 
ensured that the advertisement appealed to a wide audience. Once at the meeting, attendees 
listened to speakers who were familiar with the nature of their grievances and understood 
their desire for urgent action. Bagot urged the crowd at the inaugural Citizens’ League of 
South Australia meeting to bring about ‘the cleansing of our political stables’, whilst other 
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speakers warned that ‘a crisis is approaching’ that required ‘immediate action’.5
 
 Gibson gave 
a rousing speech to the inaugural All for Australia League meeting that listed a plethora of 
grievances with the government, including its ‘reckless borrowing and expenditure’, the 
‘deliberate alignment of class against class’, and ‘the setting of party and personal power 
above the interests of the State’. Speakers often involved the audience in their speech by 
appealing to their sense of public duty: 
[The Depression] had been referred to as a financial crisis: but they were 
approaching a crisis in their national honour. Were they going to stand by and 
see the fair name of Australia dragged in the dust of infamy? (Cries of “No” 
and “Never.”).6
 
 
This reinforced the link between individual action and national well-being: attendees were 
cast as the pivotal players in ensuring whether government carried out its duties responsibly. 
Mass meetings were typically concluded with a resolution condemning government inaction 
or calling for greater unity and cooperation between parties, which invariably gathered 
unanimous support. The text of these resolutions was usually prepared in advance, which 
made the expression of approval by attendees a formality.7
 
 
                                                     
5 Addresses by E. D. A. Bagot, L. V. Pellew, and T. R. H. Griffiths at a Citizens’ Public Meeting in Adelaide Town 
Hall, 14 October 1930, box 1 item 1, CLSA papers. 
6 Sydney Morning Herald, 13 February 1931, 11. 
7 Resolution passed at Citizens’ Public Meeting in Adelaide Town Hall, 14 October 1930, box 1 item 1, CLSA 
papers. 
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Figure 7: Advertisement for a Citizens’ League of South Australia ‘monster meeting’. 
Source: Box 1 item 8, CLSA papers. 
 
One of the crucial ingredients in the success of the citizens’ movements was the importance 
that was placed on the attainment of a mass membership. The very legitimacy of their cause 
depended on the belief that only the mobilised and directed voting power of decent, fair-
minded citizens could achieve what they perceived as true, lasting democratic change. As a 
result, the citizens’ movement leaders went to great lengths to organise their new movements. 
Between 17 February and 26 March 1933, New Zealand Legion committee members 
travelled nearly 15000 kilometres across the country organising meetings and establishing 
branches. Begg alone traversed 8490 kilometres and attended 42 meetings, which led the 
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Evening Post to declare that he ‘must have some of St. Paul's qualifications as a missionary’.8 
Inaugural meetings were by invitation only and were closed to the press, which generated an 
air of mystery about the new movement. This attracted audiences of over 2000 in major 
cities, whilst country meetings were often attended by 300 or more people.9 The Australian 
movements were no less energetic; the Citizens’ League of South Australia held 221 public 
meetings between October 1930 and June 1931, which attracted a total attendance of 42000. 
Bagot in particular was praised as the figure to whom ‘the success of the League’s operations 
to date has been due in a very large measure.’10
 
 
The citizens’ movements utilised novel enrolment techniques to encourage new recruits. The 
Citizens’ League, for example, awarded gold badges and brooches to individuals who 
encouraged large numbers of individuals to join.11 It also created the ‘L. G. Abbott Shield’ 
which was awarded each month to the district which recruited the most new members.12 The 
All for Australia League and the Australian Citizens’ League operated hugely successful 
enrolment booths in central Sydney and Melbourne: an advertising campaign by the All for 
Australia League for its first convention in March netted 25000 new members in one week.13
                                                     
8 Itinerary in Forming the NZ Legion, file 1 folder 1,NZL papers; Evening Post, 6 April 1933, 10. 
 
In New Zealand, the Legion utilised a ‘ticket’ system of enrolment whereby each new 
member was requested to recruit five new members. Enrolment booths were planned for 
9 Letter to Y. T. Shand from the Organiser of the inaugural Legion meeting in Christchurch, 17 March 1933, 
Papers concerning the New Zealand Legion, Arthur Nelson Field papers, MS-Papers-0426-086, ATL; Pugh, "The 
New Zealand Legion and Conservative Protest," 97-98. 
10 Report of Executive Committee presented at Third Convention of Delegates, 10 June 1931, box 1 item 1, 
CLSA papers. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Report of Executive Committee presented at First Convention of Delegates of Branch Committees of the 
CLSA, 1 December 1930, box 1 item 1, CLSA papers. 
13 Sydney Morning Herald, 18 March 1931, 9; Sydney Morning Herald, 21 March 1931, 1; Argus, 21 February 
1931, 18. Bagot was very impressed with this achievement, and considered opening enrolment booths for the 
Citizens’ League of South Australia in Adelaide; see letter from Bagot to J. Blitz, 19 March 1931, box 12 item 2, 
CLSA papers. 
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several cities, although the only one established was in the square at Palmerston North.14 
Cheap membership fees of two shillings or less, which were often waived in cases of 
financial hardship, further ensured the spread of the movements. The subscription for the 
Citizens’ League was voluntary.15
 
 
The organisational structure adopted by the citizens’ movements was designed to facilitate 
democratic participation and encourage leadership at multiple levels. The lowest units of 
organisation were typically arranged at the level of a town or suburb. These units, known 
variously as sub-divisions, branches or centres, were supposed to meet frequently and discuss 
important political and economic questions. They would also review policies proposed by the 
leadership and nominate members to represent them at higher levels of the organisation.16
                                                     
14 Minutes of Meeting of the Provisional National Council, 4-5 April 1933, file 1 folder 1, NZL papers; National 
Opinion 1:5 (5 October 1933): 7. 
 
The New Zealand Legion was particularly interested in maximising the participation of its 
members. Front-line ‘centres’ were supposed to investigate and develop policy ideas which 
would be submitted to a National Council that met quarterly in Wellington. Ideas considered 
worthy of pursuing would be circulated to all centres, and those that received the approval of 
every centre would be adopted as official Legion policy. In practice, however, centres 
typically looked for guidance to the National Executive, a small body appointed by Begg to 
manage the everyday business of the movement. To assist in the production and 
dissemination of discussion material, the Executive appointed research Committees in 
15 Evening Post, 27 April 1933, 12; Argus, 2 April 1931, 7; Minutes of Inaugural Meeting, 3 October 1930, box 1 
item 1, CLSA papers. 
16 All for Australia League: Draft Constitution (Sydney: All for Australia League, 1931); All for Australia League: 
Locality Layout for Metropolitan Campaign, 3 March 1931, item 70, Thomas D. Mutch papers, MLMSS 426, 
SLNSW (hereafter ‘Mutch papers’); Constitution of Citizens' League of South Australia (Adelaide: F. Cockington 
& Co. Printers, 1931); Constitution and Rules of the New Zealand Legion, No. NZL 15, file 1 folder 1, NZL 
papers; All for Australia League shows the way to prosperity (Melbourne: All for Australia League, 1931), 26. 
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Wellington to study topics including central government, local government, economics, 
unemployment, and land.17
 
 
These organisational techniques helped the citizens’ movements to spread rapidly. Within a 
week of its official launch on 14 October 1930, the Citizens’ League of South Australia had 
1500 members.18 That figure tripled to 4765 by the end of November, and tripled again to 
14200 by the following March.19 At its height in August 1931 the League had 21752 
members representing 6.71 percent of the total electors of South Australia.20 In New South 
Wales, the All for Australia League amassed a membership of 30000 by March 1931, with 
between four and five hundred new members enrolling every day.21 A peak figure of 137000 
was reached at the end of June.22 The Australian Citizens’ League in Victoria recruited 5691 
members by 4 March 1931 when it decided to adopt the name and objects of the All for 
Australia League.23 By its first annual meeting on 19 May its membership was 80000; two 
months later it claimed to have exceeded 100000.24 Across the Tasman, the New Zealand 
Legion enrolled 2000 individuals in its first month, and by July 1933 its membership totalled 
15000.25 At the end of August it claimed to have in excess of 20000 members.26
                                                     
17 Minutes of Meeting of the Provisional National Council, 4-5 April 1933, file 1 folder 1; Ref. 6/2/16 – 12 May 
1933, file 1 folder 2, NZL papers; Pugh, "The New Zealand Legion and Conservative Protest," 92-93.  
 In total, 
close to 300000 Australians and New Zealanders joined one of the four citizens’ movements. 
18 Minutes of Meeting held at Balfour’s Cafe, 21 October 1930, box 1 item 1, CLSA papers. 
19 Report of Executive Committee presented at First Convention of Delegates of Branch Committees of the 
CLSA, 1 December 1930; Report of Executive Committee presented at Second Convention of Delegates of 
Branches of the CLSA, 16 March 1931, box 1 item 1, CLSA papers. 
20 Report of Executive Committee presented to the First Annual Convention of Branch Delegates, 16 
September 1931, box 1 item 2, CLSA papers. A slightly higher figure of 23133 was reported in August 1932; 
however, it is likely that the majority of members were nominal by this point, as the League had rapidly 
declined in strength and influence from the end of 1931. 
21 Horsham Times, 13 March 1931, 2; Matthews, "The All for Australia League," 139. 
22 Sydney Morning Herald, 26 June 1931, 16; Committees (handwritten note), undated, item 79, Mutch papers. 
23 Sydney Morning Herald, 5 March 1931, 10; Argus, 6 March 1931, 6. 
24 Age, 20 May 1931, 8; Wodong and Towonga Sentinel, 24 July 1931, 3. 
25 No. N.Z.L. 1, 11 March 1933; Circular to all members, 28 July 1933, file 1 folder 2, NZL papers. 
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A sense of belonging was reinforced by the use of easily recognisable and culturally resonant 
symbols. This use of symbolism was similar to that identified by Bruce Scates in his study of 
radical left wing culture in the 1890s. Scates argued that symbols allowed those who were 
unfamiliar with the issues under discussion to still feel as if they belonged. They represented 
broader ideas and forces with which the observer could identify, even if they did not fully 
understand those ideas and forces.27 Symbols of Britishness provided one of the main sources 
of inspiration for the citizens’ movements: mass meetings always began and closed with God 
Save the King, Rule Britannia or other patriotic songs, and the Union Jack was usually hung 
from the podium where speakers stood. Badges provided a much more potent symbol of the 
movements themselves: as the quote at the start of this chapter demonstrates, the All for 
Australia League badge became a regular sight on the streets of Sydney, and provided an 
effective barometer of the movement’s growth. So pervasive was the badge that opponents of 
the League measured its failure by the same standard: in July, the Worker proclaimed that 
‘[t]o-day it is difficult to find anyone wearing [the badge]’, whereas it had once ‘decorated 
every second coat lapel in Sydney.’28
 
 Public interest pieces in the newspaper further 
enhanced its recognisability: in March 1931, for example, the Sydney Morning Herald 
claimed that a man wearing a League badge subdued a crowd of unemployed threatening to 
riot in front of parliament house: 
At this stage Mr O. W. Lapham, who was wearing the badge of the All for 
Australia League, scrambled up on to a derrick nearby, and appealed for law 
and order. To the consternation of the leaders, the majority of the unemployed 
                                                                                                                                                                     
26 Letter from J. B. Wilson to Hawkes Bay members, 22 August 1933, file 5 folder 1, NZL papers. Wilson claimed 
that the membership was ‘in excess of 20,000 and is increasing daily’, but he may have been exaggerating 
given that the purpose of his letter was to remind members to regularly attend meetings and to encourage 
them to enrol more members. 
27 Bruce Scates, A New Australia: Citizenship, Radicalism and the First Republic  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 30-32. 
28 Worker, 15 July 1931, 13. 
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gathered below to listen to him. The militant element counted him out on 
several occasions, but he persisted and out-talked them.29
 
 
Whilst this story was undoubtedly exaggerated, it demonstrates the power that conservatives 
associated with the badge. It identified the wearer as embodying something greater than 
themselves; they carried with them the ideals of the movement, and their rational and clear-
headed rhetoric could be expected to win through the false and pernicious doctrines of the 
disloyal minority stirring up the unemployed. 
 
The culture of mass conservative mobilisation was further promoted by the citizens’ 
movements through the use of mass media. In the first year after it was founded, the Citizens’ 
League of South Australia distributed 222,250 dodgers and dispatched 4261 letters and 
29,605 circulars.30 The Australian Citizens’ League distributed batches of circulars directly to 
employers across Melbourne so that they might encourage their staff to join en masse.31 
Pamphlets, booklets and journals allowed the movements to distribute more in-depth 
collections of ideas and policies through popular outlets. The New Zealand Legion’s two 
booklets, Light on the Legion and National Unity in Crisis, sold well in many bookstores and 
newsagents, although its journal National Opinion only had a circulation of 2400.32
                                                     
29 Sydney Morning Herald, 7 March 1931, 15. 
 Radio 
provided a more modern, and potentially more far-reaching, distribution medium. Speeches at 
large meetings of the Citizens’ League were broadcast on 5AD, and twice-weekly broadcasts 
30 Report of Executive Committee presented to the First Annual Convention of Branch Delegates, 16 
September 1931, box 1 item 2, CLSA papers. 
31 Hewitt, "The All for Australia League in Melbourne," 5-7. 
32 Light on the Legion (Wellington: Commercial Printing Co. Ltd., 1933); Ref. 6/12/17, 15 May 1933; Letter from 
Begg to all Divisions and Centres, 3 February 1934, file 1 folder 2; Letter from A. S. Tonkin to J. R. V. Sherston, 6 
June 1933, file 2 folder 3, NZL papers. 
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commenced in June 1931.33 The All for Australia League gave broadcasts on the theosophist 
radio station 2GB three nights a week.34
 
 As with the movements’ organisational techniques, 
this focus on the mass dissemination of ideas emphasised a conscious focus on scale. The 
movements were demonstrating their ability to reach far and wide with their mission to 
educate the masses whilst reinforcing their belief that they represented a significant body of 
moderate opinion. 
A NATION-WIDE PROTEST? 
Bagot was an important advocate of nation-wide mass conservative mobilisation. Indeed, 
from its inception, he viewed the Citizens’ League as the first branch of a nationwide 
movement. In his speech before the inaugural Town Hall meeting on 14 October, he called on 
‘similar minded people in other States to take similar action, so that the voices of the citizens 
of Australia will be heard as one.’35 An Australia-wide organisation, he told the Executive 
Committee, could recruit as many as 680,000 individuals, and he offered to visit other States 
and ‘get the movement going there.’36
                                                     
33 Report of Executive Committee presented to the First Annual Convention of Branch Delegates, 16 
September 1931, box 1 item 2, CLSA papers; Advertiser, 11 February 1931, 8; Advertiser and Register, 17 April 
1931, 20. 
 This was the impetus that led him to approach the 
Melbourne Citizens’ Committee, which is explored in chapter two. He also contacted other 
Constitutional Clubs across the country, and discovered that ‘similar bodies to the South 
Australian League’ were already taking shape in several states – a ‘Vigilance Committee’ in 
Brisbane, a ‘Citizens’ Federation’ in Perth, and the Who’s for Australia League in Sydney. 
Bagot advocated forming an ‘Interstate organisation’ as soon as possible, arguing that the 
‘moral effect’ of holding simultaneous demonstrations across the country ‘would be 
34 All for Australia League (Sydney: All for Australia League, 1931), 16. 
35 Address by Bagot at a Citizens’ Public Meeting in Adelaide Town Hall, 14 October 1930, box 1 item 1, CLSA 
papers. 
36 Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 16 October 1930, box 1 item 2. CLSA papers. 
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enormous’.37
 
 Such a massive force of public opinion would either compel the Federal 
government to act or use its directed voting power to elect a government that would. 
Despite Bagot’s lofty ambitions, most of the embryonic citizens’ movements in other states 
failed to achieve a mass following. This was due primarily to their inability to tap into 
conservative discontent and channel it through relevant promotional and organisational 
techniques. The Brisbane organisation named ‘the Vigilants’ was formed in October 1930 by 
representatives from several dozen conservative groups including the Constitutional Club, the 
Chamber of Commerce, the Taxpayers’ Association and the United Graziers’ Association. It 
sought to achieve drastic government economies, including the suspension of awards and a 
reduction in the size of Federal and State governments.38 In mid-November the Vigilants 
redirected their efforts toward local government reform in Brisbane, seeking a reduction in 
the number of aldermen and the abolition of their salaries. A combination of bad publicity 
and repeated failures to convince the Mayor to implement their recommendations led to the 
sidelining of the Vigilants by a new municipal party named the Civic Reform League.39 In 
December the Citizens’ League of South Australia Secretary C. W. Andersen, visiting 
Brisbane on business, gave a speech before the Constitutional Club and ‘several members of 
the Vigilant Association’ in the hopes of establishing the basis of interstate cooperation. 
Nothing came of the visit, for the Vigilants were largely defunct by this time.40
 
 
                                                     
37 Report of Sub-Committee, 21 October 1930, box 1 item 1; Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 21 
October 1930, box 1 item 2, CLSA papers. 
38 Brisbane Courier, 8 October 1930, 13. 
39 Brian Costar, "Was Queensland Different?," in The Wasted Years? Australia's Great Depression, ed. Judy 
Mackinolty (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 170-2. 
40 Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 15 December 1930, box 1 item 2; Letter from Bagot to Phillip 
Frankel, 18 February 1931, box 13 item 12, CLSA papers. 
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Undeterred, Bagot attempted to establish a branch of the Citizens’ League in Queensland. In 
January 1931 Philip Frankel, owner of a motor accessories distributing company in Brisbane, 
wrote a well-publicised open letter calling for the abolition of political parties and the 
replacing of State parliaments with regional councils under a uniform central government.41 
Bagot read Frankel’s commentary with interest, and sent him a copy of the Citizens’ League 
program in the hope that he might start a branch in Brisbane. The two entered into 
correspondence for the next several months, during which time Frankel attempted to establish 
a ‘Citizens’ Federation’ in Queensland with several members of a non-party electoral 
organisation named the ‘Grand Council of Progress Associations’.42 At Frankel’s request, 
Bagot forwarded him a copy of the Citizens’ League constitution and several other pamphlets 
‘as a foundation’ for drawing up similar documents in Queensland.43 Bagot also forwarded 
copies of this material to W. A. Burns, an associate of Frankel’s in Cairns who had been 
working to establish a branch of the All for Australia League but decided to work with 
Frankel on the Citizens’ Federation.44
 
 
Despite this support, the Queensland Citizens’ Federation failed to make headway. Frankel 
decided to join the ‘Queensland Non-Party League’ in June, a group formed by the new 
Mayor and Progress Association candidate J. W. Greene.45
                                                     
41 Brisbane Courier, 19 January 1931, 13. The same letter was republished in several other papers, including 
the Cairns Post, the Morning Bulletin, and the Albany Advertiser. Frankel wrote a follow-up letter in February 
advocating the reduction of the franchise to ‘those capable of giving an intelligent reflex of the wishes of the 
people’; see Brisbane Courier, 14 February 1931, 15. 
 Frankel gave all of the material he 
had received from Bagot to the new group, which established relations with the Citizens’ 
42 Letter from Bagot to Phillip Frankel, 18 February 1931; Letter from Frankel to Bagot, 28 February 1931; 
Letter from Bagot to Frankel, 9 March 1931; Letter from Frankel to Bagot, 30 April 1931, box 13 item 12, CLSA 
papers. 
43 Letter from Bagot to Frankel, 4 May 1931; Letter from Frankel to Bagot, 12 May 1931; Letter from Bagot to 
Frankel, 16 May 1931; Letter from Bagot to Frankel, 15 June 1931, box 13 item 12, CLSA papers. 
44 Letter from W. A. Burns to Bagot, 22 May 1931; Letter from Bagot to W. A. Burns, 2 June 1931, box 12 item 
1, CLSA papers. 
45 Letter from Frankel to Bagot, 25 June 1931, box 13 item 12, CLSA papers; Brisbane Courier, 10 June 1931, 10. 
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League of South Australia in July.46 However, like its predecessors, the Non-Party League 
proved short-lived, accomplishing little beyond a series of public debates with kindred 
associations such as the League of Women Voters.47 Brian Costar argued that the Vigilants 
focused on civic rather than state or federal politics because the Queensland state government 
was in conservative hands for most of the Depression.48 Yet in South Australia, where a 
centrist and economically orthodox Labor government held power, the Citizens’ League was 
still able to thrive by directing its frustrations against the Federal government.49
 
 This suggests 
that individuals like Frankel lacked the skills of Bagot and Langsford, whose organisational 
skills, speaking ability, and focus on rapid membership growth ensured that the Citizens’ 
League became a mass movement. 
In contrast, the Tasmanian branch of the All for Australia League was hampered by internal 
divisions. Its founding was delayed until May 1931 by bickering amongst the leaders of the 
proposed branch over who would lead the movement and how many labour representatives 
would be included on its committee. Even after it was founded, the movement was only 
concerned with holding on to the ‘floating vote’ which had swung in favour of the 
conservatives in 1930 rather than actively recruiting a mass membership. As a result, one 
contemporary noted that it had not found ‘any substantial footing in Tasmania’.50
                                                     
46 Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 7 July 1931, box 1 item 2, CLSA papers. 
 The 
Tasmanian All for Australia League also had to compete with a group named the Tasmanian 
Reform League, which was founded in April 1931 to agitate for a smaller state parliament, a 
47 Brisbane Courier, 30 September 1931, 16. The Non-Party League may also have influenced the formation of 
the rabidly anti-party ‘Queensland Party’ in 1932, which ran several independent candidates in the June 1932 
state elections. See box 33, Albert Welsby papers, UQFL40, UQFL. 
48 Costar, "Was Queensland Different?" 173. 
49 James, "God, Mammon and Mussolini," 31. 
50 Mercury, 21 May 1931, 9; Letter from F. Mary Parker to Latham, 29 May 1931; Letter from Latham to Parker, 
11 June 1931, box 89, series 49, folder 2, Sir John Latham papers, MS 1009, NLA (hereafter ‘Latham papers’). 
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reduction in members’ salaries, and the banning of seditious literature.51
 
 Given the relatively 
small population size of Tasmania, this further reduced the potential membership pool of the 
League. 
The Citizens’ League of South Australia fared little better with its attempts to cooperate with 
a group known as the Citizens’ Federation of Western Australia. The Federation’s founder 
and President, Colin Unwin, subscribed to a very particular and parochial form of anti-
partyism which he termed ‘Unism’ that he had promoted through a variety of short-lived 
protest movements since before the Great War.52 Unwin was very protective of his 
philosophy, which was focused heavily on parliamentary reform and rejected any form of 
economic policy as potentially divisive. As a result, he was wary of forming an alliance with 
the other citizens’ movements. Despite sharing their distaste for party politics, he feared that 
any ‘broad common policy’ would require the Federation to adopt ‘proposals of an economic 
or financial character’.53
 
 As he explained to S. R. Dickinson, editor of the Melbourne Argus, 
in March 1931: 
[W]e cannot trace that any of them [the citizens’ movements] are dealing with 
fundamental electoral and parliamentary reform, but rather do they seem to 
urge a mixture of principles and political, financial and economic planks all 
more or less debatable, and thus liable to split any movement at any time, 
especially as new planks are introduced.54
 
 
Instead of cooperating with the established citizens’ movements, Unwin sought to establish 
branches of his own movement in other states. He wrote to Kingsley Henderson during the 
formation of the Australian Citizens’ League in February 1931 urging it to adopt the 
                                                     
51 Examiner, 7 May 1931, 6. 
52 Colin Unwin, Unism: The New Constructive Policy (Freemantle: Porter & Salmon, 1916). 
53 The abolition of party government depends upon you (Perth: Citizen's Federation of Western Australia, 
1931), 1. 
54 Letter from Unwin to S. R. Dickinson, 6 March 1931, folder 15, Colin Unwin papers, ACC 6321A, SLWA. 
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Federation’s platform, and sent a similar letter to Dickinson in the hopes that he would 
publish it.55 When Dickinson replied stating he had declined to join the Australian Citizens’ 
League because of its economic policy, Unwin urged him to join the Federation and form 
local ‘Propaganda Groups’ in Victoria.56 He asked Citizens’ Federation assistant organiser 
Mrs C. T. Wright to do the same during a six week stay in Adelaide in early 1931, even if this 
‘conflict[ed] with The Citizen’s League in Adelaide’.57 These efforts came to nothing: 
Wright left Adelaide the following month without forming a local branch of the Citizens’ 
Federation, and if Dickinson complied with Unwin’s request the press took no notice.58
 
 
The Citizens’ Federation failed to achieve the mass mobilisation of its eastern cousins for 
several reasons. Firstly, by refusing to consider economic policies, the Federation missed the 
opportunity to tap into the widespread conservative discontent over the policies of Scullin, 
Theodore and Lang. The citizens’ movements in South Australia, Victoria and New South 
Wales were all fluent in the conservative language of laissez-faire and individualism, which 
provided them with a large base of potential members. Secondly, Unwin was opposed to the 
idea of holding ‘big meetings first’, preferring ‘study circles’ and ‘Propaganda Groups … 
until we can be sure of reasonable support in the Town or other large halls’.59
                                                     
55 Telegram from Unwin to Kingsley Henderson, 11 February 1931; Telegram from Unwin to Dickinson, 11 
February 1931, folder 15, Colin Unwin papers, ACC 6321A, SLWA. 
 This cautious 
approach proved to be counterproductive: the Federation never actually held a Town Hall 
meeting, which prevented its message from reaching the wide audiences that the mass rallies 
56 Letter from Unwin to Dickinson, 6 March 1931, folder 15, Colin Unwin papers, ACC 6321A, SLWA. 
57 Letter from Unwin to Mrs C. T. Wright, 6 March 1931, folder 15, Colin Unwin papers, ACC 6321A, SLWA. 
58 Advertiser and Register, 4 April 1931, 19. 
59 Letter from Unwin to S. R. Dickinson, 6 March 1931, folder 15, Colin Unwin papers, ACC 6321A, SLWA; An 
Australia-wide appeal for the abolition of the party system of government (Perth: Citizens' Federation of 
Western Australia, 1931), 8. 
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of the citizens’ movements did. As a result, its propaganda efforts were limited to several 
letters in the West Australian and the occasional public meeting.60
 
 
Thirdly, and more fundamentally, aspiring citizens’ movements in Western Australia had to 
compete with the growing tide of secessionism in that state, which exploded during the 
Depression in the form of the Dominion League of Western Australia.61
 
 When R. F. Rushton, 
a Perth accountant, attempted to form a local branch of the Citizens’ League of South 
Australia in 1933, he encountered this problem: 
The swing towards Secession is most pronounced and the bulk of those sane-
minded citizens who could be looked to to support our movement are now 
becoming somewhat active supporters of the Secession movement with the 
result that much time and much money which could be expected to be given to 
our movement is being absorbed in other directions.62
 
 
As a result, the small nucleus of members which Rushton was able to assemble decided to 
focus their energies on Empire trade, tariff reduction, and the formation of a ‘lesser states 
movement’.63 Even this failed to make headway, and the September 1933 Annual Convention 
of the Citizens’ League reported that ‘[t]he Secession movement in [Western Australia] … 
was so strong that no close affiliation was possible.’64 This confirms C. J. Lloyd’s assertion 
that the Dominion League channelled populist sentiment in Western Australia ‘into 
resentment against the Commonwealth, and away from the anti-party and sane finance 
preoccupations of the eastern states.’65
 
 
                                                     
60 West Australian, 20 March 1931, 15; West Australian, 31 March 1931, 8; West Australian, 27 April 1931, 5. 
61 Hiller, "Secession in Western Australia," 222-33; Musgrave, "The Western Australian Secessionist 
Movement," 103-5. 
62 Letter from Rushton to Bagot, 19 January 1933, box 14 item 20, CLSA papers. 
63 Letter from Rushton to Bagot, 24 January 1933, box 14 item 20, CLSA papers. 
64 Report of the Executive Committee presented to the Third Annual Convention of Delegates, 12 September 
1933, box 1 item 4, CLSA papers. 
65 Lloyd, "The Formation and Development of the U.A.P.," 58-59. 
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The spread of the citizens’ movements in Australia had a more appreciable impact on other 
forms of mass conservative mobilisation. In particular, their populist style of organisation and 
rhetoric were adapted by several movements that arose in 1931. Eric Campbell, the founder 
and Chief Commander of the New Guard, attended the inaugural meeting of the All for 
Australia League and was thoroughly impressed with its anti-partyist stance.66 The New 
Guard subsequently utilised mass rallies and demonstrations in its campaign against 
communism, and combating ‘machine politics’ became one of its core aims.67 Campbell was 
also friends with All for Australia League executive member Sydney Snow, and the two 
believed that ‘the New Guard was the fighting wing and the A.F.A. the political wing of the 
same brand of thought’.68 The secessionist Riverina Movement in southern New South Wales 
also relied on ‘monster meetings’: its inaugural open-air rally in Wagga Wagga attracted 
10000 attendees, which was widely touted as the biggest meeting of its kind ever held in rural 
Australia.69 The policy and rhetoric of the new movement, which blended anti-partyism with 
criticisms of city dominance and calls for rural relief, represented an adaptation of citizens’ 
movement ideology to the rural fraction of capital.70
 
 
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION 
Despite these promotional and organisational techniques, the geographical distribution of the 
citizens’ movements generally tended to favour urban over rural areas. Figures 8-11 display 
the locations of branches, centres or sub-divisions of each movement. The data used in this 
quantitative analysis is provided in appendix A. The initial growth of the Citizens’ League of 
                                                     
66 Eric Campbell, The Rallying Point: My Story of the New Guard  (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1965), 
42-43. 
67 Cunningham, "Australian Fascism?" 386. 
68 Campbell, The Rallying Point, 43. 
69 Sydney Morning Herald, 2 March 1931, 9; Argus, 7 March 1931, 15. 
70 Townsville Daily Bulletin, 16 March 1931, 4. Hardy claimed several years later than the two primary 
objectives of the Riverina Movement had been to combat party politics and city dominance; see Ellis, A Pen in 
Politics, 195. 
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South Australia was restricted to suburban Adelaide, with as many as 130 branches being 
established by March 1931.71 Many of these branches evidently failed or were combined with 
other branches, because in September it was reported that there were 94 branches in the six 
urban Districts. The period from March to June witnessed a dramatic increase in rural activity 
through the work of the League’s country organiser, A. L. Langsford, who held 40 meetings 
addressing a total audience of 8150.72 His speech proved so convincing in the town of 
Moculta that, out of a town population of 142, 141 signed membership forms.73 Nevertheless, 
by September the country membership was only 4877 across 64 branches, or 22.4% of the 
total membership of the League.74 Figure 8 demonstrates that country branches were limited 
to the south-eastern portion of the state, which roughly matched South Australian population 
density in the 1930s.75
 
 Given the low non-Aboriginal population in these parts of South 
Australia during this time, this is unsurprising. 
The All for Australia League fared even worse in rural New South Wales. Its original plans 
specified the creation of fourteen country divisions of the League that would share equal 
representation with their urban counterparts on the State Council. But rural New South Wales 
was a crowded ideological space in 1931. The League was competing against established 
bodies such as the Country Party and the Farmers’ and Settlers Association, along with new 
groups such as the Producers’ Advisory Council and the secessionist movements in New 
England and the Riverina. The League attempted to overcome this competition by drawing 
                                                     
71 Attendance Book for Second Convention, 16 March 1931, box 2 item 20, CLSA papers. 
72 Report of Executive Committee presented at Third Convention of Delegates of Branches, 10 June 1931, box 1 
item 1, CLSA papers. 
73 Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 16 June 1931, box 1 item 2, CLSA papers. 
74 Report of Executive Committee presented to the First Annual Convention of Branch Delegates, 16 
September 1931, box 1 item 2, CLSA papers. 
75 Graeme Hugo, "A Century of Population Change in Australia," Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/0B82C2F2654C3694CA2569DE002139D9?Open. 
135 
 
upon the tenets of Don Aitkin’s ‘countrymindedness’, including the romanticisation of rural 
life and the centrality of primary production. They also played on fears of city dominance: 
 
The cost of Government has grown like a mushroom, the city has fattened at 
the expense of the rural districts, and the whole social structure of the 
community to-day is ill-balanced and conducive to bitter factional 
animosities.76
 
 
Their efforts were mostly unsuccessful. Had the All for Australia League managed to recruit 
the leader of a country movement – as the Citizens’ League of South Australia did with A. L. 
Langsford, leader of the Wheat Producers’ Freedom Association – it might have fared 
differently in rural New South Wales. Its attempt to convince Riverina Movement leader 
Charles Hardy to unite with the League were rebuffed, although Hardy did attend several 
League meetings and maintained correspondence with its leaders.77 Other secessionists were 
less enamoured with the League’s perceived interference in country affairs: the Western 
secessionist movement, for example, was ‘definite in its opinion that the league should 
confine its activities to the metropolitan area.’78 One Country Party stalwart in Griffith 
responded to a request to form a local League division by telling them to ‘confine their 
operations to the Cities and leave the country districts alone’.79 In a last-ditch effort to secure 
a country foothold, the League supported a constitutional convention to consider, amongst 
other things, the revision of state boundaries in the interests of creating new states within 
New South Wales.80
                                                     
76 All for Australia League (Sydney: All for Australia League, 1931), 5. 
 When the secessionist movements agreed to form a United Country 
77 Beveridge, "The Riverina Movement and Charles Hardy," 31; Ellis, The Country Party, 143-4; Robinson, "The 
All for Australia League in New South Wales," 42; Sydney Morning Herald, 30 March 1931, 12; First Meeting of 
the State Executive, 1 June 1931, item 79, Mutch papers. 
78 Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June 1931, 10. 
79 Letter from W. Moses to Earle Page, 15 May 1931, box 19 folder 76, Ulrich Ellis papers, MS 1006, NLA. 
80 Policy as Adopted by Convention of the League (Sydney: All for Australia League, 1931), 4, 13-15. 
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Movement in August 1931, the League announced it would disband its country 
organisation.81
 
 
Nevertheless, as figure 9 attests, the All for Australia League was not entirely limited to 
metropolitan Sydney. By the end of March it had 15 sub-divisions outside of Sydney, 
compared to 84 in the city.82 It enjoyed considerable support in suburban Newcastle, where 
eight sub-divisions were created and an official journal titled The Hunter Statesman was 
produced.83 It is likely that the majority of the ‘30000 Country + Newcastle badges’, 
representing 21.9% of the movement’s total membership, came from the greater Hunter 
area.84 The few rural sub-divisions it established performed relatively well; Broken Hill 
reported a local membership of ‘well over 125’, while in Lithgow the number ‘exceeded 
200’.85 The location of these two towns in the area west of Sydney may explain why the 
Western secessionist movement was so opposed to the League’s rural activities. The 
metropolitan-adjacent country electorates of Macquarie and Werriwa were represented at the 
September State Council, as was Eden-Monaro from south-eastern New South Wales.86 The 
latter is surprising given that Eden Monaro was also home to a secessionist movement, 
although the fact that it was not launched until April 1931 may have allowed the League time 
to gather supporters there.87
 
 
The centres of the New Zealand Legion were more evenly distributed between city and 
country. Whilst a complete list of centres has not survived, a geographical analysis of the 
                                                     
81 Circular re: decision to close down country district organisations, 14 August 1931, item 70, Mutch papers. 
82 Sydney Morning Herald, 20 March 1931, 12. 
83 There may have been only one volume of this; see Hunter Statesman, 2 July 1931, item 68, Mutch papers. 
84 Committees (handwritten note), undated, item 79, Mutch papers. 
85 Barrier Miner, 16 June 1931, 2; Sydney Morning Herald, 1 June 1931, 10. 
86 Sydney Morning Herald, 22 September 1931, 8. 
87 Sydney Morning Herald, 10 April 1931, 10; ‘Monaro-South Coast Movement: Its history summarised’, c.1931, 
box 19 folder 76, Ulrich Ellis papers, MS 1006, NLA. 
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Legion in Otago (see figure 10) shows a significant rural presence in Central Otago and in the 
country west of Oamaru. It is difficult to determine whether this equated to an equal 
distribution of membership between city and country, but the 1007 members in Hawkes Bay 
division represented one-twentieth of the Legion’s total strength – an almost one-to-one ratio 
with the total number of divisions.88 This rural spread may have been due to a lack of rural 
alternatives: a proposed country protest movement in 1930 named the ‘Political Committee’ 
failed to secure widespread support, and the Douglas social credit movement did not begin to 
make headway in rural areas until mid-1933.89 The Legion’s success was also greatest in 
regions represented by conservative MPs which, prior to Labour’s success in 1935, included 
most of rural New Zealand.90
 
 
Nevertheless, the bulk of Legion activity occurred in urban areas. Gerard Campbell and 
Elizabeth Ward’s studies of the Legion in Otago and the Manawatu-Wanganui regions paint a 
picture of highly active city leadership mirrored by moribund rural centres. The Otago 
leadership was particularly active, producing several reports on local government reform that 
became official Legion policy.91 In contrast, Pugh suggested that towns such as Ashburton 
and Waipukurau were more active than most city centres. Wellington was the exception with 
its 900 members, but this was largely due to Begg’s personal following.92
                                                     
88 List of members in H. B. Division of N. Z. Legion (undated), file 2 folder 1, NZL papers. The tally on the list 
itself claims a total of 1011, but four names were repeated twice. 
 However, 
Waipukurau had the well-respected Sir Andrew Russell as a drawing card for local members, 
89 Dominion Executive Meeting, 28 January 1931, Dominion Executive - Minutes, 1928-1931, New Zealand 
Farmers’ Union papers, MSY-0288, ATL; Clifton, "Douglas Credit and the Labour Party," 73-76, 128-9. 
90 Pugh, "The New Zealand Legion and Conservative Protest," 98. 
91 Campbell, "The New Zealand Legion in Otago", 23-31; Ward, "The New Zealand Legion in Manawatu-
Wanganui," 11-15, 17. 
92 Pugh, "The New Zealand Legion and Conservative Protest," 98. 
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and Ashburton is the third largest town in Canterbury. Thus, Pugh’s observation that the first 
meeting was also the last for many centres was probably truer in rural areas.93
 
 
In contrast with the other three citizens’ movements, the Australian Citizens’ League was 
spread out across the entire state of Victoria. Out of a total of 317 branches and sub-branches 
in May 1931, only 28 were located in metropolitan Melbourne.94 The geographical analysis 
of those branches in figure 11 suggests a fairly even distribution throughout Victoria, with the 
highest concentrations in the area north-west of Wilson’s Promontory and along the border 
south of the Riverina. The overall distribution is roughly congruent with the rural population 
density of Victoria, which was similar in size but broader in spread than New South Wales 
and greater on both accounts than South Australia.95
                                                     
93 Ibid., 91-92. 
 For this reason, the Australian Citizens’ 
League was the only citizens’ movement within Australia that could truly lay claim to being a 
state-wide movement. 
94 All for Australia League shows the way to prosperity (Melbourne: All for Australia League, 1931), 26. 
95 Hugo, "A Century of Population Change in Australia". 
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Figure 8: Citizens’ League of South Australia geographical distribution 
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Figure 9: All for Australia League geographical distribution 
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Figure 10: New Zealand Legion geographical distribution (Otago only)  
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Figure 11: Australian Citizens’ League geographical distribution 
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MEMBERSHIP AND MOTIVATIONS 
Several scholars have attempted to discern the motivations that drew discontented 
conservatives to the citizens’ movements. In the case of the New Zealand Legion, Michael 
Pugh, Elizabeth Ward and Gerard Campbell show that a significant number of leaders were 
involved in other voluntary endeavours including community service organisations, 
unemployment relief committees, and local government. Several were serving or had 
previously served as Mayors and Council members, and others had presided on government 
commissions.96 The leadership of the other citizens’ movements performed a similar level of 
public service: there were seventeen Councillors in the Australian Citizens’ League, whilst 
the All for Australia League had at least one Councillor and an Alderman. Pugh, Ward and 
Trevor Matthews also highlight the influence of Rotary on important figures within the New 
Zealand Legion and the All for Australia League.97
 
 This high level of participation in 
voluntary organisations was one of the components of the conservative notion of good 
citizenship: it signified a commitment to public service and civic duty. Founding or joining a 
citizens’ movement, according to this argument, demonstrated a similar commitment to 
voluntary service and self-sacrifice in the interests of the nation. 
Class played an important part in the motivations of citizens’ movement members. Previous 
quantitative studies of the leadership of the Citizens’ League of South Australia and the New 
Zealand Legion have demonstrated the predominance of middle class businessmen and 
professionals in these movements.98
                                                     
96 Pugh, "The New Zealand Legion and Conservative Protest," 104; Campbell, "The New Zealand Legion in 
Otago," 41-42; Ward, "The New Zealand Legion in Manawatu-Wanganui," 25. 
 This thesis has augmented those studies with original 
97 Pugh, "The New Zealand Legion and Conservative Protest," 102; Ward, "The New Zealand Legion in 
Manawatu-Wanganui," 26; Matthews, "The All for Australia League," 138. 
98 Lonie, "Conservatism and Class in South Australia," 212-4; James, "'The Big Hand of Service'," appendix G; 
Pugh, "The New Zealand Legion and Conservative Protest," 100-8; Gerard Campbell, "The New Zealand Legion 
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quantitative research into the leadership of the All for Australia and Australian Citizens’ 
Leagues. However, it is important to distinguish between the movements’ leaders and the 
rank-and-file membership. Leaders, or those who actively participated in the movements by 
joining committees and attending conventions, have been the focus of previous quantitative 
studies.  This has been largely due to the limitations of extant source material – leaders are 
regularly recorded in correspondence, official journals, and newspaper reports, whereas full 
membership lists for the citizens’ movements no longer exist. But leaders were atypical when 
taken as an overall percentage of the movements, and their ongoing participation differed 
from the apathy of the average member. To treat them as indicative of the constitution of the 
movements as a whole is problematic without comparing them to a corresponding data set for 
front-line members. Fortunately, two partial front-line lists remain – the Hawkes Bay division 
of the New Zealand Legion, and the North Adelaide branch of the Citizens’ League of South 
Australia. An analysis of these lists will be compared with a leadership analysis of the four 
movements to determine whether the two levels of membership were similarly constituted. 
The data used in this analysis is provided in appendix B, and are summarised in tables 1-2 
and graphs 1-4. Unfortunately, the electoral rolls for South Australia were not available 
electronically at the time of writing. Consequently, without the full names of Citizens’ 
League of South Australia members, it was impossible to determine their ages and military 
histories. Fortunately, the works of Lonie and James, which analysed the occupations of 
Citizens’ League leaders, include their original data sets. Lonie also collated the occupations 
of the North Adelaide Branch members under similar categories as have been used in this 
study, which enabled them to be grafted onto the framework used to categorise the other 
citizens’ movements. 
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A comparison of the leadership of the four citizens’ movements confirms that the 
professional, business and commercial fraction of the capitalist class comprised between 60% 
and 75.5% of each sample. The All for Australia League also had a significant minority of 
manufacturers (11.3%), which explains why it was so reluctant to commit to tariff reform like 
the other citizens’ movements.99
 
 In addition, the majority of the leaders were above 40 years 
of age, with the average age for each sample ranging between 44.9 and 45.7. The percentage 
of eligible leaders who served in the Great War was 46% in New Zealand and varied between 
25.7% and 32.5% in Australia, which may have been due to the fact that conscription was 
introduced in the former but not the latter. Over half of those leaders who served in the 
military did so at a commissioned or non-commissioned officer level. 
The sample lists of front-line members indicate a slightly broader class spread. Over three 
quarters of the North Adelaide branch of the Citizens’ League of South Australia were 
professionals and businessmen, although these figures cannot be taken as representative of 
the movement as a whole given that North Adelaide was a wholly urban branch. In contrast, 
the professional, business and commercial fraction only constituted 42.6% of the Hawkes 
Bay division of the New Zealand Legion, whilst 34.4% of the sample were primary 
producers. Given the predominantly rural nature of the Hawkes Bay division this is not 
unusual: a previous study of Legion leadership in the Manawatu-Wanganui found that 
farmers constituted a significant fraction in this area as well.100
                                                     
99 After much obfuscation, the All for Australia League ultimately decided to leave the tariff in the hands of its 
proposed Economic Advisory Board, which would ‘scientifically’ determine ‘the limits of tariff incidence and 
the industrial directions in which it should be imposed’. See Policy as adopted by convention of the League, 8 
August 1931 (Sydney: All for Australia League, 1931), 18; All for Australia League (Sydney: All for Australia 
League, 1931), 11.  
 However, the fact that almost 
one in four Hawkes Bay members was working class is surprising – especially since just over 
half of that number were unskilled workers. Front-line members were slightly younger than 
100 Ward, "The New Zealand Legion in Manawatu-Wanganui," 22. 
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their leaders at the average age of 42.9, although unlike the leadership there were a 
significant number of members under 35 – particularly in the 25-29 bracket. 38.4% of eligible 
front-line members had served in the Great War – less than the 46% of leaders – however 
almost sixty percent of them did not progress beyond the rank of Private or equivalent. Seven 
had also served in the Boer War, and two members fought in both wars. 
 
The dominant position of professional, business and commercial interests at a leadership and 
front-line level suggests that the citizens’ movements were an important outlet for the 
frustrations of this particular class fraction. Unlike farmers and manufacturers, who could 
seek some form of protection or guaranteed price from the government for their goods, the 
services of professionals and businessmen were relatively intangible. Since government 
assistance was not an option, the best ideological defence for their trades lay in lower taxes 
and minimal government interference. The tropes of individualism thus assumed a particular 
importance for them, unlike manufacturers and farmers who were more willing to fall back 
on the developmental pragmatism that characterised nineteenth and twentieth century 
Antipodean conservatism. This further reinforces the symbiotic relationship between the 
citizens’ movements and their members: the movements’ provided a channel for conservative 
discontent, yet their immense popularity was predicated on their ability to recognise the 
nature of the discontent expressed by the professional, business and commercial fraction and 
respond using the same individualist language in which their grievances were being 
expressed. 
 
It is difficult to determine what percentage of citizens’ movement members were actively 
involved. In his study of the New Zealand Legion, Michael Pugh claimed that signing a 
membership form and paying the subscription was the extent of participation for a majority of 
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individuals, and that only a quarter of the total membership actively participated in the 
movement.101 The experience in New South Wales was similar; members in Fairfield, for 
example, did not attend any meetings, whilst another member complained that he had not 
received any further communication after joining the movement.102 In contrast, branches of 
the Citizens’ League of South Australia appear to have been quite active throughout 1931, 
and reports of decline did not begin to appear until the beginning of 1932.103 The fact that the 
All for Australia League badge adorned so many lapels in Sydney further attests to a level of 
pride amongst members, even if it did not equate to regular attendance at meetings.104
 
 Any 
attempt to estimate participation without further evidence is highly problematic and 
ultimately unnecessary for the purposes of gauging the conservative discontent underlying 
the citizens’ movements. Even the act of signing a membership card required some form of 
commitment. 
 
  
                                                     
101 Pugh, "The New Zealand Legion and Conservative Protest," 97. 
102 Letter from R. T. Gillies to Mutch, 13 July 1931, item 70, Mutch papers; Sydney Morning Herald, 18 July 
1931, 5. 
103 Report of Executive Committee presented to the Second Annual Convention of Branch Delegates, 12 
September 1932, box 1 item 9; Country Organisers’ Report, 23 July 1932, box 13 item 10; Address to the 
Executive Committee, 19 December 1933, box 3 item 25A, CLSA papers. At least one member of the Citizens' 
League resigned in 1931 due to a lack of communication from his leaders, although he was also motivated by 
his belief that it had become a ‘class conscious’ movement. See Letter from R. B. Petch to Bagot, 2 February 
1931, box 12 item 5, CLSA papers. 
104 Argus, 16 March 1931, 8. 
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Table 1: Employment Statistics (Leadership) 
 
 
  
1a: All for Australia League 
Primary production 
 Farmers:  2 
 Pastoralists:  1 
2.8% (3) 
Manufacturing 11.3% (12) 
Professional, business and 
commercial 
 Professionals:  35 
 Semi-professionals: 9 
 Business:  19 
 Commercial:  14 
72.7% (77) 
Working class 
 Skilled workers:  9 
 Unskilled workers and 
 unemployed:  2 
10.4% (11) 
Other 2.8% (3) 
Total number for whom occupations 
were identified 106 
 
 
1c: Citizens’ League of South Australia 
Primary production 
 Farmers:  8 
 Pastoralists: 2 
13.7% (10) 
Manufacturing 1.4% (1) 
Professional, business and 
commercial 
 Professionals:  20 
 Semi-professionals: 11 
 Business:  11 
 Commercial:  6 
65.7% (48) 
Working class 
 Skilled workers:  12 
 Unskilled workers and 
 unemployed:  2 
19.2% (14) 
Other 0 
Total number for whom occupations 
were identified 73 
 
1b: Australian Citizens’ League 
Primary production 
 Farmers:  38 
 Pastoralists:  18 
25.4% (56) 
Manufacturing 0.5% (1) 
Professional, business and 
commercial 
 Professionals:  54 
 Semi-professionals: 25 
 Business:  26 
 Commercial:  23 
60% (132) 
Working class 
 Skilled workers:  19 
 Unskilled workers and 
 unemployed:  12 
14.1% (31) 
Other 0 
Total number for whom occupations 
were identified 220 
 
 
1d: New Zealand Legion 
Primary production 
 Farmers:  12 
 Pastoralists:  11 
14.5% (23) 
Manufacturing 0.6% (1) 
Professional, business and 
commercial 
 Professionals:  68 
 Semi-professionals: 14 
 Business:  21 
 Commercial:  17 
75.5% 
(120) 
Working class 
 Skilled workers:  7 
 Unskilled workers and 
 unemployed :  7 
8.8% (14) 
Other 0.6% (1) 
Total number for whom occupations 
were identified 159 
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Table 2: Employment Statistics (Front-line membership) 
 
2a: Citizens’ League of South Australia 
Primary production 
 Farmers:     0 
 Pastoralists:     0 
0 
Manufacturing 0 
Professional, business and commercial 
 Professionals:     25 
 Semi-professionals:    32 
 Business:     45 
 Commercial:     22 
76.5% (124) 
Working class 
 Skilled workers:     14 
 Unskilled workers/unemployed:   10 
14.8% (24) 
Other 8.7% (14) 
Total number for whom occupations were identified 162 
 
 
2b: New Zealand Legion 
Primary production 
 Farmers:     189 
 Pastoralists:     68 
34.4% (257) 
Manufacturing 0.5% (4) 
Professional, business and commercial 
 Professionals:     127 
 Semi-professionals:    78 
 Business:     51 
 Commercial:     63 
42.6% (319) 
Working class 
 Skilled workers:     82 
 Unskilled workers/unemployed:   86 
22.5% (168) 
Other 0 
Total number for whom occupations were identified 748 
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Graph 1: Age Statistics (Leadership) 
 
1a: All for Australia League 
 
Average age: 45.7 
 
 
 
 
1b: Australian Citizens’ League 
 
Average age: 44.9 
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1c: New Zealand Legion 
 
Average age: 45.1 
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Graph 2: Age Statistics (Front-line membership) 
 
2a: New Zealand Legion 
 
Average age: 42.9 
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Graph 3: Military Statistics (Leadership) 
 
3a: All for Australia League 
 
  Total number for whom military histories were identified: 91 
  Total number eligible to have served in World War One105
  Total eligible who served:     18 (25.7%) 
:  70 
 
 
3b: Australian Citizens’ League 
 
  Total number for whom military histories were identified: 153 
  Total number eligible to have served in World War One106
  Total eligible who served:     39 (32.5%) 
: 120 
 
                                                     
105 If the individual was aged 18-47 in 1918 they will be treated as having been eligible to serve in the 
Australian military: ‘In 1914 recruits had to be 18–35 years with a height of 167.6 centimetres and a chest 
measurement of 86.3 centimetres. In June 1915 the age and height standards were changed to 18–45 years 
and 157.5 centimetres. The minimum height was lowered again, to 152.4 centimetres, in April 1917. The 
standard of medical fitness required from recruits was also lowered.’ (“Australian recruitment statistics for 
World War I,” National Library of Australia, http://vrroom.naa.gov.au/records/?tab=about&ID=19590). 
106 Ibid. 
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3c: New Zealand Legion 
 
  Total number for whom military histories were identified: 132 
  Total number eligible to have served in World War One107
  Total eligible who served:     46 (46%) 
: 100 
 
 
                                                     
107 If the individual was aged 20-47 in 1918 they will be treated as having been eligible to serve in the New 
Zealand military, based on the conscription range of 20-45 that was introduced in 1916. (James Belich, 
Paradise Reforged (Auckland: Penguin Press, 2001), 99.) 
Commissioned officers 
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Graph 4: Military Statistics (Front-line membership) 
 
4a: New Zealand Legion 
 
  Total number for whom military histories were identified:  576 
  Total number eligible to have served in World War One108
  Total who served in the Boer War:     7 
:  380 
  Total who served in the Boer War and World War One:   2 
  Total eligible who served in World War One:    146 (38.4%) 
 
 
  
                                                     
108 Ibid. 
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The citizens’ movements appealed to the same middle class audience as the other mass 
conservative movements that arose during the Depression, in particular the paramilitaristic 
New Guard. Andrew Moore concluded that the New Guard consisted predominantly of 
‘small capitalists, those reliant on bank credit and subject to the fierce competition of larger 
and more established business firms’, but that there was also a ‘significant minority’ of 
working class members.109 Working class support for the New Guard’s thoroughly anti-
working class platform might seem contradictory; certainly, the works of Humphrey 
McQueen, William Tully, and Phyllis Mitchell contended that the proletariat was sparsely 
represented in the movement.110 However, whilst Robert Darlington’s suggestion that ‘there 
were undoubtedly large numbers of workers in the New Guard’ was surely an exaggeration, it 
is partially borne out by the evidence.111 Jean O’Mara’s study of the Five Dock locality of the 
New Guard – a predominantly working class suburb – demonstrated that eighteen percent 
were working class.112 Moore wisely advised against extrapolating this figure across the 
entire movement as the Five Dock locality leader was ‘unusually attentive to trade union 
issues.’113 Nevertheless, the Guard enjoyed the support of several right-wing trade unions, 
such as the Railway Service Association, and it managed to make inroads into communities 
with a strong working class RSL presence.114
                                                     
109 Andrew Moore, "Workers and the New Guard: Proletarian Fascism in New South Wales, 1931–35," in 
Transforming Labour: Work, Workers, Struggle and Change: Proceedings of the 8th National Labour History 
Conference, ed. B. Bowden and J. Kellett (Brisbane: Brisbane Labour History Association, 2003), 244. 
 This minor working class presence is also 
apparent in the citizens’ movements at both a leadership and front-line level. 
110 Humphrey McQueen, "The Social Character of the New Guard," Arena 40 (1975): 85-86; William Tully, "The 
New Guard of New South Wales, 1931-1932" (BA Hons diss., Australian National University, 1974). 1, 6; Phyllis 
Mitchell, "Australian Patriots: A Study of the New Guard," Australian Economic Historical Review 9:2 (1969): 
164. 
111 Robert Darlington, "Was There a Significant Working Class Element in the New Guard?" (paper presented at 
the Armies of the Night, Armies of the Right conference, Macquarie University, Sydney, 25 August 1979). 
112 J. O'Mara, "Guarding Five Dock: A Study of the Five Dock Locality of the New Guard, 1931–1935" (BA Hons 
diss., University of Western Sydney, 1997), 50-52. 
113 Andrew Moore, "The New Guard and the Labour Movement, 1931-1935," Labour History 89 (2005): 56. 
114 Moore, "The New Guard and the Labour Movement, 1931-1935," 57; Moore, "Workers and the New 
Guard," 242. 
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The percentage of ex-servicemen in the New Guard was also similar to the citizens’ 
movements, although this is the subject of some debate in the historiography. Keith Amos 
argued that the Guard was made up primarily of middle class ex-servicemen who sought to 
recapture ‘the sense of belonging, security of numbers, and consciousness of purposeful, 
organized co-operative effort’ they experienced during the war.115 Mitchell similarly argued 
that, to the returned soldier, the New Guard stood for ‘patriotism, loyalty, honesty, courage, 
freedom and sacrifice’ – all of which they could sympathise with.116 However, Tully’s 
quantitative assessment of the movement’s membership suggested it was ‘more 
representative of the middle to lower income petit bourgeoisie, than ex-servicemen or 
workers.’117 Whilst McQueen reached the same conclusion, he added that ‘its leaders were 
ex-A.I.F. officers who used their military experience to help them organize the bourgeoisie 
and its class allies.’118
 
 
The constitution of the citizens’ movements membership was also similar to the two new 
state movements, although the New England and Riverina Movements differed somewhat in 
their membership. Grant Harman’s quantitative analysis of the New England Movement 
demonstrated that it drew most of its support from ‘newspaper editors and proprietors, urban 
businessmen and professional people, and the grazing community.’119
                                                     
115 Amos, The New Guard Movement, 7-9. 
 Likewise, E. R. 
Woolmington’s geographical analysis of new state support in New England suggested it was 
concentrated in the bigger centres of Tamworth, Armidale, Glen Innes and Coffs Harbour, 
116 Mitchell, "Australian Patriots," 163-4. 
117 Tully, "The New Guard of New South Wales," 3-8. 
118 McQueen, "The Social Character of the New Guard," 68-69. 
119 Grant Harman, "New State Agitation in Northern New South Wales, 1920–1929," Journal of the Royal 
Australian Historical Society 63:1 (1977): 36-37. 
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with a strong component of rural support in the area surrounding these towns.120 In contrast, 
Nancy Blacklow demonstrated that the Riverina Movement enjoyed a much wider range of 
support, including ‘graziers with vast landholdings, many less substantial landholders and 
small crop farmers, and men of the towns in business, the professions and the trades.’ The 
Riverina Movement also enjoyed a far higher level of farming and grazing support than its 
New England counterpart. Blacklow suggested the ‘strong regional identity and pride’ in the 
Riverina region contributed to this wide base of popular support.121
 
 
There are limitations to this purely material analysis of motivation. For example, 
conservatives and capitalists of all stripes could hardly be considered marginalised or 
unrepresented – there was a swathe of conservative party options available to them at the 
time, ranging from the Nationalist and United Parties to Reform and the Country Party. In 
addition, whilst class allegiance no doubt influenced the significant minorities of primary 
producers and manufacturers in the citizens’ movements, these groups were more likely to 
favour state intervention when it suited their interests. As Pugh, Ward, Campbell and 
Matthews suggest, the explanation lay partly in the conservative notion of good citizenship, 
which extolled individuals to participate in voluntary endeavours in order to give back to the 
community. This was certainly a factor with the leaders of the citizens’ movements, whose 
middle and upper class upbringing had afforded them significant opportunities in education, 
business, politics, and the military. By the time that the Great Depression hit they were well-
established within their business or professional fields, and possessed sufficient means to be 
able to devote significant time and resources into establishing and running large-scale 
                                                     
120 E. R. Woolmington, "The Geographical Scope of Support for the New State Movement in Northern N. S. W." 
(PhD diss., University of New England, 1963), X11-X26. 
121 Nancy Blacklow, "‘Riverina Roused’: Representative Support for the Riverina New State Movements of the 
1920s and 1930s," Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society: Special Riverina Issue 80:3-4 (1994): 177-
83, 194; Blacklow, "Regional Support for Riverina New State Movements in the 1920s and 1930s" (BA Hons 
diss., Charles Sturt University, 1992). 
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voluntary endeavours such as the citizens’ movements. For example, the Provisional 
Committee of the Australian Citizens’ League included the founders and managers of 
Nicholas Aspro Pty. Ltd. and retail chain G. J. Coles & Co., whilst the State Council of the 
All for Australia League included the managing directors of James Sandy and Co. Ltd. and 
General Industries Ltd. 
 
Conservative notions of ‘good citizenship’ are less likely to have been a primary motivating 
factor for front-line and working class members, who possessed far less in the way of 
disposable time and income for such endeavours. They needed something else to draw them 
in and maintain their interest. In his study of the All for Australia League, Geoffrey Robinson 
argued that ‘ideological enthusiasms and shared antipathies’ was a more potent motivator 
than class allegiance.122 A qualitative analysis of the accounts of citizens’ movement 
members provides insight into what those enthusiasms and antipathies were. Such accounts 
are few and mostly limited to former members of the New Zealand Legion, but a textual 
analysis demonstrates a common perception of urgency and the pressing need to ‘do 
something’ to address the Depression crisis.123
 
 This analysis, which is discussed below, 
shows that the high ideals and populist approach of the citizens’ movements played a central 
role in securing new members. 
Many Legionnaires joined out of a desire for urgent action. Shortly after launching the 
movement’s journal National Opinion, the editor wrote that he had received many letters 
expressing disappointment that it ‘did not reflect a bolder note of immediate action – 
                                                     
122 Robinson, "The All for Australia League in New South Wales," 44-45. 
123 The desire to ‘do something’ is also mentioned in Beveridge, "The Riverina Movement and Charles Hardy," 
2-3, 13, 60. 
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something that would stir and perhaps startle the public’.124 One letter from ‘Do Something’, 
who had ‘joined the Legion at its birth [in the] hopes that [it] might do some good’, was 
bitterly disappointed in the Legion’s inactivity.125 L. E. Earle, who wrote several articles for 
the journal, recalled that he had joined ‘because I was out of work and because I thought that 
things were in an awful mess and here seemed to be someone who was doing something.’126 
This ‘something’ did not need to be well-defined, as N. Tilley noted: ‘[t]he man in the street 
felt doubtful – he could easily be sold a pup with so little support.’127
 
 This demonstrates that 
many members viewed the worsening conditions of the Depression with a growing sense of 
desperation and disenchantment. The citizens’ movements appeared to offer a simple yet far-
reaching solution – a psychological salve, however nebulous, which swept away doubts with 
high ideals and platitudes that promised a radical turnaround of the nation’s woes. 
The desire for action led many members to view the citizens’ movements with an almost 
spiritual reverence. Sir Douglas Robb, who would later have a distinguished career as a 
surgeon and a reformer of the medical profession, claimed that he and his colleagues looked 
upon the Legion as ‘a voice, & a hope ... a light in the sky’, and viewed Begg himself as a 
‘saviour’.128
 
 A letter in the Sydney Morning Herald from an All for Australia League member 
used similar language: 
Like many other people in those misguided times, I hoped for some relief from 
Mr. Lang’s oppression and looked upon this league as the saviour. I was 
prepared to help the league in every possible way, and was enthusiastic 
enough to wear the badge for a time.129
 
 
                                                     
124 National Opinion 1:2 (24 August 1933): 2. 
125 National Opinion 2:16 (29 March 1934): 12; National Opinion 2:23 (5 July 1934): 13. 
126 Letter from L. E. Earle, 27 August 1972, Transcripts of taped interviews with various people for Tony 
Simpson, ‘The Sugar Bag Years’, MS-Papers-9902, ATL (hereafter ‘Simpson papers’). 
127 Letter from N. Tilley, 26 August 1972, Simpson papers. 
128 Letter from Sir Douglas Robb, 29 September 1972, Simpson papers. 
129 Sydney Morning Herald, 18 July 1931, 5. 
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Given that he wrote this letter out of frustration with the lack of communication he had 
received after joining, his reverence is more likely to have been genuine. The fact that both 
used the word ‘saviour’ suggests that the connection felt by many members to the citizens’ 
movements was emotional as well as material. They inspired faith that the growing economic 
turmoil could be addressed, and that society could be transformed so that such crises would 
never occur again. This emotional investment amongst front-line members was also driven by 
a sense of personal threat: whilst the upper class may have possessed the means to insulate 
themselves from the Depression, the middle class had no such luxury. As Robb put it, ‘we 
were interested in the depression & the effect on our new-born practices, and on our friends, 
particularly farmers.’130
 
 
A dislike for party politics was also a strong motivating factor. As chapter two argued, this 
‘anti-political political thought’ was a central component of the conservative radicalisation 
which occurred during the Depression. According to former Legionnaire J. D. Hall: 
 
I think the main thing which attracted us (certainly the under 30’s) was the 
ideal that it would be possible to elect a governing body, which would 
recognise no party ties, obey no government whips but vote solely as our 
consciences dictated. This seems incredible nowadays and probably does to 
you now – but, I can assure you that to a 30 year old in the thirties, it actually 
appeared possible.131
 
 
Such a hope would certainly have seemed possible in the 1930s, given that party politics were 
a relatively new innovation and the nineteenth century ideal of the independent colonial 
statesman was still within living memory. For many who had witnessed the growth of extra-
parliamentary machines and the solidification of the two-party system – in particular those 
who recalled the supposed unity of wartime – it was an unwelcome intrusion on the once 
                                                     
130 Letter from Sir Douglas Robb, 29 September 1972, Simpson papers. 
131 Letter from J. D. Hall, 24 August 1972, Simpson papers. 
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dignified field of politics. As R. F. Gambrill, author of an unofficial history of the Russell 
family, put it: 
 
It was not my experience of the depression which attracted me to the Legion. 
As a Returned Service Man from World War I, after 4 ½ years of active 
Service, I was (in 1919) concerned with the state of party politics. No party 
then seemed to have any policy other than to become the Government ... We 
suffered “depression” in 1920 and other years prior to 1933, but these were 
more or less local ones. Enough, however, to convince me of the “rottenness” 
of party politics.132
 
 
Given that Hall and Gambrill wrote their recollections in the 1970s, when such rampant anti-
partyism was imbued with fascist connotations, it is likely they were telling the truth. The 
citizens’ movements restored faith amongst people whose confidence in the existing political 
machinery had been sapped by its apparent inability to deal with the economic turmoil. 
 
Conservative dicta played a part in attracting members as well. The chairman of the Otago 
division of the New Zealand Legion H. L. Paterson ‘understood that the legion was to combat 
the growing multiplicity of local bodies of all types and the increasing burden of taxation 
created by these local bodies.’133
 
 The rationalisation of government also appealed to 
Wanganui division chairman W. R. Brown, who drew parallels between the Legion and the 
Kyabram Reform Movement that had secured a reduction in the number of members of the 
Victorian parliament thirty years earlier: 
[I]nfluence could be attained by securing a predominating portion of voting 
power, and this the Legion felt hopeful of securing. A similar movement was 
started in Victoria 30 years ago, and at the following elections the movement 
was influential in securing the return of 64 members out of 93. The New 
Zealand Legion aspired to succeed in the same way, so as to be instrumental in 
effecting a big improvement on the present unsatisfactory state of affairs.134
                                                     
132 Letter from R. F. Gambrill, 24 August 1972, Simpson papers. 
 
133 Letter from H. L. Paterson, 28 August 1972, Simpson papers. 
134 Taihape Times, 2 June 1933, 3. 
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Public service and civic duty was also a motivating factor for some. Legionnaire W. Bright, 
who was also president of the local Rotary Club and Unemployment Relief Committee, wrote 
that he was ‘attracted to the Legion ... by the desperate state of the country with its ever 
increasing numbers of unemployed.’135 Tilley joined because ‘the main advocate in H.B. was 
our one-time Div. Com., Sir Andrew Russell, a man for whom I had a great respect’. This led 
him to assume that Begg must also be ‘of Andy Russell’s type, one who would automatically 
receive respect & confidence’.136
 
 This suggests that, for those already participating in public 
life, the Legion was viewed as one of many ways of ‘doing something’ about the Depression. 
A major shortcoming of previous quantitative analyses of the citizens’ movements has been 
the lack of attention given to the role of women. The only work that has included a gender 
analysis is Ward’s thesis on the New Zealand Legion in the Manawatu-Wanganui. Her work 
demonstrated that women comprised 12% of the region’s membership, some of whom played 
a role in establishing new centres and serving on committees. The Legion also actively 
attempted to enrol women in the movements, stressing in their meeting invitations that 
women were ‘especially invited’. This led Ward to conclude that ‘women were more 
involved in the New Zealand Legion than previously assumed.’137
 
 Whilst this thesis does not 
purport to undertake a thorough analysis of gender, it builds on Ward’s work with additional 
quantitative and qualitative information for each of the citizens’ movements. Nevertheless, 
this remains a subject in need of further study. 
The quantitative data discussed above demonstrates that women were indeed more involved 
in the citizens’ movements than previously expected, albeit much more so at a front-line than 
                                                     
135 Letter from W. Bright, 26 August 1972, Simpson papers. 
136 Letter from N. Tilley, 26 August 1972, Simpson papers. 
137 Ward, "The New Zealand Legion in Manawatu-Wanganui," 21. 
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a leadership level. Women only comprised between 5.2% and 6.4% of the leadership samples 
for the four citizens’ movements, and only in the case of the Australian Citizens’ League had 
women participated in the founding of a movement.138 Conversely, women comprised 20.3% 
of the membership of the Hawkes Bay division of the New Zealand Legion, two of whom 
were particularly active – Lady Russell, the wife of Sir Andrew Russell, and Mrs Dorothy de 
Castro who had previously worked for the Conservative and Unionist Party in Britain.139
 
 
Women also made up 54.4% of the front-line membership of the North Adelaide branch of 
the Citizens’ League of South Australia, which may have reflected the ongoing cooperation 
between the Citizens’ League and the South Australian Branch of the Women’s Non-Party 
Association. Female leaders tended to be married, whilst there were a roughly equal number 
of married and unmarried women in the rank-and-file membership. Many joined with their 
husbands or other family members as part of a wider family unit. 
A qualitative analysis provides more information on the role of women in the citizens’ 
movements. Their motivations for joining and participating in the movements were 
influenced by the traditions of ‘conservative feminism’ and ‘female imperialism’ identified 
by Marian Simms and Katie Pickles.140
                                                     
138 The female participants in the Australian Citizens’ League provisional committee were Mrs L. M. Skene, Mrs 
A. F. Moss, and Mrs W. Thomas (who was also a member of the Melbourne Housewives’ Association). 
 This tradition was discussed in chapter one through 
the emergence of women’s Empire and non-party movements in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. These movements channelled the political and moral aspirations of newly 
enfranchised women into areas of ‘acceptable’ public activity that did not overtly challenge 
the patriarchal status quo. As New Zealand Legion member Edith Willoughby saw it, the 
139 National Opinion 2:24 (19 July 1934): 14. 
140 Simms, "Conservative Feminism in Australia: A Case Study of Feminist Ideology," 305-18; Pickles, Female 
Imperialism and National Identity, 16. 
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citizens’ movements were a continuation of this tradition, in particular of the women’s 
patriotic societies that arose during the Great War: 
 
Wake up, women citizens! You answered the call for help to the nation in 
August, 1914. Now, once again, use your powers and do your bit in this 
August, 1933, to help alleviate the chaos that exists ... Let us think more of our 
sisters’ need, and practise daily doing unto others as we would be done by. 
You can be a magnificent support and help to your people if the right spirit 
prevails in your doings. Get together! Discuss serious questions of national 
import. Form your committees and work wholly and solely for the salvation of 
this beautiful country!141
 
 
The citizens’ movements were also a valuable arena for women to express themselves 
politically. By the time the citizens’ movements arose in the 1930s, a younger generation of 
post-suffrage women were beginning to seek avenues for political participation in a society 
where female representation in parliament was still very much the exception rather than the 
norm. The citizens’ movements provided one such environment: not only did they encourage 
their members to learn about current affairs, they also provided opportunities to gain 
leadership and public speaking experience. Whilst this still occurred within the confines of a 
conservative worldview that remained uncomfortable with female political power, it 
nevertheless provided a level of exposure to matters of national importance that the ballot box 
did not. This suggests that the citizens’ movements fulfilled a similar function as women’s 
non-party organisations and branches of conservative political organisations such as farmers’ 
unions.142
 
 
The All for Australia League was the only citizens’ movement that took deliberate action to 
encourage female representation at all levels of the organisation. Women were entitled to 
                                                     
141 National Opinion 1:3 (7 September 1933): 14. 
142 See Fitzherbert, Liberal Women: Federation to 1949; Anne Henderson, Enid Lyons – Leading Lady to a 
Nation  (Melbourne: Pluto Press, 2008); Heather Gunn, "‘For the Man on the Land’: Issues of Gender and 
Identity in the Formation of the Victorian Farmers’ Union Women's Section, 1918–1922," Journal of Australian 
Studies 18:42 (1994): 32-42. 
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create their own women’s divisions and sub-divisions to parallel the existing structure of the 
movement. In addition, five seats were reserved for women on the State Council. Along with 
this parallel organisation, women were still entitled to join standard sub-divisions and run for 
offices.143 Feminist organisations such as the National Council of Women and the United 
Associations of Women initially treated the League with suspicion, but by July several of 
their members, including Mildred Muscio, were on the State Council.144
 
 Despite this, women 
represented only 5.2% of the leadership sample compiled for this study – the lowest of the 
four citizens’ movements – and most of these women held the reserved seats on the State 
Council. This suggests that, despite its progressive intentions, the All for Australia League 
was still hampered by the cultural barriers against female leadership in the Anglo world. 
CONCLUSION 
The success of the citizens’ movements in achieving a mass following was due in part to their 
ability to channel conservative discontent through appropriate promotional and organisational 
techniques. From the start, the movements staked their legitimacy on their ability to harness a 
large body of popular opinion: therefore, much of the initial work of their founders was 
directed towards recruiting and sustaining a large membership. This was accomplished in part 
through the promotion of a culture of mass conservative mobilisation based on public 
ceremonies to demonstrate mass appeal, organisational structures that encouraged democratic 
participation and leadership, culturally resonant symbols, and a variety of media such as radio 
and print culture. Nevertheless, the geographical spread of the citizens’ movements was 
generally limited to urban areas, although the New Zealand Legion and the Australian 
                                                     
143 All for Australia League: Draft Constitution (Sydney: All for Australia League, 1931), 14-15. 
144 Robinson, "The All for Australia League in New South Wales," 48-49. 
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Citizens’ League had a more significant rural base. In the case of the All for Australia 
League, this was due to competing conservative organisations in rural New South Wales.  
 
Despite their claims to represent a broad, cross-class national consensus, the citizens’ 
movements were largely the manifestation of the frustrations of a particular fraction of 
Australasian society. The majority of members were from the professional, business and 
commercial fraction of the capitalist class: they were reasonably well-educated, in their early-
to-mid forties, and those that had served during the Great War had usually done so at an 
officer level. Progressing down the membership hierarchy to the front-line correlated with 
increased diversity of employment, a slightly younger average age, higher participation in the 
Great War, and a lower military rank for those who served. The periodic claims of the 
citizens’ movements to have recruited a significant number of working class individuals were 
largely hyperbole, although there was a significant manufacturing minority within the All for 
Australia League. This contrasts with the cross-class, youthful, and largely veteran 
membership of fascist movements.  
 
However, the ability to channel conservative discontent was only part of the reason why the 
citizens’ movements were so successful. They needed to be fluent in the nuanced and often 
contradictory conservative grievances with the way the Depression had been handled by 
politicians. The testimony of citizens’ movement members themselves suggests that the 
average member was motivated just as much, if not more so, by ideological considerations as 
by their place in the class structure. These ideological considerations, which comprised a 
careful balance of reactionary and radical ideas, are explored in chapter four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MOBILISING THE MASSES: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
CITIZENS’ MOVEMENTS 
 
I was very unaware of politics – its motives, mechanics etc. We all knew there 
were parties in Wgn, but it was before a serious Labour Party came up ... [b]ut 
we were interested in the depression & the effect on our new-born practices, 
and on our friends, particularly farmers. There were also street riots to be 
feared. The Govt. of the day seemed as confused as we were and we heard the 
self-appointed saviours professing new economic doctrines, particularly Social 
Credit & Major Douglas … When Dr Campbell Begg, a urologist in 
Wellington – in good professional status – started to raise his voice … we 
sniffed a saviour.1
 
 
Sir Douglas Robb offered this recollection in 1972 of the motivations that led him to join the 
New Zealand Legion. It neatly captures the growing sense of discontent felt by many 
conservatives during the Depression and the sense of enthusiasm that they felt when the 
citizens’ movements swept across the political landscape. The readers’ eye is drawn most 
poignantly to the use of the word ‘saviour’: it suggests a degree of emotional investment 
bordering on reverence, as if the waters of economic peril had finally parted to reveal the 
long-awaited path to recovery. This chapter examines how such a sense of reverence was 
inspired by the citizens’ movements. It argues that the movements espoused a populist 
ideology comprised of a blend of high-level reactionary and radical tropes rather than specific 
policies. This chapter also compares this ideology to other forms of right-wing radicalism, in 
particular fascism, to determine whether the citizens’ movements fit within any broader 
ideological categories or trends. 
 
                                                     
1 Letter from Sir Douglas Robb, 29 September 1972, Simpson papers. 
169 
 
THE RADICAL 
Above all else, the citizens’ movements portrayed themselves as forces of political and moral 
idealism. Their mission was just as much a spiritual one as it was an ideological one, for they 
aimed at nothing less than the awakening of the civic spirit of the citizenry and the 
transformation of the nation’s moribund political apparatus into what they believed would be 
a more deliberate and democratic body. This awakening, they believed, had already begun as 
a formerly apathetic citizenry revolted against the worsening conditions of the Depression 
and the apparent inaction of party politicians. As the Citizens’ League of South Australia put 
it: 
 
We are not a political party and have no desire to become one, but we are a 
conscience, a sentiment, a force, the force of public opinion, public sentiment, 
public conscience, which, awakened at last by the crisis that confronts us, 
demands to make itself both heard and felt.2
 
 
The All for Australia League termed this ‘a spontaneous rising of the public conscience’ 
possessing ‘something almost of a spiritual nature’; in Victoria, Australian Citizens’ League 
President Ernest Turnbull wrote that he ‘might as well be leading a whirlwind’.3 This 
suggests a mutually reinforcing relationship between the citizens’ movements and their 
membership: the former claimed to provide a channel for the raw, nebulous public outrage of 
the latter, yet it was also upon this very outrage that the citizens’ movements staked their 
claim to represent ‘a higher political conscience amongst the people’.4
                                                     
2 Address by E. D. A. Bagot at a Citizens’ Public Meeting in Adelaide Town Hall on 14 October, box 1 item 1, 
CLSA papers. 
 Thus the citizens’ 
movements perceived themselves as the focal point of a wider grassroots wave of righteous 
frustration with the status quo. 
3 All for Australia League: its real significance (Sydney: All for Australia League, 1931), 2, 3; R. W. Kenderdine, 
‘The Demand for Honest Government’, Life (1 May 1931): 400. 
4 All for Australia League: its real significance, 2. 
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The citizens’ movements exalted idealism above the need for concrete policies or reforms. 
Whilst there may have been an element of pragmatism in this, the movements were primarily 
motivated by their belief that theirs was a much more transformative, and therefore a more 
fundamental and far-reaching agenda than the shallow and parochial platforms of political 
parties. The New Zealand Legion called this ‘a more definite, concrete and daring objective 
than any political party has had the courage to formulate’.5
 
 Indeed, the citizens’ movements 
believed their aims transcended politics entirely – it was their job to rebuild the tattered and 
fragmented political structures of the nation and ensure that the right kind of men were 
elected to keep it that way: 
That is the problem – to call up a crusading spirit, to sound a rallying cry, not 
to elaborate details of policy. Details divide, we need to unite. Give us a 
common basis on which we can agree – first principles, fundamentals. In 
short, give us a creed, a confession of faith, high in its ideals, daring in its 
demands ... Let us leave the details to those whose job it is to work them out. 
Ours be the job of putting into expression the hopes and fears and dreams of 
the common man.6
 
 
However, this did not prevent the citizens’ movements from developing policies on how a 
more deliberative democracy might be structured. ‘There must be a practical side to any 
movement the purpose of which is to shape public policy’, stated the All for Australia 
League, ‘but the husk must not be mistaken for the kernel, the visible machinery must not 
dominate the underlying purpose.’7
 
 As chapters five and six demonstrate, this tension 
between the desire to preserve ideological unity and the need to translate idealism into policy 
was a central problem of the movements, and it ultimately contributed to their downfall. 
                                                     
5 No. N.Z.L. 3, 11 March 1933, file 1 folder 2, NZL papers. 
6 National Opinion 1:3 (7 September 1933): 3. 
7 All for Australia League: A Call to Citizenship, item 70, Mutch papers. 
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The citizens’ movements’ claimed to provide the vehicle through which this fundamental 
change could be realised. In November 1930, Edward Daniel Alexander Bagot – General 
Secretary of the newly formed Citizens’ League of South Australia – expressed the following 
ardent hope for his nascent movement: 
 
We hope that all decent-minded citizens will rally to the call which we are 
making and help us by unity to fight this enemy which is in our midst. It can 
only be done by organisation, and it is for that purpose, amongst others, that 
we wish to see on non-party lines the union of all loyal citizens.8
 
 
His statement was built around three key subjects: firstly, the ‘loyal’ and ‘decent-minded’ 
citizens which he hoped to mobilise; secondly, an internal ‘enemy in our midst’ which 
needed to be faced; and thirdly, a desire to carry out these objectives by uniting under a ‘non-
party’ organisation. These subjects are easily recognisable in the myriad of right-wing non-
party leagues which preceded the citizens’ movements, and which are discussed in chapters 
one and two. What distinguished the citizens’ movements from their predecessors was the 
way in which they utilised these ideas to develop an ideology aimed at overthrowing the 
supposedly self-serving and out-of-touch political elites and transform parliament into a more 
deliberative and democratic body. In doing so, they directly challenged the status quo of the 
mainstream conservative political apparatus. 
 
                                                     
8 Advertiser, 27 October 1930, 12. 
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Figure 12: Australian Citizens’ League cartoon demonstrating the citizens’ movements’ 
challenge to mainstream political parties. Source: All for Australia League shows the way 
to prosperity (Melbourne: All for Australia League, 1931), 3. 
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The conservative notion of the good citizen lay at the heart of the citizens’ movements’ 
vision of a transformed society. Chapter one demonstrated how the citizen became the central 
figure in the popular conservative worldview during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries as a bulwark against the potentially transformative powers of the broadening 
electorate. The citizens’ movements glorified the citizen as the voice of reason and 
moderation in a world of extremes. He (once again codified by the masculine pronoun) 
occupied an ideological ‘middle ground’: stoic, hardworking, and able to put the interests of 
the nation above his own parochial concerns. As E. Lee Neil, a founding member of the 
Australian Citizens’ League put it: 
 
I believe myself to be typical of thousands of serious-minded citizens who, 
over and above all party preferences or convictions, are as jealous as they are 
determined that our country shall be wisely led through the present stress … it 
is of the highest importance that we as a people should be judged not upon 
extremist or factional opinions, but upon the considered views and 
determinations of the great body of sane, sober-minded citizens properly 
organised to express what they stand for in the life of the nation.9
 
 
The perceived separation of the citizen from the world of politics further increased his 
ideological appeal. Whilst party politicians were busily employing their powers to the benefit 
of themselves or the interests they represented, the citizenry were devotedly going about their 
everyday businesses in an attempt to keep the country afloat. This ‘long suffering section of 
the public’, according to the Citizens’ League of South Australia, had gone for a long time 
without adequate political representation whilst the political extremists on either side 
developed sophisticated political machinery to represent themselves. The citizens’ 
movements intended to change that: 
 
Although all other interests appear to be represented by strong and influential 
organisations, John Citizen alone remains without any machinery through 
                                                     
9 E. Lee Neil, Why we need a citizens' league (Melbourne: Australian Citizens' League, 1931), 3. 
174 
 
which his voice can be effectively sounded. He is sick and tired of being the 
shuttlecock of party politics. The time has come, therefore, and he intends to 
rouse himself and show the party-bound politicians what a powerful force of 
public opinion can become.10
 
 
This notion of the loyal and self-sacrificing citizenry as the legitimate voice of the national 
interest represented an analogue of the populist conception of ‘the people’. 
 
Class played a role in the citizens’ movements’ description of the loyal citizenry. Positioned 
as they were between two political poles, it was necessary to describe what those poles were. 
The citizens’ movements used a variety of terms, including ‘Reactionary Tories’ and ‘Red 
Labour’ or ‘Diehards’ and ‘Reds’.11
 
 This analysis of class, however, had less to do with the 
means of production than it did with the dominant position which these poles supposedly held 
within the political system. As the All for Australia League put it: 
[C]lass-consciousness has found expression in the political sphere through 
organisations of employers and employees whose respective political and 
industrial activities, pursued without regard to the interests of the community 
as a whole induce a state of mutual antagonism rather than co-operation for 
the common weal.12
 
 
The shallowness of this class analysis was demonstrated by the appeal of the citizens’ 
movements to a form of class collaborationism. In essence, this represented a rejection of the 
validity of class difference in favour of a broad horizontal kinship based on ideological rather 
than material interests. As the New Zealand Legion argued: 
 
New Zealanders of all walks of life – labourers, farmers, merchants, artisans, 
clerks, professional men – share this belief with us and, given a common 
ground on which to meet, will gladly work together for its attainment, instead 
                                                     
10 Citizens' League: its formation, aims, and objects (Adelaide: Citizens' League of South Australia, 1931), 4. 
11 The Financial Record of Party Politics [undated], item 68, Mutch papers; E. D. A. Bagot, ‘Principles in Politic: 
What the Citizens’ League hopes to achieve’, Progress, 31 October 1930, 11. 
12 All for Australia League: Draft Policy (Sydney: All for Australia League, 1931), 1. 
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of importer against exporter, farmer against townsman, and employee against 
employer.13
 
 
The movements argued that class consciousness had been artificially engineered by a small 
minority of ‘extremists’ on either side of the political spectrum so that they could gain control 
of the mainstream political parties. They countered that the loyal citizenry was comprised of 
both employers and employees who recognised that their interests were complementary 
rather than contradictory: 
 
The A.F.A. League aims at excluding the extremists on both sides and 
reconstructing the body politic … [around] Sane Labour and the business and 
producing interests [who] constitute the great majority of the citizens in this 
country. Freed from the domination of extremists, the Australian people have 
energy, initiative, courage, and ability sufficient to frame a policy and carry it 
into effect by legislation designed to promote the welfare of the whole 
community and not of any particular class or section.14
 
 
The citizens’ movements aimed to provide a ‘common ground’ upon which these groups 
could come together free from the corrupting influence of party politics.15
 
 
Despite their glorification of the loyal citizenry, the citizens’ movements also chastised them 
for their political apathy. During times of plenty they had been willing to ignore the welfare 
of their country in favour of material concerns, leaving matters of state in the hands of ‘party 
hacks’.16 The movements thus perceived themselves as fulfilling a vital educative function by 
encouraging its members to ‘think nationally instead of individually’ and ‘be prepared to 
render service as the price of citizenship.’17
                                                     
13 National Opinion 1:5 (5 October 1933): 2. 
 This followed in the pattern of previous right-
wing leagues such as the Constitutional Associations which considered their primary function 
14 The Financial Record of Party Politics [undated], item 68, Mutch papers. 
15 All for Australia League: its real significance, 3. 
16 National Unity in Crisis: The Story of the N. Z. Legion (Wellington: New Zealand Legion, 1933), 2-3; Citizens' 
League: its formation, aims, and objects, 9-10. 
17 Citizens' League: its formation, aims, and objects, 5. 
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to be the elevation of the public consciousness on matters of public affairs. The New Zealand 
Legion was particularly concerned with providing a ‘space’ for honest political discussion 
that was free from sectional influences. It encouraged its centres to consider questions of 
national importance, and it formed central committees to produce and disseminate material 
for members on a wide range of subjects including central government, local government, 
economics, unemployment, and land.18 By reminding their members of the duties of 
citizenship, the movements hoped to encourage the values of ‘frankness, altruism and insight’ 
in place of ‘hypocrisy, selfishness, and superficial thought’.19
 
 
Had they simply sought to educate a large body of individuals in traditional conservative 
dicta, the citizens’ movements may have amounted to little more than a larger version of the 
right-wing non-party leagues that preceded them. However, one of their fundamental tenets 
was their complete opposition to the party system of government and their commitment to 
challenging the electoral dominance of political parties on both sides of the spectrum. Their 
main target was the party ‘machines’, the extra-parliamentary arms of political parties that 
controlled party platforms and pre-selected candidates for elections. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, non-labour politicians had distinguished themselves from their labour 
counterparts by highlighting their independence: whilst labour members were bound by the 
pledges and rigid caucus structure of their parties, non-labour candidates were free to serve 
their constituencies by exercising their own judgement. By the 1920s, however, the 
conservative party apparatus in Australia and New Zealand had evolved in an attempt to 
                                                     
18 Minutes of Meeting of the Provisional National Council, 4-5 April 1933; Minutes of Meeting of the National 
Council, 19-21 July 1933, file 1 folder 1, NZL papers. 
19 National Opinion 1:4 (21 September 1933): 3. 
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replicate the organisational unity and extra-parliamentary support structure of labour.20
 
 The 
growth of this extra-parliamentary apparatus was pejoratively termed ‘machine politics’. 
The citizens’ movements were critical of two elements of ‘machine politics’ in particular: 
party platforms and the pre-selection of candidates. Party platforms, which were enforced 
through candidate pledges and block voting in parliament, were seen to contradict the belief 
in reasoned and independent thought that was so central to the conservative worldview: 
 
The present political parties form “platforms” with numbers of “planks” to 
which their candidates must adhere absolutely. Any display of individuality is 
severely “disciplined.” By a system of pre-selection, electors must vote for 
candidates who may have no other qualifications than their obedience to their 
party “bosses.” Thus, individuality is destroyed and Governments, instead of 
governing, are dictated to by cliques and caucus.21
 
 
This hearkened back to the conservative ideal of voluntary political participation. The 
citizens’ movements believed that the key to good citizenship lay in complete independence 
from any organisational structure that sought to impose collective rules, behaviours, or ideas. 
Party platforms robbed candidates of the ability to exercise their own judgment on political 
matters, resulting in a form of ‘Party dictatorship’.22 The citizens’ movements considered this 
to be anti-democratic and immoral: it had caused ‘the degradation of the political conscience 
of the people.’23 In a particularly vitriolic turn of phase, the New Zealand Legion termed 
party politics an ‘abrogation of democracy’ that had ‘led to the substance of the State being 
poured out as a bloody sacrifice to the Moloch of party’.24
 
  
                                                     
20 Loveday, "Emergence: Realignment and Consolidation," 453-87; Smith, Against the Machines, 23-50. 
21 E. D. A. Bagot, ‘Principles in Politic: What the Citizens’ League hopes to achieve’, 11. 
22 National Opinion 1:1 (10 August 1933): 2. 
23 All for Australia League: its real significance, 2. 
24 National Opinion 1:1 (10 August 1933). 2. 
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Figure 13: The clash between party politics and ‘public interests’. Source: R. W. Kenderine, 
‘The Demand for Honest Government: How the All for Australia League Originated and 
Swept the Country’, Life (1 May 1931): 398. 
 
The citizens’ movements also considered pre-selection to be anti-democratic in nature. By 
only selecting candidates who were willing to follow the party line, they argued that party 
machines limited the electoral choice available to everyday citizens and actively prevented 
any alternative political candidates from emerging: 
 
Such pre-selected persons are then submitted as the candidates of the 
respective parties, and the only franchise the individual elector can exercise is 
to support the candidate, whoever he might be, of one or other of the 
contending parties. Thus the electors no longer vote for responsible 
representatives in Parliament, but vote for a party, and, by the strength of their 
machines, the major parties endeavour to defeat any effort to bring new 
political aspirations of the people into existence.25
 
 
This robbed individuals of the chance to fully exercise their democratic responsibilities as 
informed and reasoned citizens. As the All for Australia League put it, pre-selection 
                                                     
25 Policy as adopted by convention of the League (Sydney: All for Australia League, 1931), 9. 
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‘deprived the people of their freedom in the choice of their Parliamentary representatives’ 
and ‘defeated the freedom of adult franchise’.26 Instead of promoting the kind of deliberative 
and democratic body that the citizens’ movements envisioned for parliament, pre-selection 
encouraged mediocrity and cronyism. Only ‘incompetent men’ could be elected under such a 
‘treacherous electoral system’, and only ‘[b]lind adherence’ and ‘ready acquiescence’ could 
guarantee them a continued seat.27 As a result, it was ‘practically impossible for a citizen to 
secure election to Parliament against the will of the party machines and the powerful 
sectional interests that dominate them.’28
 
 
Party politicians provided the ‘other’ against which the loyal citizenry were pitted. They were 
portrayed in citizens’ movement ideology as members of a small but powerful political 
minority whose interests lay solely in retaining and enhancing their power at the expense of 
national interests. As the All for Australia League put it: 
 
By the caucus machine control, a minority in Parliament can impose its will on 
a Parliamentary party, and, because party solidarity demands that members 
shall place their party before their conscience or their country, such minority 
can dominate Parliament and the Country.29
 
 
In contrast to these party politicians, the citizens’ movements stressed their supposedly 
apolitical and national credentials. As non-party movements, their members were governed 
by purer motives than self-serving and parochially-minded party politicians: they were 
willing put the nation ahead of their own personal desires by facing the Depression crisis with 
disinterested determination. They represented the true voice of democracy, the nation’s 
                                                     
26 All for Australia League: its real significance, 1-2; Policy as adopted by convention of the League, 8. 
27 Minutes of Inaugural Meeting, 3 October 1930, box 1 item 1, CLSA papers; National Opinion 1:1 (10 August 
1933), 2. 
28 Policy as adopted by convention of the League, 9. 
29 Ibid., 8. 
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‘noblest, truest interests’, devoid of class or sectional prejudices.30
 
 The following passage 
from a speech by Bagot demonstrates the interwoven and mutually reinforcing nature of the 
dichotomy between the loyal citizenry and party politicians: 
We can do nothing until we can convince the political leaders that we are sick 
to death of party politics, that we will not consent any longer to remain passive 
while they bicker and quarrel and play for their own ends instead of sinking 
their differences and uniting for the good of the country as a whole. 
... 
We must take the lead ourselves. We must organise and unite until we are 
such a huge power that our wishes can no longer be ignored. We must show 
these politicians, who are so prone to listen to arguments of force, that there is 
a force which can make itself felt above all others, the force of public opinion 
directed towards a common objective, and that object the cleansing of our 
political stables, which we intend to secure by every constitutional means 
within our power.31
 
  
In this, the loyal citizens were the inheritors of the ANZAC tradition: stoic, hardworking, 
self-sacrificing, and above all united in a common purpose. The citizens’ movements drew 
parallels between the Great War and the Depression: both were crises on a national scale, and 
both required the concerted efforts of the entire nation. However, rather than being invoked 
on a militaristic basis, the ANZAC tradition was used to reinforce the values of unity and 
self-sacrifice that the citizens’ movements claimed to represent.32 Otherwise, the ANZACs 
did not feature heavily in citizens’ movement rhetoric.33
 
 
The citizens’ movements sought to overcome the dominance of party machines and self-
serving politicians through the directed voting power of their membership. In place of party 
                                                     
30 E. Lee Neil, Why we need a citizens' league, 3. 
31 Address by E. D. A. Bagot at a Citizens’ Public Meeting in Adelaide Town Hall on 14 October, box 1 item 1, 
CLSA papers. 
32 Circular Ref. 6/2/34, 6th June 1933, file 1 folder 2, NZL papers; No. NZL 15, file 1 folder 1, NZL papers. 
33 For examples of the ANZAC tradition being invoked, see address by L. V. Pellew at a Citizens’ Public Meeting 
in Adelaide Town Hall, 14 October 1930, box 1 item 1, CLSA papers; Citizens' League: its formation, aims, and 
objects, 2; Light on the Legion, 5-6, 13; All for Australia League shows the way to prosperity, 20, 22; Sydney 
Morning Herald, 26 February 1931, 10. 
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lists they would support individual candidates ‘who by their past records merit our 
confidence as fit and proper persons to represent us.’ It did not matter whether they were 
independents or members of existing parties: the only criterion that the citizens’ movements 
would require of them was that they were prepared to serve their country before their party.34 
Such a ‘loose grouping of Independents’ was one of the strategies commonly utilised by 
minor parties and independents in New South Wales to combat the dominance of the major 
parties, according to Rodney K. Smith.35 By doing so, the movements hoped to encourage a 
greater sense of political awareness amongst the public and restore parliament to a more 
deliberative and democratic body. Instead of being bound by restrictive party pre-selection 
lists and pledges, candidates would be free to campaign on their own merit and to exercise 
their own judgment. This would eventually ‘rais[e] the average personal standard of those 
who enter public life’ by encouraging the ‘right type of men’ to run for parliament.36
 
 It might 
also ultimately lead to the abolition of political parties entirely, or at the very least relegate 
them to irrelevance. However, as chapter five will show, holding to this ideal would prove 
especially difficult for the Australian citizens’ movements when faced with pressure from 
mainstream conservative politics. 
The citizens’ movements also hoped to overcome party politics by reforming government 
along what they considered to be more democratic and cooperative lines. These proposed 
reforms typically focused on one of two areas: the size and scope of government and the 
management of the economy. The movements claimed that their proposed reforms in the size 
and scope of government were designed to encourage greater efficiency, decentralisation, and 
                                                     
34 Report of Executive Committee presented at First Convention of Delegates of Branch Committees of the 
CLSA, 1 December 1930, box 1 item 1, CLSA papers. 
35 Smith, Against the Machines, 3-4. 
36 All for Australia League: All for Australia, item 70, Mutch papers; Citizens' League: its formation, aims, and 
objects, 14. 
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pluralism, and they drew on standard conservative tropes regarding limited government. Such 
reforms were of particular importance to the New Zealand Legion, and remained one of its 
most consistent policies throughout its life. From its first press release in February 1933 the 
Legion stressed its devotion to ‘more efficient government, [both] central and local’.37 Local 
bodies were of particular concern: their sheer number and overlapping responsibilities made 
them ‘troublesome excrescences on the body politic’ in desperate need of rationalisation.38 
To combat the proliferation of local body government, the Legion proposed dividing New 
Zealand into a series of autonomous shires along lines of ‘communit[ies] of interest’ and 
‘convenience of communication’.39 Shire Councils would be given authority on all matters of 
local government, including harbours, rivers, highways, power, and healthcare, leaving 
national matters such as justice, police, defence, railways, and external affairs in the hands of 
Parliament.40
 
 
The New Zealand Legion’s fixation on governmental reform was caused by a number of 
factors. In part, the Legion was merely rehashing the mainstream conservative stance on the 
inefficiencies of local government, which had been the subject of criticism amongst 
deflationists and the press in New Zealand since the Depression began.41
                                                     
37 Auckland Star, 23 February 1933, 8. 
 It was also 
influenced by Begg’s campaign to rationalise the Wellington Hospital Board in 1931 and his 
desire to promote similar economies on a national scale. However, the Legion primarily 
viewed these reforms as a practical fulfilment of its opposition to party politics. It believed 
that the abolition of the Provincial system of government by Julius Vogel in 1876 had created 
38 Light on the Legion. 9. 
39 National Opinion 1:4 (21 September 1933): 8-10. The Legion’s policies on governmental reform were largely 
developed by the Dunedin executive, although the term ‘shire’ was introduced by the National Council; see 
Campbell, "The New Zealand Legion in Otago," 27-31. 
40 National Opinion 2:13 (15 February 1934): 5; National Opinion 2:14 (1 March 1934): 1, 5-6. 
41 Pugh, "The New Zealand Legion and Conservative Protest," 124. 
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an ever-increasing demand for local government bodies, which exerted a ‘tyrannical 
influence’ on their members of parliament.42 By strictly delineating the responsibilities of 
local and central government, the Legion intended to free parliament from electoral concerns 
and allow it to focus solely on national affairs.43
 
 
The Citizens’ League of South Australia took a more extreme view on reforming the size and 
scope of government. It called for the standardisation of Commonwealth laws and services 
across all states and territories and the amalgamation of every Australian parliament into a 
single body comprised of ‘60 honest representatives’. In addition, the salaries of civil 
servants should be halved because Australia ‘[could not] afford the luxury of supporting a 
huge army of social parasites’.44 This was partially a reflection of the League’s particularly 
strong espousal of laissez-faire economics, which included a desire for a ‘drastic curtailment 
in Governmental expenditure’.45 However, the League was also influenced by the idea of 
‘rationalisation’. Two days before its inaugural meeting on 3 October 1930, the 
Constitutional Club hosted a speaker on the topic of economic rationalisation in Germany and 
the United States, which he defined as ‘a combination of the scientific organisation of 
materials and products, simplification of processes, and improvement in transport and 
marketing’.46 This had a profound impact on Bagot, who was already an admirer of Henry 
Ford’s innovations in management and the division of labour, and during the inaugural 
meeting be proclaimed that politics needed to be ‘rationalised’ in the same fashion as 
commerce and industry.47
                                                     
42 National Opinion 1:2 (24 August 1933): 1-2; Light on the Legion, 8. 
 
43 National Opinion 2:13 (15 February 1934): 5. 
44 Bagot, Address at Public Meeting, 14 October 1930, box 1 item 1, CLSA papers. 
45 Meeting of a Special Sub-Committee appointed to draft proposed policy, 18 January 1932, box 1 item 3, 
CLSA papers. 
46 Register News-Pictorial, 2 October 1930, 4. 
47 Minutes of Inaugural Meeting, 3 October 1930, box 1 item 1, CLSA papers. 
184 
 
The citizens’ movements shared a common interest in redistributing power between political 
parties and the people at a national level. They favoured elective cabinets and proportional 
voting systems to ensure that no one party could dominate parliament or the executive, and 
the introduction of the powers of referendum, initiative and recall to give the electorate 
greater power in national decision making.48 This reflected the movements’ aim to transform 
parliament into a more deliberative body and to elevate the political mindedness of the 
citizenry. It also reflected their brand of ‘anti-political political thought’ which sought to 
sideline or eliminate political parties. Voting along party lines would be abolished by these 
reforms, leaving members free to vote ‘according to their conscience’ on all proposed 
legislation. In addition, the people would have the power to ensure that government respected 
the ‘wishes and desires of the people’.49 By introducing these reforms, the movements hoped 
that ‘Party Government as we know it will cease to exist’.50
 
 
The Citizens’ League of South Australia was also willing to support more extreme measures 
to combat party politics. As with its policies on the ‘rationalisation’ of politics, this was 
largely due to the influence of Bagot on the movement’s ideology. During his process of 
political radicalisation in 1930, Bagot had become increasingly drawn to the idea of an 
Australian-style dictatorship led by a ‘big man in business leadership’ backed by a ‘small 
strong Committee of Management’.51
                                                     
48 National Opinion 1:4 (21 September 1933): 8-10; Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 2 May 1933, box 
1 item 3; Citizens’ League Policy for 1934, 6 March 1934, box 1 item 4; Letter from Bagot to W. A. Burns, 2 June 
1931, box 12 item 1, CLSA papers; Policy as adopted by convention of the League, 11-12. 
 He carried this rhetoric across into the Citizens’ 
League, where he called for the kind of leader who could ‘“cleave through Party Politics” and 
49 Policy as adopted by convention of the League, 11-12. 
50 National Opinion 2:13 (15 February 1934): 5. 
51 Bagot, ‘A Dictator Needed’, submitted to the Editor of “The Advertiser”, 5 September 1930, box 3 item 25D, 
CLSA papers. 
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establish Law and Order in our Social System’.52
 
 This was reminiscent of the nineteenth 
century patrician conservative suspicion of universal adult franchise and the desire to curb the 
influence of ‘the masses’ with strong and educated leadership. Bagot favoured a top-down 
style of governance which favoured personalities over democratic process – providing, of 
course, that the ‘right’ kind of personality could be found. Such a leader would be ‘of the real 
bull dog breed’ – a man willing to take control of the floundering affairs of the state, to place 
the national interest above all personal or sectional demands, and with the personal gravitas 
to inspire his fellow citizens: 
Instead of the captain, the whole crew is trying to steer the ship of State. Let us 
get back the control, select our leader, and say to him: “In the name of 
humanity, take charge. We will gladly serve to the best of our ability, so long 
as you continue to justify our confidence. You shall swear to serve us, fearless 
and unfaltering, to one end – the welfare of the nation as a whole.” Who will 
pledge to serve?53
 
 
Bagot believed that Sir John Monash, commander of the Australian corps during the Great 
War, fit the bill, and he made it clear that he would gladly support a dictatorship led by 
Monash if it was the only way to abolish party politics.54 He was even willing to countenance 
unconstitutional methods, such as the withholding of taxation or a ‘show of force’, if the 
government failed to take action.55
 
 
The tension between democracy and ‘national unity’ also influenced the movements’ 
suggestions for the management of the economy. The general thrust of these proposed 
reforms was that the industrial and technological growth that had occurred since the founding 
                                                     
52 Minutes of Inaugural Meeting, 3 October 1930, box 1 item 1, CLSA papers. 
53 Citizens' League: its formation, aims, and objects, 14. 
54 Advertiser, 12 February 1931, 7. 
55 Minutes of Inaugural Meeting, 3 October 1930, box 1 item 1, CLSA papers. 
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of most Western democracies had outpaced the ability of their political institutions to 
comprehend them: 
 
Economic matters to-day are so complex, so diversified, so badly understood 
as to their general laws, that the people acting blunderingly through their 
representative institutions, and incapable of calculating and foreseeing the 
results of the measures adopted, generally have acted so as to injure the very 
interests which they were trying to defend.56
 
 
To cement the immunity of government from ‘sectional’ interests, the movements supported, 
to varying degrees, devolving authority on economic matters to independent ‘experts’. The 
Citizens’ League of South Australia advocated for ‘an independent and qualified Board, free 
from political influence’ to control public expenditure, revise tariffs and bounties, and 
manage unprofitable assets in preparation for their ultimate privatisation.57 The All for 
Australia League advocated a similar policy, although its proposed ‘Economic Advisory 
Council’ was, as its name suggests, an advisory body only. Comprised of ‘the highest experts 
obtainable in finance, economics and industry’, it would ‘disinterestedly examine’ questions 
of taxation, wages and the tariff and provide recommendations to the government on 
economic policy. This would ‘decisively check governmental extravagances or any tendency 
to the placation of sectional interests’.58
 
 
The Citizens’ League and the All for Australia League complemented these proposed ‘expert’ 
bodies with policies on industrial relations. The Citizens’ League suggested the creation of 
industrial boards comprised of trade union and employers’ association representatives who 
would determine wages for each industry and impose penalties on ‘sweating, profiteering ... 
                                                     
56 Policy as adopted by convention of the League, 16-17. 
57 Address by Bagot at a Citizens’ Public Meeting in Adelaide Town Hall, 14 October 1930; Report of Executive 
Committee presented at First Convention of Delegates of Branch Committees of the CLSA, 1 December 1930, 
box 1 item 1; Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 29 September 1931, box 1 item 3, CLSA papers. 
58 Policy as adopted by convention of the League, 8 August 1931, 16-18. 
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[and] malingering’.59 This was not envisaged as an equal partnership, but as a redefinition of 
industrial relations in favour of employers, who possessed the ‘brains’ to labour’s ‘muscle’.60 
To emphasize the point, the League called for the abolition of the existing wage Arbitration 
Courts and their ‘pernicious awards’ which denied men the ‘right to work’.61 With wages 
subsequently lowered to their ‘natural’ level, unemployment would naturally decrease. To 
ensure that employment was found for all, the League advocated the rationalisation of various 
local unemployment relief schemes and bureaus under a single State Council to avoid 
duplication of effort. The South Australian government adopted this recommendation in 1933 
in one of the few occasions where a citizens’ movement directly affected government 
policy.62
 
 
The All for Australia League’s approach to industrial relations was much more ambitious. 
Like the Citizens’ League, it called for the establishment of a Federal Tribunal to arbitrate 
wages and hours based on the advice of the Economic Advisory Council. It, too, opposed the 
Arbitration Courts, but not for their ‘pernicious awards’: the League believed that State 
control of arbitration pitted States against each other, which was disruptive of national unity. 
A Federal Tribunal would eliminate this disunity by standardising industrial conditions across 
the Commonwealth.63 In order to eliminate the class antagonism that had been fostered by 
party politics, the League also proposed an ‘industrial parliament’ called the ‘Bureaux of 
Industrial Co-operation’ that would adjudicate issues between employers and employees and 
promote a spirit of ‘mutual understanding’.64
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encourage the formation of voluntary cooperatives in each industry comprised of ‘labour, 
management, capital and consumption’ that would plan the production and distribution of 
goods and services, standardise products and methods, and equitably distribute profits 
between employers and employees.65
 
 
THE REACTIONARY 
Whilst the citizens’ movements were launching their radical populist campaign against the 
political system, they were also appealing to a set of traditional conservative values whose 
roots lay in the emergence of an Australasian conservative tradition in the late nineteenth 
century. This essentially reactionary and backwards-looking appeal contrasted with the 
radical and forwards-looking rhetoric of anti-partyism. The citizens’ movements’ ideal 
society drew upon the myth of the rugged and hardy individuals who had built European 
society in the colonies, and it was to them that they suggested the nation look for a model of 
how to reconstruct society: 
 
[W]hat is essential to-day is a spirit akin to that of our pioneers, who 
deliberately and willingly faced the dangers, hardships, and privations of the 
pathway that led to prosperity, progress, and the making of a nation. To-day 
those hundreds of thousands of sturdy Australians in whom breathes the spirit 
of their forebears, are looking for a lead, and hoping for the emergence of an 
organisation that will link them together in a common ideal and a common 
purpose, so that their desire to re-adjust community life on sound foundations 
may be crystallised[.]66
 
 
This myth brought together several conservative tropes regarding civic duty and good 
citizenship. The pioneer was hard-working, self-sacrificing, and willing to get on with the 
day-to-day business of carving a nation out of the Antipodean wilderness without fuss or 
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undue ceremony. Furthermore, he had done all of this without having to resort to the kind of 
‘State paternalism’ and ‘[s]ervile dependence on the Government’ which had gradually 
eroded the foundations of individualism since the turn of the century.67
 
 This provided an 
ideal archetype for the citizenry of the Depression to aspire to whilst conveniently ignoring 
the fact that the nineteenth century developmentalist ethos of the colonies involved the 
considerable investment of public funds in farming technologies and techniques. There was 
also an element of implicit racism in this pioneer myth in that it ignored the wholesale 
appropriation of land from indigenous populations in order to establish an economy based on 
primary production. 
The myth of the pioneer also represented an unspoken contract with traditional values. As the 
Citizens’ League of South Australia put it: 
 
Fellow Citizens, we have received from the past a priceless inheritance – a 
trust that must not be betrayed – and that trust is the fair name of Australia. It 
remains for each of us to see that we shall pass on to posterity that name 
unblemished.68
 
 
Michael Cathcart termed this an ‘unwritten constitution’ – ‘a body of principle and tradition 
which can never be fully known or articulated, but which defines the grounds upon which 
political activity may legitimately be undertaken’.69
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 Anything that lay outside the bounds of 
such unwritten constitutions could thus be delegitimised as sectional, disloyal, or seditious. In 
the case of the citizens’ movements, this meant the normalisation of conservative values 
regarding society, politics and economics, and the delegitimisation of opposing points of 
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phrases such as the ‘national interest’, which framed conservative values as sacred and 
inviolable rather than one worldview amongst many. Self-reliance, private enterprise, 
balanced public budgets, imperial patriotism: these were part of the natural order, a set of 
‘fundamental laws’ that could not be changed ‘any more than we can alter the laws of 
gravity.’70
 
 They were also a matter of national honour: 
We recognise that differences of political opinion must exist ... but when the 
differences involve a distinction between honesty and dishonesty, integrity and 
default, honour and dishonour, we rise in our wrath – and I think I can say to-
day in our MIGHT – and denounce as traitors to their country those who put 
forward such views.71
 
 
This provides an additional dimension to the movements’ criticism of party politics. The 
‘national interest’ supposedly lay in non-interventionist government, whereas ‘sectional’ 
interests were those that used the public coffers to support their own agendas to the detriment 
of others. Language such as this provided a convenient ideological smokescreen for 
conservative values by framing them as apolitical. 
 
The citizens’ movements drew on a number of tropes consistent with popular conservative 
ideology, and which were compatible with the policies of mainstream conservative parties. 
They believed in individualism, which exalted private enterprise and self-reliance over the 
interference of the state in matters of the economy. As ‘non-party’ movements, however, the 
citizens’ movements were able to extol the ideals of individualism without being bound by 
the practicalities of economic policy or the desires of the electorate for increased state 
activity. Unhampered by details, they levelled criticism at the perceived ‘economic 
interference’ from both sides of the political spectrum: 
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[The crisis] has been brought about by the ever-increasing inroads made in 
recent years by the various Governments of Australia – both Federal and State 
– Liberal and Labour - into the fields of legitimate trade and commerce; 
inroads so aggressive and unwarranted that we now find every phase of our 
commercial and financial life subjugated either directly or indirectly to 
political interference.72
 
 
Public economy activity, according to this line of thought, was inherently political in that it 
brought ‘legitimate’ private enterprise under the control of party politicians. This criticism 
did not generally extend to the developmental pragmatism of the nineteenth century, although 
some of the citizens’ movements were willing to challenge this. The Citizens’ League of 
South Australia, for example, called for the privatisation of public assets such as railways and 
waterworks.73
 
 
The citizens’ movements adhered to the conservative belief in more businesslike government. 
They argued that government departments and enterprises should be small, efficient, and free 
of unnecessary ‘trammels’ on the growth of private enterprise. A phrase used by the Legion 
and the Citizens’ League to summarise this point was ‘more business in government and less 
government in business’.74
 
 In this worldview, government and business were analogous, and 
should therefore be run in the same fashion: 
[M]achine politics must give way to Government on sound business lines, in 
which the economic structure of the country is viewed as a gigantic business 
enterprise, with every member of the community as a shareholder. Overhead 
charges, represented by Governmental expenses must be kept down so that 
national dividends may be paid. In this way only can prosperity return.75
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The central concern of this businesslike approach was government debt. The citizens’ 
movements believed that public borrowing had spiralled out of control during the 1920s, 
resulting in a ‘false prosperity’ that showed ‘a callous disregard of the impossible burdens 
being prepared for the rising generation’. The movements called on governments to curb such 
‘reckless’ and ‘extravagant’ borrowing and learn to live within their means.76 Some, such as 
the New Zealand Legion, sought to remove the dependence on foreign borrowing altogether; 
others like the Australian Citizens’ League recognised its necessity and aimed to reassure 
British investors of the ‘sincerity’ of the average citizen by forcing government to honour its 
debt commitments.77
 
 
Beyond economics, the citizens’ movements believed that individualism provided a 
framework for the entire ordering of society from the role of government and the 
responsibilities of elected officials to the relationships between individuals, associations and 
businesses. This was summed up by the All for Australia League: 
 
[We] desire above all things to see Australia’s finances restored and the 
country once more on the way to prosperity; to see the man on the land, the 
office-worker and the wage-earner receiving the rewards of their efforts 
untrammelled by those crippling experiments in Government – existing and 
proposed – which withhold from a man the full fruits of his labour, and would 
deny him the freedom to work out his destiny in accordance with his own 
inclinations and ability.78
 
 
Individualism was thus concerned with both the material and the spiritual. Private enterprise 
and self-reliance were not only the most efficient means of delivering services to the public, 
they were also the most moral. They represented the ability to stand on one’s own two feet 
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without having to rely on the charity of others, whether through private donations or the 
coffers of the state. As such, the movements generally favoured lower taxes, reduced public 
spending, and a more efficient government whose functions were limited as much as possible 
to the business of everyday governance.79 This formed part of a general belief in deflationary 
economic methods across the board, which they justified as being about ‘equality of 
sacrifice’.80
 
 
The citizens’ movements attempted to incorporate the working class into their individualist 
worldview. The premise of their appeal was that moderate or ‘sane’ labour had more in 
common with the middle class than with the ‘revolutionaries ... masquerading under the 
honourable title of Labour’.81 They believed that government borrowing, combined with 
trade union agitation and arbitration, had led to unrealistically high wages and standards of 
living. In accordance with their preference for deflationary methods, the movements believed 
that these wages should be allowed to fall in line with the reduced national income to ensure 
that the ‘available wage pool’ was ‘divided equitably among all workers’.82
 
 Trade union 
activity, whilst not overtly condemned, was suspiciously regarded as a vehicle for extremism: 
Trades unionism is recognised as representing one of the most beneficent 
movements of the past century ... In recent times, however, trades unionism 
has been so managed as to become a menace to the worker, whom it was 
designed to protect ... Unions cannot claim that they recognise the true worth 
and dignity of the worker when he is used merely as a pawn in political 
strategy or industrial conflict.83
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This language attempted to define the range of legitimate trade union activity: honest 
negotiation in the spirit of cooperation was acceptable, whereas strikes were selfish and 
sectional. Moreover, the ‘sane’ worker possessed full agency in the former, whereas in the 
latter they were unwilling dupes of a sinister agenda beyond their control. The movements 
thus attempted to pave over the complexities of class and the distribution of power between 
employers and employees with the dual tropes of ‘sane’ and ‘extreme’ labour. 
 
Imperial patriotism played an important part of the conservative worldview to which the 
citizens’ movements ascribed. Britain and the Empire were the guarantors of the individual 
liberties that the citizens’ movements claimed to champion: 
 
The New Zealand Legion is sturdily loyal to the Crown and Constitution. In 
the whole of the world, citizens of British countries have the greatest measure 
of liberty, the widest scope for individual development, the best system of 
justice. Loyalty to the Crown and Constitution is not a blind fetish; it is not 
old-fashioned sentiment; it is robust common-sense; it is the individual 
citizen’s insurance policy for personal freedom and justice. There is more 
liberty, equality and fraternity under the British Crown than under any 
republican flag.84
 
 
The protection offered by belonging to the British Empire was twofold. In a physical sense, 
the might of the British navy was perceived as offering protection against foreign threats, 
particularly those in the Pacific.85 In a moral sense, however, the Crown was a potent symbol 
of ‘those great ideals of liberty, justice and national righteousness’.86
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 Belonging to the 
Empire simultaneously recognised those shared values whilst ensuring their perpetuation. At 
the same time, the citizens’ movements stressed a more reciprocal relationship with Britain 
than mere colonial dependence. The Antipodean colonies were no longer ‘the suckling child 
85 Speech given by Bagot to the Political Reform League, September 1930, box 3 item 25, CLSA papers. 
86 Light on the Legion, 13; All for Australia League: Draft Policy, 5. 
195 
 
always at liberty to ask for protection and sustenance’; it was time to become ‘grown-up 
son[s]’ and do ‘something to assist and support the Mother Country’.87 This reflects the 
complementary national, imperial and Anglo-Saxon identities of many Australians and New 
Zealanders in the early twentieth century.88
 
 
Having established their worldview as the ‘natural’ order of things, the movements believed, 
to varying degrees, in the necessity of suppressing those ideas they considered ‘unnatural’. 
All four movements believed to some extent that communist forces in league with the Soviet 
Union were secretly fomenting revolution throughout the British Empire. The Citizens’ 
League was the most open about its suspicions, and the most extreme in its suggested 
solutions. It called on the government to declare communism illegal, ban the distribution of 
‘dangerous propaganda’, and deport all ‘agitators’ who refused to swear loyalty to the Crown 
and Constitution.89 This was partially the result of Bagot’s personal distaste for communism, 
which he had been nurturing for several years. He had been particularly affected by the 1928 
Adelaide waterside strikes, which he believed had been ‘engineered’ by the Militant Minority 
Movement as part of an ongoing Soviet plan to create ‘a ring of socialised States’ around ‘the 
Commonwealth of British nations’.90
 
 
Given their shared belief in a communist conspiracy, the four citizens’ movements each 
considered the possibility of forming a paramilitary wing to combat any perceived threats to 
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law and order. The extent of their preparations varied according where, and when, the 
movements arose. For example, it appears that neither the All for Australia League nor the 
Australian Citizens’ League felt it necessary to assume a paramilitary function. This was due 
to the fact that highly secretive and semi-official paramilitary movements already existed in 
New South Wales and Victoria. The Old Guard and the League of National Security, as they 
were respectively known, were closely tied to the political, economic and military elite in 
each state, and it is likely that the leaders of the All for Australia League and the Australian 
Citizens’ League were aware of their existence. It is also possible that there was a degree of 
cross-membership between the movements. However, Moore and Cathcart’s argument that 
the All for Australia League and the Australian Citizens’ League were ‘front’ organisations 
for their paramilitary counterparts does not consider the genuine conservative discontent that 
the citizens’ movements, and those that had preceded them, represented.91
 
 The ideas that they 
promulgated held wide social traction, and did not require a paramilitarist backing to lend 
them legitimacy. It is more likely that paramilitarism and public agitation were 
complementary and occasionally overlapping manifestations of the widespread conservative 
discontent with government policy. 
The Citizens’ League specifically sought to build a reserve special constabulary in case of 
emergency. This was partially due to the recent example of the Essential Service 
Maintenance Volunteers, which had been established in Adelaide in September 1928 in 
response to a labour dispute on the waterfront. On 1 December 1930, the League’s Executive 
Committee recommended the ‘formation of committees of loyal citizens able and willing to 
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help maintain essential services in case of industrial unrest’.92 Bagot discussed this with 
Colonel G. W. Shaw, an acquaintance in the Police Commissioner’s office, who reported that 
Police Commissioner R. L. Leane – the man responsible for swearing in the special 
constables in 1928 – ‘would welcome the formation of a further Essential Service Body’. 
Bagot was authorised to offer the services of the League to Leane, with the understanding 
that their discussions ‘be kept strictly secret’.93 By March 1931 a number of Citizens’ League 
members had been enrolled as special constables ‘for the purpose of taking the place of 
police who are withdrawn from their districts in cases of emergency’. In such an emergency, 
a smaller force of dedicated specials would also serve alongside regular police under the 
command of Captain A. S. Blackburn and Lieutenant Colonel W. C. N. Waite, the men who 
had led the special constabulary in 1928.94 Bagot was also inspired by the success of the 
Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies, a British strikebreaking outfit that had assisted 
the government with the provision of ‘essential services’ during the 1926 general strike. If a 
similar strike occurred in Australia, Bagot stated that the Citizens’ League would ‘carry on 
and assist in the maintenance of the essential services of the country, just the same as people 
of England did in 1926.’95
 
 
In contrast, the discrediting of the paramilitary activities of the New Guard in 1932 made the 
New Zealand Legion keen to disavow any paramilitary activity. It began its very first 
pamphlet by stressing that it was ‘not a New Guard’ or ‘a Fascist body’, and the same 
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reassurance was sent out in a circular to division and branch chairmen.96 The same point was 
presented during public appearances and in press releases.97 Public comparisons proved 
difficult to shake, however: in April the Secretary of the Gisborne centre wrote that the main 
criticism he had faced during his recruitment campaign was that the Legion was a ‘New 
Guard’ or ‘Fascist’ group.98 When Sherston was asked whether the Legion was a New Guard 
movement and what was ‘the colour of its shirt’, he replied, tongue-in-cheek, that he 
preferred to wear a coat.99 When the possibility of assuming a strikebreaking function was 
raised at a public rally in April, Begg stated that the Legion intended to render strikes 
unnecessary by addressing their root cause.100
 
 The Legion’s leadership decided that it would 
be in the best interests of the movement to avoid making any paramilitary preparations 
entirely and leave the matter to individual members to decide for themselves. When the 
Hawkes Bay Chairman asked the National Executive in June what action the Legion should 
take in the event of civil commotion, the response was blunt: 
[T]he Legion is a society for propagation of political thought and action, and is 
not concerned with taking upon itself any such function as suggested. The 
actual control or dealing with Civil commotion is in the hands of the 
Government and Police and any members of the Legion must act according to 
their conscience in their private capacity. This is one of the points that has 
been very firmly stressed in regard to the movement [emphasis added].101
 
 
The quote that has been highlighted demonstrated the Legion’s keen desire to dissociate itself 
from the negative connotations of paramilitarism. This may have been what Begg referred to 
when he told the Provisional National Council in April 1933 that ‘[w]e must fearlessly 
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analyse the weaknesses in similar movements that caused them to fail.’102
 
 Whilst he was 
most likely referring to the failure of the Legion’s predecessors such as the New Zealand 
National Movement, he may also have been hinting at the negative publicity that had befallen 
the New Guard.  This reflected the links between the two movements that are explored in 
chapter two. 
AN ANTIPODEAN FASCISM? 
The above analysis begs the question: what exactly were the citizens’ movements? A related 
but equally important question is whether it is constructive or useful to assign a label to them 
at all. Labels are certainly heuristically pleasing – they allow disparate phenomena to be 
categorised, and they provide a simple language whereby academics can discuss those 
phenomena without having to delve deeply into specifics. This thesis has already made two 
such heuristic decisions – the use of the phrase ‘citizens’ movement’ to differentiate the four 
movements with which this thesis is concerned from the broader body of mass conservative 
mobilisation, and the differentiation of the ‘Australian Citizens’ League’ from the ‘All for 
Australia League’ despite their nominal merger. However, labels can also be useful from a 
comparative point of view by encouraging the analysis of shared and idiosyncratic attributes. 
This section compares the citizens’ movements with two such broad analytical categories: 
fascism and populism. This is not to say that the two categories are unrelated – on the 
contrary, populism is unmistakeably a key component of fascist ideology, particularly during 
the interwar period. However, populism in itself does not imply fascism: it is a strategy that 
has been employed widely across the political spectrum, and is therefore treated as a separate 
analytical category in this section. 
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Any analysis of right-wing movements during the interwar years must inevitably draw 
comparisons with fascism – a difficult task, given the lack of consensus around a concise 
definition. The history of the scholarly quest to define fascism can be broadly understood as 
an ongoing, and often highly controversial, debate between ideological and material 
approaches. Daniel Woodley has defined these dual approaches as ‘comparative-analytic 
studies of fascist ideologies which interpret fascism as a millenarian revolt against the 
degenerative impact of modernity, and political-economic studies which link fascism to the 
economic and social-structural crisis of capitalism.’103 The comparative-analytic approach, of 
which Roger Griffin, Stanley Payne, and Zeev Sternhell are demonstrative, seeks to highlight 
a series of generic attributes to which all fascist movements adhered – a ‘fascist minimum’, 
as it is commonly referred to.104 In contrast, the political-economic approach favoured by 
Woodley and David Renton explores the material conditions out of which fascism arose.105
 
 It 
is ultimately beyond the scope of this thesis to decide which approach is best suited to 
understanding fascism. Both the comparative-analytic and political-economic approaches 
have drawbacks – the former overlooks the historical causes of fascist movements, their 
relationship with capitalist forces and conservative elites, whilst the latter risks overextending 
the definition of fascism by neglecting to engage with the common factors that distinguished 
it from other forms of right-wing mobilisation. This section will draw on elements of both 
approaches to compare various aspects of the citizens’ movements with fascism. 
The conditions that gave birth to the citizens’ movements are similar to those that nurtured 
fascism. Both were born of, or given added impetus by, crises within the capitalist economic 
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system coupled with the disarray or disunity of right-wing parliamentary forces. As 
mainstream conservative parties struggled to cope with the Depression, disaffected 
conservatives turned to political alternatives in the hopes of a dramatic turnaround in their 
fortunes. Both were also buoyed by the rise of organised labour and their political 
representatives, although the Australasian communist parties were far smaller than their 
European counterparts. However, their ideological backgrounds were vastly different. Where 
fascism drew upon particular traditions of organic nationalism and antirationalist socialism, 
the citizens’ movements emerged from a wholly conservative tradition of non-party activism. 
Fascism also attracted broad, cross-class support, whereas the citizens’ movements drew 
most of their support from the professional, business and commercial fraction of the capitalist 
class.106
 
 
There are elements of the citizens’ movements’ ideology that are reminiscent of fascism. 
Whilst idealism is a component of most political ideologies, the elevation of idealism to the 
position of a driving transformative force and the relegation of policy to a minor secondary 
role was similar to fascism’s vitalist and anti-rationalist spirit. Fascists were also known for 
their appeals to national unity, self-sacrifice and their demonization of the ‘other’, although 
the fascist ‘other’ was a dynamic mix of Jews, communists and other perceived enemies 
rather than party politicians. The citizens’ movements also experimented to varying degrees 
with corporatist economic ideas, although never to the same extent as the British Union of 
Fascists.107
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Their professed goal was a more democratic and pluralistic society, albeit within the bounds 
of acceptable conservative opinion, and whilst they shared a belief in the necessity for new 
and charismatic leadership, this was almost always within the confines of the existing 
democratic structure. Only the Citizens’ League of South Australia was openly willing to 
countenance more extreme measures, such as a dictatorship or the employment of force by 
extra-parliamentary means. Some of the citizens’ movements’ ideas on governmental reform 
were reminiscent of fascist policies of class collaboration and corporatism, although they 
were far less developed and far more wedded to the economic status quo. Only the New 
Zealand Legion seriously considered radical alternatives to the existing economic system – a 
subject which is discussed in chapter six. In contrast, the reactionary component of the 
citizens’ movement ideology had far more in common with traditional Australasian 
conservatism than it did with fascism. Whilst the nostalgia of the citizens’ movements for a 
mythical nineteenth century utopia was reminiscent of fascism’s palingenetic ultra-
nationalism, their reliance on the tropes of individualism were the opposite of fascism’s anti-
liberal and anti-conservative attitudes. Even their anti-communism was more in line with the 
typical attitudes of mainstream conservatism than it was with fascism. In fact, had it not been 
for their radical side, there would have been little to distinguish the ideas of the citizens’ 
movements from those of their mainstream conservative counterparts. 
 
The paramilitaristic New Guard had far more in common with fascism than the citizens’ 
movements, although the extent to which it can be classified as fascist has generated some 
debate. Drawing upon the works of scholars such as Nicos Poulantzas, Ernst Nolte and Roger 
Griffin, most studies argue that it was a fascist movement.108
                                                     
108 See for example Baron Alder, "The Ideology of the New Guard Movement," Journal of the Royal Australian 
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Poulantzas’ Marxist interpretation to the ‘fascist minimum’ approach founded by Nolte can 
be charted in Andrew Moore’s works, which began with The Secret Army by categorising 
fascism as ‘less a set of ideas and programs than a stage of capitalist development.’109 His 
position attracted some virulent criticism from Richard Evans and Gerard Henderson, the 
latter of whom countered that the New Guard ‘was one essentially Australian response to an 
essentially Australian situation.’110 Henderson was particularly vitriolic in his tirade against 
‘left-wing historians’ and their supposed ‘ideological agenda’. Even if such baseless 
accusations are overlooked, Henderson’s ignorance of the wide body of primary source 
material suggests that he has little to offer the debate.111 Moore responded by enhancing his 
strictly structural approach – which he admitted was ‘decidedly quaint’ – with the wide body 
of literature on fascism that has emerged in the last two decades around Nolte’s challenge to 
find a ‘fascist minimum’.112 Nevertheless, scholars such as James Saleam, Stephen Reid and 
the present author have questioned whether the New Guard met this ‘fascist minimum’, 
pointing to its steadfast commitment to individualism and imperial patriotism as 
uncharacteristic of fascist movements.113
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New Guard clearly shared more tenets with fascism than the citizens’ movements, and it was 
the only mass conservative movement in Australia and New Zealand to openly term itself 
fascist. 
 
The citizens’ movements were much more reminiscent of populism than fascism. In their 
ideology, their organisational style, and their focus on mass politics, the citizens’ movements 
pitted the supposedly unified and homogenous values of the citizenry against the malevolent 
forces of machine politics that had failed to set aside their own sectional interests to resolve 
the Depression. As such, the citizens’ movements could be described as a form of 
‘conservative populism’. This label is loosely congruent with the label of ‘conservative 
radicalism’ that the present author has previously used to describe the citizens’ movements, 
although ‘conservative populism’ more adequately captures the demagogic nature of that 
radicalism.114 A useful comparison could be made to the recent Tea Party protests in the 
United States, although given the contemporary nature of these events there is little scholarly 
literature upon which to base such a comparison.115
                                                                                                                                                                     
Australian Extreme Right Ideology, Politics and Organization 1975-1995" (PhD diss., University of Sydney, 
1999): 17-34; Cunningham, "Australian Fascism?" 375-93. 
 ‘Conservative populism’ also has an 
analogue in other forms of Australasian mass conservative mobilisation, in particular the 
dramatic rise of ‘One Nation’ in rural Queensland and New South Wales in the 1990s. 
Gregory Melleuish described One Nation as a backlash against the dismantling of the 
‘Australian Settlement’ in the 1980s and its replacement with the new multicultural and 
neoliberal status quo. He categorised its ideology as consisting of a struggle between the 
‘ordinary people’, whose cultural values were sacred and ubiquitous, against a ‘new class 
114 Cunningham, "Conservative Protest or Conservative Radicalism?" 139-58. 
115 See Jill Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party's Revolution and the Battle over American History 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson, The Tea Party and the 
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elite’ seeking to destroy those values.116 Geoffrey Stokes partially accepted Melleuish’s 
connection between One Nation and the decline of the Australian Settlement, but also argued 
that One Nation was distinguished from earlier forms of populism by its lack of a coherent 
ideological tradition.117
 
 Whilst the citizens’ movements shared few ideological or structural 
similarities with One Nation, both are examples of conservative populist revolts against the 
political establishment. They demonstrate the significant fracturing that can occur within 
conservatism when significant numbers of conservatives with a shared sense of discontent 
cannot find an outlet for their concerns in the existing political apparatus. 
CONCLUSION 
The citizens’ movements espoused a form of conservative populism which blended 
reactionary conservative ideas regarding the role of government and the individual with 
radical ideas for transforming the political machinery of the state. Their ideology stressed the 
centrality of idealism over policy: it was portrayed as both something for all members to 
aspire to and as a fundamental, all-encompassing goal that outweighed trifling policy 
considerations. It was this idealism that allowed them to gloss over the contradictions 
between their reactionary and radical beliefs. By using high-level populist rhetoric, the 
movements were able to maintain a broad sense of inclusiveness without alienating particular 
fractions within their membership. Theirs was a mission to build a sense of ‘national unity’, 
where all loyal citizens would cooperate to bring their country out of the Depression. This 
also allowed the movements to couch their essentially conservative beliefs as non-partisan in 
nature whilst decrying those of their opponents as sectional and divisive. 
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Unlike the various right-wing leagues that preceded them, the citizens’ movements posed a 
direct threat to the forces of mainstream conservatism. Their most radical belief lay in their 
anti-partyism, which questioned the very basis of the existing parliamentary system. Whilst 
not typically anti-democratic, the movements challenged the existence of political parties, or 
at the very least sought to circumvent them by supporting independent candidates who were 
free of the grip of party ‘machines’. This brought them into direct competition with the 
ideological and electoral hegemony of mainstream conservative parties over the right-minded 
voting public. However, it also exposed the inherent contradictions between reactionary and 
radical ideas as the movements attempted to transform their high ideals into concrete policy. 
The challenges inherent in this transformation are discussed in the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FLIRTING WITH PARTY POLITICS: THE AUSTRALIAN 
CITIZENS’ MOVEMENTS AND THE UNITED AUSTRALIA 
PARTY 
 
[T]he position in Federal politics is so critical that even at a temporary 
sacrifice of some degree of independence, we [are] acting in the best interests 
of the country and citizens by co-operating with other political bodies to 
ensure the return to Parliament … of representatives who will stand for the 
broad principles of national integrity and sound finance.1
 
 
By the beginning of 1931, the Australian Labor Party held power at a Federal level as well as 
in every state except Queensland and Western Australia. In contrast, the mainstream 
conservative parties and their supporters were in disarray, and had only just begun to rebuild 
their political brand. However, at a time when the need for conservative political unity was 
greater than ever, there had arisen a powerful backlash of anti-political political thought 
which questioned the very legitimacy of the mainstream political parties. The citizens’ 
movements sat at the apex of this backlash, and their willingness to bypass the existing 
political machinery by supporting independent candidates posed a fundamental challenge to 
the electoral base of the mainstream conservative parties. This chapter explores the ways in 
which this challenge between the citizens’ movements and the conservative parties was 
negotiated, and ultimately overcome, in the interests of ousting Labor from power by 
securing the return of mutually agreeable political candidates. It argues that it was this act of 
negotiation that exposed the inherent contradictions between reactionary and radical elements 
of the Australian citizens’ movements’ ideology. By exposing the schism between political 
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expediency and anti-party purity, the Australian citizens’ movements paved the way for their 
downfall. 
 
This chapter also explores how the Australian conservative political status quo was 
renegotiated during the heyday of the citizens’ movements. Peter Gourevitch’s Politics in 
Hard Times provides a useful model for this process. Gourevitch’s work compared the effects 
of three economic crises – the Long Depression, the Great Depression, and the ‘wide 
gyrations of the 1970s and 1980s’ – on the internal politics of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Sweden. These crises, he argued, ‘opened the system of 
[political] relationships, making politics and policy more fluid’ until ‘a resolution was 
reached, closing the system for a time, until the next crisis’. This process was driven by 
‘masses of voters desperate for some sort of change’ led by political parties willing to make 
deals ‘that took them away from their traditional political as well as policy attachments’.2
 
 In 
Australia this renegotiation took the form of a resurgent conservative opposition which 
competed with the citizens’ movements for electoral support and political power. The extent 
to which the citizens’ movements recognised and played a part in this renegotiation, it will be 
argued, was a crucial factor in their downfall. 
THE DEFECTION OF JOSEPH LYONS 
When the acting Federal Treasurer Joseph Lyons resigned from the Labor cabinet in January 
1931, he was in a surprisingly good position to reinvent his political career as a leading 
conservative. Chapter two discussed how he had spent the second half of 1930 establishing 
his credentials as a fiscal conservative by adhering to the conditions of the deflationary 
                                                     
2 Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises  (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), 10, 21-22, 160-1. 
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‘Melbourne Agreement’. He had also successfully conducted a £28 million loan conversion 
campaign in the closing months of 1930 despite caucus opposition, thus avoiding the spectre 
of repudiation which so terrified conservatives. His resignation over Prime Minister Scullin’s 
reappointment of E. G. ‘Ted’ Theodore as Treasurer cemented his image amongst 
conservatives as an honest man who was willing to defy the directions of his party on matters 
of principle.3 As the editors of the Sydney Morning Herald put it, ‘[i]n these days of political 
opportunism, it is refreshing to know that there are still a few public leaders who prefer 
honour to power.’4
 
 
The processes and forces behind Lyons’ political reinvention have been explored by several 
scholars. Most have focused on how the members of the conservative political and economic 
establishment convinced him to assume the leadership of a reinvigorated conservative 
opposition party. Chapter two touched upon the influence of a small clique of Melbourne 
politicians and professionals informally known as ‘the Group of Six’ who had become 
familiar with Lyons through the conversion loan campaign. Members of the Group were also 
closely associated with the Citizens’ Committee – the precursor to the Australian Citizens’ 
League – and the chief conservative political fundraising organisation known as the National 
Union. According to P. R. Hart, by the beginning of 1931 the Group envisaged Lyons as a 
leader who could unite the various anti-Scullin forces. At a meeting in early February they 
encouraged him to cross to the opposition benches and pledged their support to uniting the 
various non-labor groups behind him. After much soul-searching and a final failed attempt to 
defeat Theodore’s economic proposals in caucus, Lyons and his small circle of followers 
issued a joint vote of censure against the government with the Nationalist Party on 13 
                                                     
3 Brett, Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class, 97-100; A. W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, Vol 1, 
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March.5 Whilst the vote failed to achieve a majority, Judith Brett demonstrated that it 
cemented Lyons’ image as a principled man who was willing to place the good of the nation 
above party interests and his own personal ambitions.6 It also signalled Lyons’ final break 
from Labor: he pledged to form a new centrist party with his small group of followers, which 
received the tentative support of the opposition parties.7
 
 
Lyons’ supporters in the Group and the National Union were keen for him to assume the 
leadership of the Nationalist Party. Since the end of 1929, the Nationalists had been led by Sir 
John Latham, a former judge and Attorney-General who, according to Zelman Cohen and 
John Williams, lacked Lyons’ popular appeal and accessible speaking style.8 Hart, Williams 
and A. W. Martin demonstrate how, under the concerted pressure of the Group and the 
National Union, Latham ultimately agreed in April 1931 to step aside as leader of the 
opposition and recommend Lyons as his successor.9
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a ‘fair deal’ for employers and employees.10
 
 This demonstrated Lyons’ desire to cement his 
image as a force for unity rather than division by reaching out to the various cleavages of the 
capitalist class. 
However, Australian conservatism was dominated by two political forces in the first half of 
1931 – the mainstream conservative parties, represented chiefly by the Federal and State 
branches of the Nationalist and Country parties; and the citizens’ movements, which by 
March had already secured over 100000 members. In order to secure unopposed leadership of 
a united conservative opposition, Lyons needed to gain the support of both. Scholarly 
attention has tended to focus on the way that Lyons and the conservative establishment 
outmanoeuvred the citizens’ movements and brought them back into the mainstream political 
fold. C. J. Lloyd attributed this to the greater political experience of the Nationalists, who 
were able to co-opt Lyons and the inexperienced leaders of the citizens’ movements.11 In 
contrast, Hart, Brett and Anne Henderson emphasised the political nous of Lyons himself in 
gaining the support of the Nationalists and making use of the non-party language of the 
citizens’ movements in order to appeal to their wide support base.12
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THE SEARCH FOR A LEADER 
Chapter four argued that one of the central ideals of the citizens’ movements was their 
opposition to party politics. Had it not been for this, the ideology of the Australian citizens’ 
movements would have been little more than a populist form of Australasian conservatism. 
Despite the occasionally anti-democratic and proto-corporatist nature of their economic 
policies, their ideal society was one in which the tenets of individualism were paramount. But 
anti-partyism complicated the ideological congruence between the Australian citizens’ 
movements and mainstream conservative parties: it was an ideological line in the sand which 
the movements had drawn, and a foundation upon which they defined what made them 
different from ‘sectional’ party machines. The irony of opposing parties on both sides of the 
spectrum equally was that the goals of the citizens’ movements were far more congruent with 
mainstream conservatism than they were with Labor, and the extent to which the movements 
clung to their anti-partyism despite this congruence demonstrates how central it was to their 
ideology. 
 
The negotiation of this inherent contradiction between radical anti-partyism and reactionary 
conservatism, and the way in which it was ultimately overcome, needs to be examined at both 
the State and Federal level. The reason for this distinction is twofold: firstly, the separate 
elections for State and Federal parliaments; secondly, and more importantly, the central role 
of the State-based political machines in controlling conservative politics at the ballot box. 
The Nationalist Party, which was the leading conservative political force at the Federal level 
in 1931, was an organisational chimera. Rather than being comprised of a series of united and 
hierarchical party divisions, the Nationalist Party was a loose coalition of different State-
based conservative organisations, including the National Federation of Victoria, the 
Nationalist Association of New South Wales, and the Liberal Federation of South Australia. 
213 
 
These organisations fielded and supported candidates for both State and Federal elections 
whilst maintaining their independence from each other. Federal policy was developed 
through an Australian National Federation comprised of six delegates from each State, 
although in practice only five interstate conferences were ever convened.13
 
 
It was at the State level where conservative machine politics were most apparent, due in large 
part to the increasing sophistication of extra-parliamentary support structures throughout the 
1920s in an attempt to replicate Labor’s organisational unity.14
 
 This made them the target of 
fierce and uncompromising criticism from the citizens’ movements, who drew no distinction 
between their methods and those of their Labor opponents. As the All for Australia League 
said of the Nationalist Association: 
[T]he Reds dominate the Labour Movement and the Reactionaries have gained 
control of the Nationalist Party. Controlling these organisations as they do, the 
extreme sections have forced Parliament to legislate in the interests of their 
respective factions, regardless of the welfare of the community at large.15
 
 
This criticism of conservative parties was more than a half-hearted attempt to win the support 
of centrist voters by appearing to seek out the middle ground. The citizens’ movements were 
squarely set against the methods of machine politics irrespective of where on the political 
spectrum they lay. As chapter four demonstrated, they viewed party politics of all strands as 
anti-democratic, believing that they allowed the political fortunes of the nation to be 
dominated by a scheming minority and deprived citizens of their right to choose their 
parliamentary representatives. 
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The question thus became, how could the citizens’ movements secure the election of a 
government committed to the ‘national interest’ without resorting to party politics 
themselves? Though this question might seem simple, it raised a whole swathe of other 
questions that required much more specific answers than the high-level platitudes with which 
the citizens’ movements were more comfortable. After all, abolishing party politics was a 
very ambitious goal: it was one thing to speak of expanding ‘until we are such a huge power 
that our wishes can no longer be ignored’, but would it be acceptable if those wishes were 
fulfilled by a party government in the short term?16
 
 If it was acceptable, did this mean that 
anti-partyism was less important, and could therefore be temporarily cast aside, in order to 
achieve the more pressing goal of a change in government? And finally, if the goal of sound 
government was so important, was it acceptable for the citizens’ movements to cooperate 
with other conservative organisations – even if only temporarily – to ensure it was realised? 
These were very important questions in Australia, as the three Labor bogeymen – James 
Scullin, E. G. Theodore and Jack Lang – presented conservatives with a real and immediate 
threat to the very basis of sane finance with their supposedly ‘inflationary’ and 
‘repudiationist’ ideas. However, as will be shown below, the conflicting answers posed by 
each movement to these questions – and by different fractions within the movements – 
exposed an inherent contradiction that had previously been obscured by high-level rhetoric. 
As the first of the citizens’ movements to be founded, the Citizens’ League of South Australia 
was also the first to grapple with this contradiction. Its original strategy was to pressure the 
Scullin government to enact its desired reforms, if necessary by creating an all-party 
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coalition.17 However, in late January Scullin openly sided with Theodore’s proto-Keynesian 
proposals, which the League condemned as a ‘refusal to deal with matters affecting the 
interests of the citizens on national instead of party lines’.18
 
 However, even if he had chosen 
not to support Theodore, Scullin was an ill-suited saviour for the Citizens’ League. Apart 
from being a party politician, the League perceived his approach to combating the Depression 
as hesitant and contradictory. Latham and the Nationalists were a possible alternative, 
although this would still have required throwing their lot in with party politicians. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the League was willing to support Scullin prior to the 
reinstatement of Theodore demonstrated their willingness to bypass mainstream conservative 
parties to achieve their goals. 
What the Citizens’ League needed was a leader who could bridge the gap between extra-
parliamentary agitation and intra-parliamentary action – someone part of, but not beholden to, 
the nation’s political machinery. Such a leader could, in the League’s eyes, effect change 
from within parliament without being attached to any particular party, thus preserving the 
illusion of a national, non-party government. Leaders of this calibre would not even be 
politicians at all, but statesman – an important rhetorical differentiation that conjured images 
of the noblesse oblige of the idealised nineteenth century independent candidate: 
 
Out of this new movement new leaders will be found. Men and women who 
are prepared to serve for the good of the country as a whole instead of for 
party. We demand statesmen instead of politicians, that all legislation be 
reviewed as to whether it is for the good of the people as a whole instead of 
for a section of them.19
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The only question that remained, as Citizens’ League General Secretary E. D. A. Bagot put in 
starkly gendered terms, was ‘who is the man?’20 He did not have to wait long for an answer. 
As the Citizens’ League rose to prominence in the closing months of 1930, so too did Joseph 
Lyons. His loan conversion campaign utilised many of the same populist tactics as the 
Citizens’ League, including mass rallies, idealistic notions of national honour, and direct 
appeals to the people against the supposedly apathetic attitudes of those in power.21 By 
December he was a nationally recognised figure, and the Citizens’ League was praising him 
for his ‘courage and plain speaking’.22 A League ‘Monster Rally’ was held on 11 December 
in part to encourage widespread support for the conversion loan, and a telegram from Lyons 
addressed to the League was read to the audience.23 When Scullin failed to enforce 
deflationary measures during the Premiers’ conference in February 1931, the Citizens’ 
League called upon Lyons to overthrow the government and form a new ministry with the 
opposition.24 Bagot offered him the League’s unqualified backing, and circulated telegrams 
to MP’s in New South Wales and South Australia urging them to support Lyons.25
 
 
THE CO-OPTION OF THE CITIZENS’ MOVEMENTS AT A FEDERAL LEVEL 
Lyons’ stand against his Labor colleagues appeared to provide an avenue for the citizens’ 
movements into parliamentary action that did not overly stretch their non-party credentials. 
He was, in essence, a conservative politician without the burden of the conservative party 
machine, which made him the ideal candidate to lead a group of self-proclaimed non-party 
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movements. However, two things needed to happen for this marriage to be realised – Lyons 
had to want the job, and all three citizens’ movements needed to accept him. Lyons’ position 
in February 1931 was complicated by the division between mainstream conservatism and the 
citizens’ movements. If he chose to contest the leadership of the Nationalists, he risked 
alienating the growing membership of the citizens’ movements; conversely, if he aligned 
himself too closely with non-party interests, he could lose his chance at leading an opposition 
coalition. Consequently, Lyons did not respond to the Citizens’ League’s overtures until after 
his announcement in March that he was forming ‘a new party which would place the country 
before party’.26 He then noncommittally informed the League that he was ‘[g]lad [to] do 
anything [to] help Australia’.27 At the time Lyons was developing the seven point policy with 
the editor of the Argus in Melbourne, who advised him to ‘check the growth of sectional 
mushroom movements that may be a menace to unity later’. Realising the electoral boon that 
such a large mass of supporters could bring to a united opposition, Lyons replied that he did 
not wish to alienate these movements.28
 
 This suggests that he wanted to keep both avenues 
open until he had decided which course to take. 
Whilst all three Australian citizens’ movements were supportive of Lyons, there was 
considerable disagreement between the Citizens’ League of South Australia and the eastern 
movements on what a united non-party front should look like. The Citizens’ League viewed 
Lyons’ desertion from Labor as a chance for all of the forces opposed to ‘inflation, 
repudiation, and financial drift’, including mainstream conservative parties, the citizens’ 
movements and other non-party organisations, and the forces of ‘sane labour’, to unite behind 
                                                     
26 Advertiser and Register, 13 March 1931, 15. 
27 Telegram from Lyons to Bagot, 13 March 1931, box 13 item 13, CLSA papers. 
28 Hart, "Lyons: Labor Minister - Leader of the U.A.P.," 46. 
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him under one non-party banner.29 Furthermore, the League believed that the large 
membership of the citizens’ movements would form the backbone of this new united front, 
and it boasted that Lyons would inherit ‘an Australia-wide organisation with an immediate 
membership of 200,000’ should he choose to accept it.30
 
 Whilst the notion that such a 
political force could really be non-party in nature may seem farcical, it must be remembered 
that in March 1931 Lyons was, for all intents and purposes, a free political agent. He had 
resigned from the Labor Party on principle and had yet to succeed Latham as leader of the 
opposition, and he had only just announced his intention to form a new minority party. With 
the citizens’ movements enjoying a spectacular rise and the Nationalists in disarray, it was 
easy for individuals like Bagot to imagine that a new political order free from party 
domination was being forged. 
In contrast, the All for Australia League saw no place for the mainstream conservative parties 
in a united non-party movement. A Citizens’ League delegate to a meeting of the two eastern 
Leagues in March 1931 reported that the All for Australia League was unwilling to discuss a 
common policy, and refused to support Lyons as Federal leader.31
                                                     
29 Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 13 April 1931, box 1 item 2, CLSA papers. 
 The reason for their 
reluctance became clear when, at the first All for Australia League State convention on 28 
March, delegates voted by 598 to 40 to launch a new political movement that would support 
its own candidates at State and Federal elections. Delegates stressed that their members, who 
supposedly came from both sides of the political spectrum, were looking to the League for 
leadership and action, and would not countenance supporting either Labour or Nationalist 
candidates. Their object, one of the founding members explained bluntly, was ‘to save 
30 Mail, 21 March 1931, 1. 
31 Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 23 March 1931, box 1 item 2, CLSA papers. 
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Australia and not to save the National party’.32 When confronted by Latham about the need 
for unity to defeat Scullin, League President Alexander J. Gibson replied that he was ‘[v]ery 
friendly’ towards the Federal opposition forces but not to the Nationalist Party in general. 
The solution to the ‘federal problem’, he explained, was for Latham, Lyons and Page to join 
the All for Australia League.33
 
 Unlike the Citizens’ League, the All for Australia League was 
unwilling to sacrifice any of its anti-party purity by cooperating with mainstream 
conservative parties – instead, it saw itself as the sole legitimate organisation through which 
to build a new non-party order. 
These differing visions of a united non-party movement were partially influenced by 
lingering mistrust between the Citizens’ League and its counterparts in the eastern States. 
Chapter two showed the unwillingness of the Australian Citizens’ League’s upper class 
leadership to align with Bagot, whose middle class origins and fiery rhetoric were viewed as 
a potential liability. The Australian Citizens’ League found the leadership of the All for 
Australia League – which included several prominent businessmen and manufacturers – 
much less objectionable, which explains their decision to adopt the latter’s name and objects. 
The placatory excuse they offered the Citizens’ League of South Australia was that ‘the name 
“citizen” to the country dweller connoted too much of city interests’.34
                                                     
32 Sydney Morning Herald, 30 March 1931, 12. 
 A heated struggle 
occurred throughout March for control over the direction of the citizens’ movement 
phenomenon. Both of the eastern Leagues pressured the Citizens’ League of South Australia 
to ‘fall into line with them in a wider movement’ under the title of ‘All for Australia’. The 
Citizens’ League refused to amalgamate ‘on the ground[s] of dominance from New South 
33 Notes made on 6th April 1931, item 106, box 89, series 49, folder 3, Latham papers. 
34 Letter from Bagot to W. A. Burns, 2 June 1931, box 12 item 1, CLSA papers. 
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Wales and Victoria’, and Bagot called the Australian Citizens’ League ‘selfish’ for affiliating 
with the All for Australia League.35
 
 
In truth, the leaders of the Australian Citizens’ League were far less enamoured with their 
alliance than they appeared to be. At the beginning of March the All for Australia League 
was a dynamic and rapidly expanding force whose only tangible targets were the forces of 
inflation and repudiation. By the end of the month, however, its opposition to cooperation 
with the Nationalists on all fronts was becoming increasingly apparent. This placed the 
leadership of the Australian Citizens’ League in an increasingly uncomfortable position given 
their work with Lyons on the conversion loan campaign. Furthermore, whilst the All for 
Australia League was launching its tirade against the Nationalists, the Australian Citizens’ 
League leaders associated with the National Union and the Group of Six were manoeuvring 
for Lyons to assume the leadership of the opposition. This may explain Bagot’s cryptic 
statement to a South Australian journalist that the Australian Citizens’ League had come to 
regret changing their name.36 On 29 March 1931, the day after the All for Australia League 
launched itself as an independent political movement, the Australian Citizens’ League 
leadership met with Latham to reassure him of their support. They also expressed their 
concern over the hostility from the All for Australia League, adding that it would be difficult 
to convince them to support the Nationalists.37
 
 
                                                     
35 Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 9 March 1931; Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 23 
March 1931, box 1 item 2; Letter from Bagot to Sir William Sowden, 23 March 1931, box 13 item 11, CLSA 
papers. 
36 Letter from Bagot to Sir William Sowden, 23 March 1931, box 13 item 11, CLSA papers. The reason that 
Bagot cited for the Australian Citizens’ League’s regret – that the badge of the newly formed Australian Labor 
Army bore a startling resemblance to that of the All for Australia League – is humorous but unconvincing. 
37 Notes made on 6th April 1931, item 106, box 89, Series 49, folder 3, Latham papers. 
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The competing visions of the Citizens’ League and the All for Australia League came to a 
head at a conference of non-party organisations in Adelaide on 9-10 April 1931. The 
conference was called for two reasons: to attempt to coordinate the efforts of the three 
citizens’ movements, as well as various other non-party organisations, behind a set of 
common principles; and to provide a platform where Lyons could address, and hopefully 
assume the leadership of, those movements. The conference represented an attempt by the 
Citizens’ League to regain control of the citizens’ movement phenomenon from the eastern 
States by securing widespread support for its vision of a united non-party force under Lyons. 
Apart from the Citizens’ League of South Australia, the All for Australia League and the 
Australian Citizens’ League, delegates were invited from the Sane Democracy League, the 
Empire Party, the Citizens’ Federation of Western Australia, the Tasmanian Producers’ 
Advisory Council, the South Australian Proportional Representation Group, the South 
Australian Women’s Non-Party Association, the Producers’ and Business Men’s Political 
League, and a revived Kyabram Reform Movement.38
 
 
Lyons, who had by this time announced his intention to form a new moderate party, accepted 
an invitation from the League to address the conference and decided to use the occasion as 
the inaugural event of a speaking tour across Australia.39
                                                     
38 Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 23 March 1931; Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 7 April 
1931; Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 8 April 1931, box 1 item 2, CLSA papers; Advertiser and 
Register, 9 April 1931, 9.  
 The influence of the citizens’ 
movements on Lyons’ thinking at this point in his political career is demonstrated by the way 
that his attendance at the conference blended the populist style of the movements with 
standard conservative canvassing techniques. The entire conference was a well-orchestrated 
theatrical affair from start to finish: Lyons was greeted at Adelaide train station by an adoring 
39 Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 16 March 1931, box 1 item 2, CLSA papers; Advertiser and 
Register, 19 March 1931, 9. 
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crowd of supporters and the press, and he gave an apparently impromptu address where he 
uttered his famous line that together they would ‘strike a match to-night which will start a 
blaze throughout Australia’.40 That night, he gave a speech to a mass rally in the Exhibition 
Hall that was broadcast live on 5AD and relayed to several radio stations in Sydney, 
Melbourne and Brisbane. Attendance was so large that he repeated his address to overflow 
crowds at the Garden Theatre and Palais Royal.41
 
 His speech skilfully blended the populist 
rhetoric of the citizens’ movements with the orthodox economic rhetoric that had won him 
acclaim amongst conservatives: 
The first problem facing us is to restore the confidence of overseas people in 
Australia. In that objective there should be no party, no sectional, and no State 
antagonisms ... let us unite on certain leading questions and then leave our 
representatives freedom of action in order that we might have true 
representative government.42
 
 
However, Lyons’ schedule for the majority of his time in Adelaide was booked solid with 
meetings and luncheons with conservative organisations and businessmen’s groups.43
 
 This 
demonstrated that he was cognizant of the political power held by the citizens’ movements 
and mainstream conservatives and was keen to maintain support from both. 
The morning after Lyons’ speech, the delegates from the various non-party movements met 
to debate the future of the citizens’ movements. The heated discussion was dominated by the 
opposing visions of the Citizens’ League and the All for Australia League, with the latter 
reiterating that it would not cooperate with any political party. Instead, its delegates 
demanded that the Citizens’ League adopt the ‘All for Australia’ brand and join the two 
                                                     
40 Advertiser and Register, 10 April 1931, 21. 
41 Advertiser and Register, 9 April 1931, 9. 
42 Advertiser and Register, 10 April 1931, 19-20. 
43 Ibid. 19, 21; Advertiser and Register, 11 April 1931, 17. 
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eastern movements in a new united movement that would field its own candidates. Bagot 
replied that the urgent need to defeat Scullin required the cooperation of all the forces 
opposed to inflation and repudiation, including the mainstream conservative parties. The All 
for Australia League delegates were eventually persuaded to support Lyons at a Federal level, 
however they refused to cooperate with the New South Wales Nationalist Association in 
selecting candidates for the next election. The delegates finally agreed to leave decisions 
regarding State-level cooperation in the hands of each movement.44 In addition, the leaders of 
the three citizens’ movements invited Lyons to become their leader so that he would have an 
organisation at his disposal that could begin encouraging candidates who subscribed to his 
broad principles.45
 
 
The path to a new united opposition movement under Lyons now seemed clear; however, the 
problem that had plagued Lyons in March 1931 was still unresolved. Utilising the Nationalist 
Party apparatus would not suit the citizens’ movements who wanted a new, united political 
force that would set aside party politics for the sake of the nation. Likewise, if he were to 
accept the offer of leadership from the citizens’ movements he risked inheriting an 
organisation with a significant membership but without a well-oiled political machine. The 
solution to the impasse was to form a new organisation under which political parties and non-
party movements could come together without merging or losing their separate identities. 
This organisation, which was named the United Australia Movement, was formed at a 
meeting of Nationalist Party and citizens’ movement delegates in Melbourne on 19 April. To 
effect the desired electoral unity, the delegates resolved to form Central Committees in each 
                                                     
44 Minutes of citizens’ movement conference, 9-10 April 1931, series 4 item 1; Minutes of meeting of 
Emergency Committee Executive, 12 April 1931, series 4 item 1, Archibald Grenfell Price papers, PRG7, SLSA 
(hereafter ‘Price papers’); Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 13 April 1931, box 1 item 2, CLSA papers; 
Advertiser and Register, 11 April 1931, 15. 
45 Letter from Gibson, Turnbull, and Bagot to Lyons, 11 April 1931, box 1 folder 8, Joseph Aloysius Lyons 
papers, MS 4851, NLA (hereafter ‘Lyons papers’). 
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State to collaboratively endorse candidates that adhered to the broad principles set out in 
Lyons’ seven point policy.46 On the surface, the United Australia Movement seemed to 
follow the non-party approach favoured by the Citizens’ League; however, in reality, it was 
little more than a rebranded conservative political party with several new faces at its helm. 
This was demonstrated on 7 May when the parliamentary Nationalist Party and Lyons’ small 
band of followers renamed themselves the United Australia Party.47
 
 
The citizens’ movements portrayed their support of United Australia at the Federal level as 
the logical progression of the non-party spirit to the political arena rather than the 
consolidation of the conservative party machine. Nationalism was a tarnished brand, 
inescapably bound to the tired system of machine politics; ‘United Australia’, as its name 
implied, was a new and invigorated political force that represented unity along national rather 
than party lines. Having Lyons at the helm made it easier to preserve this veneer of non-
partyism: he had, in the words of the All for Australia League, ‘thrown off the shackles of 
machine control and set out as a leader of the moderate section of the community.’48 It 
certainly helped that he was fluent in the language of non-partyism, which he ably 
demonstrated by stressing that the new party was built upon a ‘great force of public opinion’, 
that would ‘constantly have in mind that personal and party ends must be entirely 
subordinated to the national welfare.’49
                                                     
46 Minutes of a Conference held in Melbourne on 19 April 1931, box 1 item 2, CLSA papers. 
 But moderate or not, Lyons was still a politician 
engaged in the political process, and the citizens’ movements needed to account for this if 
they were to justify supporting him. They did this by arguing that the principles they shared 
with Lyons transcended party politics: 
47 Hart, "Lyons: Labor Minister - Leader of the U.A.P.," 51. They were also joined by W. M. Hughes’ ‘Australian 
Party’, comprised of himself and three other MPs who had defected from the Nationalists in 1930. 
48 Letter from Norman Keysor to Lyons, 23 May 1931, box 1 folder 8, Lyons papers. 
49 Advertiser and Register, 8 May 1931, 21. 
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Just as we are not “pro” any party, so we are not “anti” any party, Labour or 
other. The best proof of our non-party character is that we have given our 
support to Mr. Lyons, both before and since he left the Labour Party. In 
supporting Mr. Lyons we are supporting our own principles, and if we 
declined to support Mr. Lyons we would be false to our principles, irrespective 
of the party in which he may belong.50
 
 
This stance, argued the Australian Citizens League, was ‘political’ but not ‘party’ because 
United Australia ‘was not a political party in the [traditional] sense’.51
 
 As Lyons was free of 
the taint of party politics and shared the principles believed by the citizens’ movements to 
represent the national interest, they saw no inconsistency in supporting him in the Federal 
parliament. Australian conservatism had thus begun to renegotiate its relationship with the 
electorate by appropriating the language of the citizens’ movements, but it remained to be 
seen whether this would be enough to iron out the hostility between the citizens’ movements 
and the mainstream conservative political machinery at a State level. 
                                                     
50 All for Australia League shows the way to prosperity, 23-24. 
51 Ibid. 24; First Meeting of the Council under the new Constitution of the All for Australia League, 9 July 1931, 
Ernest Turnbull papers, MS 1942/2, NLA (hereafter ‘Turnbull papers’). 
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Figure 14: Australian Citizens’ League cartoon in support of Joseph Lyons. Source: News, 
17 December 1931, 11. 
 
THE CO-OPTION OF THE CITIZENS’ MOVEMENTS IN THE STATES 
With a commitment to unity achieved at a Federal level, mainstream conservatives in 
Australia set about co-opting the populist enthusiasm of the citizens’ movements at a State 
level. A useful framework for understanding how this occurred is provided in John Lonie’s 
analysis of the Citizens’ League and the Emergency Committee, a conservative lobby group 
founded in South Australia to select and support right-wing candidates for the Federal 
election in December 1931. Lonie argued that the Emergency Committee ‘outmanoeuvred 
and contained’ the League by corralling it into a united front dominated by mainstream 
conservatives. By participating in this united front, the League ultimately ‘negated ... its own 
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origins by integrating the disaffected parties back into line.’52
 
 Similar fronts were developed 
in Victoria and New South Wales, although achieving unity in New South Wales was a long 
and protracted process because of the All for Australia League’s intractable hostility toward 
the Nationalist Association. This section explores this process of political co-option. 
Like the Federal campaign to support Lyons, the precedent for State cooperation between 
mainstream conservatives and the citizens’ movements was set in South Australia with the 
Emergency Committee. With tensions running high between the Citizens’ League and the 
Liberal Federation in the first few months of 1931, leading Liberals W. G. Duncan and 
Charles Hawker began to consider how best to rein in the fiery and unpredictable Bagot. 
Since he seemed implacably opposed to the Liberals’ party structure, they decided to form 
the nominally independent ‘Emergency Committee’ under which the Liberal Federation, the 
Country Party, and the various non-party groups in South Australia could cooperate for the 
purposes of contesting the next Federal election. Duncan and Hawker approached A. G. 
Price, author of the highly influential and widely distributed pamphlet The Menace of 
Inflation, to lead the new movement at the end of March due to his lack of overt party 
attachments. Invitations were sent to five organisations to attend the inaugural meeting of the 
Committee on 1 April 1931 – the Liberal Federation, the Country Party, the Citizens’ League, 
the Political Reform League (whose founder Keith Wilson participated in the formation of 
the Citizens’ League), and the Producers’ and Business Men’s Association.53
 
 
                                                     
52 Lonie, "Conservatism and Class in South Australia," 208, 240; Lonie, "'Good Labor Men' and 'Non-Labor'," 30-
45. 
53 Price, "The Emergency Committee of South Australia," 11-13; Circular sent by Price, 29 March 1931, series 4 
item 1, Price papers. 
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An analysis of Price’s worldview emphasizes the similarities and differences between 
mainstream conservatism and the citizens’ movement ideology. Price was a typical 
conservative – British in his loyalties, staunch in his defence of orthodox economics, yet 
relatively ambivalent about the conservative party apparatus. He believed that deflation and 
balanced budgets were natural – and therefore apolitical – tools of economic management, 
whereas the methods pursued by Labor were ‘absolutely wrong’.54 Those who supported sane 
economy were ‘good men’ who ‘refused to be bound’, whereas Scullin led ‘a Government of 
wobblers, and financial extremists’ who had ‘temporarily sapped the foundations of 
individualism’ with arbitration, pensions, and ‘a dozen [other] socialistic policies’.55 
Nevertheless, Price was deeply concerned by Bagot’s populist leadership style and 
uncompromising anti-partyism. He agreed to lead the Emergency Committee not because of 
any strong sympathy for the Liberals, but to prevent the Citizens’ League from splitting the 
vote and ‘letting in the extremists again.’ This was a fear shared by Duncan and Hawker, who 
believed the League represented an ‘immediate danger’ and hoped to keep it under control 
until it ran out of money or momentum.56 When interviewed many years later about the 
impetus behind the formation of the Emergency Committee, Price’s response was blunt: ‘we 
started the Emergency Committee to control Bagot’.57
 
 This demonstrates the level of 
apprehension with which mainstream conservatives perceived the citizens’ movements in the 
States, and the extent to which they were willing to go to control them. 
It was the fear of splitting the conservative vote, coupled with the chance to steer 
conservative political policy in a non-party direction, which convinced the leaders of the 
                                                     
54 Price, "The Emergency Committee of South Australia," 5-6, 11. 
55 Ibid., 40. 
56 Ibid., 13-14. 
57 Quoted in Lonie, "Conservatism and Class in South Australia," 248. 
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Citizens’ League to work with the Emergency Committee. Bagot approached the inaugural 
meeting of the Committee with considerable bluster, telling the Citizens’ League President 
and fellow delegate William Queale that he intended to ‘let the bastards show themselves and 
then shoot them.’ However, whilst Bagot proclaimed that he was ‘dead against cooperation’ 
with the Liberal Federation, the more moderate Queale was won over by Price’s appeals for 
electoral unity and convinced Bagot to change his mind.58 The Committee then expanded 
Lyons’ ‘seven points’ into a twelve-point policy which it would require its candidates to 
uphold. Two of these additional policies demonstrated the willingness of mainstream 
conservatives to graft citizens’ movement ideology onto an orthodox core: the ‘[e]ntire 
freedom of members of Parliament from party or caucus control’, and a ‘truce from 
contentious party issues for the duration of the next Commonwealth Parliament’.59
 
 Whilst 
this may have been little more than a token appeasement of the Citizens’ League, it reflected 
a broader uptake of non-party language by Emergency Committee members such as Price: 
[The Emergency Committee] is not really a political movement. It is an effort 
on the part of disinterested volunteers who have left their work and business 
simply to help the old parties co-operate, simply to aid them in one essential 
task of putting the country straight.60
 
 
Nevertheless, Price strongly disapproved of the kind of populist, anti-party rhetoric used by 
the citizens’ movements. He was concerned with the Citizens’ League’s continuing ‘desire to 
run stunts’ and he chided Bagot on many occasions for making ‘overstrong statements’ about 
the Liberal Federation.61
                                                     
58 Price, "The Emergency Committee of South Australia," 14-15; Minutes of meeting of representatives to the 
Emergency Committee, 1 April 1931, series 4 item 1, Price papers. 
 Price’s loyalty lay with the existing party system and the 
parliamentary process, even if he was not connected to any particular party. This made him 
59 Report of subcommittee to the Emergency Committee, 7 April 1931, series 4 item 1, Price papers. 
60 Speech by Price to the Emergency Committee, 18 May 1931, series 4 item 1, Price papers. 
61 Price, "The Emergency Committee of South Australia," 19-20. 
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different from Lyons who, whilst committed to parliamentary politics, was willing to utilise 
the populist style of the citizens’ movements. 
 
Whilst Price had not completely ironed out the differences between the Liberal Federation 
and the Citizens’ League, he had managed to secure their cooperation in selecting and 
supporting pro-Lyons candidates for the next Federal election. If the United Australia Party 
was to successfully oust Scullin at the election and avoid splitting the vote, a similar unity 
would need to be achieved in the other States. The Emergency Committee provided a model 
for mainstream conservative parties in the other States to control the citizens’ movements, 
and it is likely that it was the inspiration for the ‘Central Committees’ in each State proposed 
at the inaugural conference of the United Australia Movement. The main purpose of the 
Committees would be to nominate and promote United Australia candidates, although their 
size and structure was left to the various parties in each State to decide.62
 
 
The ties of the Australian Citizens’ League to the conservative political establishment in 
Victoria ensured their ready acceptance of the ‘Central Committee’ proposal. So confident 
was Lyons of their support that he decided to publicly announce the launch of the United 
Australia Movement at a conference of conservative parties and non-party movements in 
Melbourne on 5 May.63 The conference agreed to form a Central Committee to ensure the 
cooperation of the various Victorian groups in fielding candidates at the next Federal election 
without sacrificing their individual identity.64
                                                     
62 Minutes of a Conference held in Melbourne on 19 April 1931, box 1 item 2, CLSA papers. 
 As with the Citizens’ League of South 
Australia, the fear of splitting the vote overcame any scruples regarding pre-selection:  
63 Present at the meeting were delegates from the National Federation, the Australian Citizens’ League, the 
Victorian Country Party, the Australian Women’s National League, the Young Nationalist Organisation, the 
National Council, and the United Country Party (women's section). 
64 Argus, 6 May 1931, 9; Conference of delegates, 5 May 1931, Turnbull papers. 
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One of the chief aims of the council will be to prevent three-cornered contests 
between two non-Labour and one Labour candidate at the polls, with 
consequent division of non-Labour votes and advantage to the Labour 
candidate. The object will be to ensure the complete cooperation of the various 
parties in supporting one candidate in each electorate[.]65
 
 
Unlike the Citizens’ League of South Australia, however, the Australian Citizens’ League 
delegates expressed few qualms at surrendering anti-partyism in the name of political 
expediency – the political ties of its leaders were simply too strong. This was demonstrated 
by the election of two founding members of ‘the Group’ and the Australian Citizens’ League, 
Ricketson and Henderson, to the positions of temporary secretary and chairman of the new 
Council.66 The strongest opponent of unity in Victoria was the Country Party: their delegates 
soon abandoned the unity movement, and the remaining groups agreed that the Central 
Council should consist of five representatives each from the National Federation, the Young 
Nationalist Organisation, and the Australian Citizens’ League.67
 
 
Working with political machines via the Committees – even if theoretically on an even 
footing – meant inevitably having to agree on a candidate list. Since the citizens’ movements 
were opposed to pre-selection, this posed a dilemma: how to agree upon a single candidate 
for each electorate without laying themselves open to the charge of hypocrisy? The solution 
required a certain amount of rhetorical gymnastics. The citizens’ movements had always 
maintained that they were willing to support any candidate, whether party member or 
independent, provided they met their strict self-sacrificing and apolitical criteria. Since the 
candidate lists produced by the Emergency and Central Committees included Nationalists, 
Liberals, Country Party members, and ex-Laborites, the Citizens’ League of South Australia 
                                                     
65 Argus, 6 May 1931, 9. 
66 Ibid. Henderson subsequently resigned from his position as honourary secretary of the League; see Meeting 
of the Executive, 15 May 1931, Turnbull papers. 
67 Meeting of the United Australia Movement, 27 May 1931; Speech made by Ernest Turnbull to the State 
Council, 20 January 1932, Turnbull papers, 3-4. 
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and the Australian Citizens’ League could nominally claim that they were merely being 
consistent in approving them.68 This was not pre-selection, the Australian Citizens’ League 
argued, but merely ‘endorsement’ – a subtle distinction, noted the Age with mirth, that ‘the 
managers of other political parties must be sorry they never before thought of’.69
 
 
 
Figure 15: An Australian Citizens’ League billboard in support of Joseph Lyons (after the 
movement adopted the ‘All for Australia League’ brand). Source: Turnbull papers. 
 
The All for Australia League remained unwilling to cooperate with the Nationalist 
Association of New South Wales, and it was here that conservatives believed the greatest 
                                                     
68 Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 2 June 1931, box 1 item 2; Minutes of Executive Committee 
Meeting, 29 September 1931, box 1 item 3; OPP Minutes, 13 October 1931, box 1 item 3, CLSA papers. 
69 Age, 20 May 1931, 8. 
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threat to conservative electoral unity lay. Gibson candidly informed Nationalist candidates 
that they should ‘efface themselves’ and join the All for Australia League if they ever hoped 
to be re-elected.70 Price, who attended the heated conference of citizens’ movements on 9-10 
April, repeatedly referred to the League as ‘dangerous’: not only could they split the vote in 
New South Wales, but the lack of electoral unity in such a key State might discourage Lyons’ 
supporters in Parliament from seeking an early election.71 This was a subject of considerable 
anxiety in Canberra: Hawker wrote to Price urging him to convince the Citizens’ League to 
pressure the All for Australia League into cooperating, and Lyons himself met with the 
leaders of the All for Australia League in mid-April.72 Latham considered the League to be 
‘impractical’ for refusing to engage in party politics, and wondered whether the only solution 
was for both organisations to surrender their separate identities and merge into a single 
United Australia Party.73
 
 This demonstrates the extent of the divide between mainstream 
conservative politics and the citizens’ movements over the issue of the latter’s populist style. 
Despite the underlying congruence of their conservative worldviews, the All for Australia 
League’s anti-partyism posed a direct electoral threat to the political forces arrayed behind 
Lyons. 
EXPOSING THE INHERENT CONTRADICTIONS 
By mid-1931 the three Australian citizens’ movements had made a decision, one way or the 
other, regarding their relationship with mainstream conservative parties. Whilst the Citizens’ 
League of South Australia and the Australian Citizens’ League had agreed to cooperate 
                                                     
70 Sydney Morning Herald, 17 April 1931, 12; Canberra Times, 21 April 1931, 1. 
71 Minutes of citizens’ movement conference, 9-10 April 1931, series 4 item 1; Minutes of meeting of 
Emergency Committee Executive, 12 April 1931, series 4 item 1, Price papers; Price, "The Emergency 
Committee of South Australia," 18. Price noted that ‘the A.F.A. in N.S.W. seemed to dislike the Nationalists 
even more than they did the Lang crowd.’ 
72 Telegram from Hawker to Price, c. April 1931, series 4 item 1, Price papers; Telegram from Gibson to Lyons, 
14 April 1931. box 1 folder 8, Lyons papers. 
73 Letter from Latham to Bavin, 5 May 1931, item 5e, box 89, series 49, folder 2, Latham papers. 
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through front groups to avoid vote-splitting, the All for Australia League had declared its 
opposition to any such cooperation. Regardless of their respective choices, each movement 
had made a decision that exposed one of the crucial contradictions between the radical and 
reactionary elements of their ideology – the preservation of anti-party purity in the interests 
of destroying the much-hated political machines, versus the need to cooperate with the forces 
of mainstream conservatism in the interests of ousting the Labor government. This section 
examines how the citizens’ movements tried, and ultimately failed, to explain this 
contradiction between political expediency and anti-party purity. 
 
Whilst supporting Lyons at the Federal level had not proved too difficult, the decision of the 
Citizens’ League of South Australia and the Australian Citizens’ League to extend this 
cooperation to the State level stretched the definition of ‘non-party’ to the breaking point. 
They justified their decision in three ways: by highlighting the urgency of the situation, by 
claiming that having a voice in a united front would allow them to counter the political 
machines, and by stressing that the cooperation was only temporary in nature. Bagot argued 
that the imperative of defeating Scullin outweighed any small loss of independence the 
Citizens’ League might incur: 
 
[T]he position in Federal politics is so critical that even at a temporary 
sacrifice of some degree of independence, we [are] acting in the best interests 
of the country and citizens by co-operating with other political bodies to 
ensure the return to Parliament … of representatives who will stand for the 
broad principles of national integrity and sound finance.74
 
 
The fear of splitting the conservative vote, which Price had been hammering home, likely 
contributed to this decision. Likewise, the Australian Citizens’ League’s ‘immediate object’ 
was securing the election of ‘all who stand on the common ground of opposition to the 
                                                     
74 Letter from Bagot to Whiteman, 1 June 1931, box 13 item 10, CLSA papers. 
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dishonest policies of repudiation and inflation’ to whom ‘we can quite safely leave the details 
of ... policy’.75
 
 Since inflation and repudiation were of such immediate concern, these 
movements were willing to sacrifice a portion of their non-party ‘purity’ in the interests of 
political expediency. 
Whilst the citizens’ movements claimed that cooperation was necessary, they also argued that 
it would allow them to further their goal of curbing the excesses of party politics. Australian 
Citizens’ League President Ernest Turnbull warned members not to ‘delude’ themselves into 
thinking that, by participating in the political process, they were ‘altering the party system’. 
The League might be able to counter ‘some of its worst faults’ by cooperating with United 
Australia, but its main purpose was more long-term: 
 
The true function of this organisation in the future is to be not a political party, 
with a policy of a hundred and one planks, but a watch dog, an overseer on 
behalf of the people to supervise the work of the political parties. Only in 
some such way can we prevent the parties in the future, as in the past, from 
sacrificing national to party interests.76
 
 
Likewise, the Citizens’ League of South Australia claimed that its participation in the 
Emergency Committee would ‘break down the control of political parties over candidates’ by 
ensuring that they would not ‘be tied in any way to any particular political party’. To prove 
this claim, Bagot pointed to the two ‘non-party’ planks that the League had secured in the 
Emergency Committee’s twelve point policy.77
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The movements also stressed that their cooperation with mainstream conservative parties 
would only last until Scullin was defeated. The Australian Citizens’ League admitted that 
there was ‘no satisfactory substitute’ for the party system of government and it was likely to 
be ‘the prevailing system for a long time to come.’78 Nevertheless, it stressed that its alliances 
with Federal and State parties were for ‘a specific purpose’, and once that purpose had been 
achieved it would ‘consider whether there is any reason for continuing them.’ This would 
avoid ‘commit[ing] it to policies and to parties with which it has only some things in 
common.’79 Similarly, the Citizens’ League of South Australia stated that its membership in 
the Emergency Committee would last ‘only until the next Federal election has been 
completed’ and would not affect its ‘permanent aims and objects and ideals’.80
 
 Apart from 
establishing a fixed timeframe for cooperation, this was also aimed at reassuring members 
that cooperation would not derail the fundamental purpose of the movements. 
The decision of the Citizens’ League of South Australia and the Australian Citizens’ League 
to cooperate with mainstream conservatives parties at a State level raised valid questions 
amongst their membership about the importance of anti-partyism. Despite their protestations 
to the contrary, the movements’ leaders had implicitly acknowledged that anti-partyism was 
less important than the more immediate goal of securing the election of a conservative-
friendly government. This exposed a contradiction between those members who agreed with 
this hierarchy of values and those who had joined primarily out of the anti-party fervour that 
arose in Australia in 1930-1931. This is demonstrated by the increased volume of complaints 
expressed by members in the wake of the movements deciding to cooperate with mainstream 
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conservative forces. One concerned member of the Citizens’ League wrote that the 
movement was in danger of being ‘swallowed up by the Liberal Federation’, whilst another 
thought that the Emergency Committee was really ‘one big party’ in disguise.81
 
 This sense of 
shock and betrayal was summarised by Miss L. Rudkin in her letter of resignation: 
It seems a pity that a movement with such a fine organization behind it should 
not undertake educational propaganda instead of tampering with politics. The 
public it seems need education in Citizenship more than anything. We need to 
develop a Public Conscience and to understand what true Citizenship means.82
 
 
Her choice of words demonstrates the central legitimating role that anti-partyism played for 
some members. The citizens’ movements were supposed to be a force that transcended 
politics entirely in their quest for spiritual and moral renewal: ‘tampering’ with party politics 
shattered this illusion, stripping away the thin veneer of non-partisanship and revealing the 
movements as simply conservative political vehicles of a more populist bent. Whilst those 
who supported cooperation may have been able to justify this ideological compromise, it was 
clearly an uncomfortable move for others. 
 
Cooperation with mainstream conservative parties seriously impacted on the fortunes of the 
two citizens’ movements. Enrolment of new members dropped rapidly: attempts to form four 
new branches of the Australian Citizens’ League in June 1931 failed.83
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of South Australia noted that metropolitan subscriptions fell dramatically after it decided to 
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popular support’.84 Existing members from both the leadership and the front-line also 
responded with protest, dissension and resignation. Australian Citizens’ League Provisional 
Committee member Alexander Dowsley resigned, claiming that the movement’s choice 
would merely reinforce ‘the present unsound system of party politics’.85 The Echuca district 
council resolved that its members should ignore the endorsed candidate list circulated by the 
Australian Citizens’ League leadership and follow the original policy of voting for any 
candidate that was prepared to abide by the movement’s ideals.86
 
 The Preston branch 
condemned the leadership for kowtowing to the Nationalists and called upon them to resign: 
That owing to the All for Australia League becoming swallowed up by a 
Nationalist organisation, and thus losing its identity and departing from its 
original ideals of non-party politics and opposition to pre-selection, the All for 
Australia League has failed in its duty to its members[.]87
 
 
The use of the word ‘identity’ reinforces the importance of anti-partyism to some members. It 
suggests that it was a crucial component of how they perceived the citizens’ movements, and 
by extension their participation in them. Sacrificing this ideal, even if supposedly on a short-
term basis, transformed the movements into something unrecognisable and therefore 
unworthy of their continued support. 
 
Unlike the Citizens’ League of South Australia and the Australian Citizens’ League, the All 
for Australia League had refused to work with the conservative party in New South Wales. 
This posed a different problem than that faced by the other two Australian citizens’ 
movements. Rather than having to justify cooperating with the Nationalist Association, the 
League had to justify competing with it in a fashion that might split the non-labour vote and 
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hand Scullin the election. The League’s leadership justified this decision by arguing that there 
were unique and irreconcilable difficulties between themselves and the Nationalist 
Association of New South Wales that were not present in the other States. Given that the 
Nationalist Association was the most organised of the conservative political machines in 
Australia in 1931, this was not entirely without merit. ‘[T]he problem in this State is different 
to the problems in the other States or in the Federal arena,’ explained one of the League’s 
founders, ‘and calls for different handling and [a] different solution.’88 In the months after it 
launched itself as an independent political force, the All for Australia League issued its most 
virulent condemnations of the Nationalist Association. It proclaimed that it stood ‘just as 
staunchly against the reactionary forces who have gained control of Nationalism’ as it did 
against ‘Mr. Lang and his Communist friends who preach the class war’.89 In response, 
National Association leader Thomas Bavin proclaimed that the League had abandoned its 
high ideals, and its main object had become to ‘destroy the Nationalist party’.90
 
 
Whilst the Citizens’ League of South Australia and the Australian Citizens’ League faced 
revolts from anti-party purists, the All for Australia League had to deal with members who 
favoured a compromise in the interests of ousting Scullin. The League’s leadership was split 
over this question at the conference on 30 March 1931 when the decision was made to field 
its own candidates. Two founding figures in particular, O. D. A. Oberg from the Sane 
Democracy League and A. E. Heath from the Constitutional Association, tried to dissuade the 
League from launching itself as an independent political force. Oberg warned that such a 
move would split the movement and ‘relegate us to the limbo of disunity in which more than 
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one political party finds itself to-day.’91 When their appeal failed, the Sane Democracy 
League convened a series of unity conferences between the All for Australia League, the 
Nationalist Association and the Country Party in the hope that the three would agree to form 
a ‘Central Committee’ along the lines that had been formed in the other States.92 The 
conferences began promisingly, but were hamstrung by the League’s insistence that 
cooperation be ‘confined entirely to the Federal sphere’ and the Nationalists’ refusal to 
surrender control of all electoral activities to the proposed committee.93 The League 
abandoned the negotiations in May and confirmed that it would contest the next elections 
independently.94 Oberg and Heath resigned from the League in disgust, and Heath publicly 
denounced its leadership in the Sydney Morning Herald.95 The remaining leaders of the 
League interpreted the outcome of the failed unity conferences as yet another example of the 
Nationalists’ rigid machine tactics.96
 
  
Criticism from front-line members over the All for Australia League’s hardline stance was 
equally heated. After the collapse of the unity negotiations in May, letters from disgruntled 
members began pouring in to the Sydney Morning Herald. They argued that the decision not 
to cooperate with the Nationalist Association had been made in an undemocratic fashion by 
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the leadership and was distracting the League from its true enemies in Scullin and Lang. As 
T. A. Baker put it: 
 
I have for some time resented the tactics employed by [League] spokesmen in 
directing their attacks on National representatives instead of attacking the real 
evils of Socialism and Communism, the growth of which threatens the country 
like a malignant cancer. Had the A.F.A. leaders (so far as they are purely self-
appointed leaders) devoted one half of their time and energy to opposing the 
repudiation policy of Mr. Lang, instead of attacking the National party, this 
State might not now be in its present parlous plight.97
 
 
Baker also pointed out the ‘gross inconsistency’ of supporting Lyons in the Federal sphere 
whilst hindering his efforts at a State level.98 Wholesale branch resignations followed in 
North Ryde, Manly and Blackheath. The Chairman of the North Ryde branch explained their 
action by arguing that ‘[t]he only object the people of the State should have in mind to-day 
was to get rid of the present Government’, and the Manly branch resolved to form a new 
‘citizens’ committee’ with the local branch of the Nationalists.99 This reaction can be 
partially explained by the fact that New South Wales was home to the biggest Labor 
bogeyman of them all, Jack Lang, who provided a more immediate reminder of the need for 
conservative unity. However, it was more fundamentally a manifestation of the split between 
anti-party purists and those who favoured political expediency. Had the All for Australia 
League opted to pursue the same conciliatory path as the other two Australian citizens’ 
movements, it is likely that it would have experienced the same backlash as they did. This is 
exemplified in the complaints it received during the unity conferences from members who 
opposed cooperation with the Nationalists.100
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With their cohesion shattered by the exposure of their inherent contradictions, the Australian 
citizens’ movements entered a terminal decline well before the United Australia Party victory 
in December 1931. Thus, whilst Geoffrey Robinson is correct that the citizens’ movements 
were undercut by the reinvigorated United Australia Party, the movements had already 
undercut themselves through the process of shifting from ideals to policy.101 The All for 
Australia League was so starved of funds and members by October that it did a complete 
about-face and agreed to cooperate with the Nationalist Association after all.102 In a final 
stinging blow after the election, branches of the Nationalist Association throughout New 
South Wales unilaterally renamed themselves as United Australia Party branches and 
cordially invited members of the All for Australia League to join them.103 The Australian 
Citizens’ League resolved to disband itself in January 1932, although they offered a parting 
blow to party politicians by voting to withdraw themselves from the United Australia 
Movement and its ‘party political objectives’.104 Nevertheless, two Australian Citizens’ 
League members were selected as United Australia Party candidates in 1931.105 The Citizens’ 
League of South Australia managed to limp on until December 1934 in a severely restricted 
capacity before resolving to enter into voluntary liquidation.106
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Citizens’ League admitted in its death throes that the majority of its members in its heyday 
were ‘Liberals who had [since] returned to the party ranks’.107
 
 
CONCLUSION 
By the beginning of 1932 the Australian citizens’ movements were a spent force, devoid of 
the enthusiastic momentum and mass membership that characterised their heyday. The 
primary reason for their decline was their inability to negotiate the inherent contradiction 
between anti-party purity and political expediency. Whilst Lyons provided a convenient and 
uncontroversial non-party figurehead at a Federal level, the conservative political machines in 
each State were irrevocably stained with the brush of party politics. Regardless of whether 
the citizens’ movements decided to cooperate or compete with these parties, they inevitably 
exposed themselves to criticism from within their ranks. This dilemma was the inevitable 
outcome for any non-political movement in a parliamentary system where genuine change 
requires a degree of political participation, but it was especially the case for the Australian 
citizens’ movements who were driven by the imperative of united political action against 
Scullin and the potentially dire consequences of vote-splitting. Once a decision had been 
made either way, the inherent contradictions within the citizens’ movements could no longer 
be hidden behind the veneer of populist unity. 
 
Exposing this inherent contradiction exposed the citizens’ movements to other factors that led 
to their decline. One such factor was the co-option of their non-party essence by the forces of 
mainstream conservatism. The chief architect of this co-option was Lyons, who was able to 
utilise the populist style of the citizens’ movements whilst simultaneously securing the 
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leadership of the conservative party apparatus that would lead him to victory in December 
1931. The collaborative committees that he helped establish in each State, which were based 
on the highly successful Emergency Committee of South Australia, further strengthened the 
electoral unity of conservatives whilst countering the threat of independent political action by 
the citizens’ movements. This demonstrates Gourevitch’s political renegotiation in action, 
albeit without the abandonment of ‘traditional political as well as policy attachments’.108
 
 The 
United Australia Party certainly benefited from the fresh influx of political enthusiasm 
provided by the citizens’ movements, but this did not result in a major shift of the political 
status quo. 
Nevertheless, the citizens’ movements posed a major threat to the electoral base of the 
mainstream conservative parties in Australia. Despite sharing the same reactionary 
worldview as the Nationalists they criticised so much, their radical side – in particular their 
anti-partyism – made electoral cooperation a difficult endeavour. This was the crucial 
difference between the citizens’ movements and their predecessors. Empire leagues, anti-
communist groups, and civic and constitutional clubs could espouse their supposedly non-
party ideology without challenging the mainstream conservative parties. This complementary 
rather than contradictory stance helps to explain why they survived for so long. In contrast, 
the citizens’ movements challenged the very existence of mainstream conservative parties 
whilst competing for the same electoral base. Had the Nationalist Party framework not 
remained essentially sound despite the shock of the Depression, it is possible that the 
citizens’ movements could have achieved the same dramatic electoral successes of European 
fascist movements which ‘smashed the electoral base of the mainstream liberal and 
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conservative parties’.109
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 But the conservative establishment stayed solid, and the elites in 
finance and industry were never forced to turn to a more extreme alternative to defend their 
interests. Rather than breaking the control of the political machines, the citizens’ movements 
ultimately helped to reinforce it. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
‘NEW DEALS’ AND ‘FUNNY MONEY’: THE NEW ZEALAND 
LEGION AND MONETARY REFORM 
 
The existing economic system, if it is to survive at all, can do so only as the 
result of strict and intelligent control, involving the carrying into effect of an 
organised plan of rehabilitation … We must reconstruct the existing system 
and embark upon a plan of increasing consuming power, limiting the 
accumulation of money for investment and organising industry, or we must 
scrap the existing system in favour of something else.1
 
 
When the New Zealand Legion arose in 1933, it faced a vastly different domestic political 
landscape than the Australian citizens’ movements had grappled with in 1931. Unlike 
Australia, New Zealand was governed almost entirely by right-wing political parties 
throughout the Depression, and in 1933 power was held by a Coalition of the two leading 
conservative parties, United and Reform. As chapter two demonstrated, the Coalition’s 
increasingly unpopular response to the Depression attempted to balance traditional 
deflationary methods with a more interventionist stance on issues such as unemployment and 
insolvency. Meanwhile, the global political environment was undergoing a major 
transformation as new ideas on the role of the state in the economy were being promulgated. 
These ideas ranged from Keynes’ demand-side economics to the more radical and 
conspiratorial ideas of social credit and other monetary reformers. This chapter explores the 
influence of these new ideas on the New Zealand Legion. It argues that the increasing 
flirtation of the movement’s leaders with radical economic alternatives resulted in a 
confusing and contradictory mix of reactionary and radical economic policy. This inherent 
                                                     
1 National Opinion 1:5 (5 October 1933): 5. 
247 
 
contradiction contributed to the Legion’s downfall by alienating and driving away its 
reactionary members. 
 
A YEAR OF ‘RAPID CHANGE’ 
In December 1933, the New Zealand Legion’s journal National Opinion ran an article 
discussing the year of ‘rapid change’ that had passed. The previous twelve months, the author 
wrote, had witnessed the beginning of President Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ in the United States 
along with a similar, albeit more militaristic proto-Keynesian experiment in Nazi Germany. 
The British were also becoming increasingly drawn to economic nationalism, whilst Douglas 
social credit – once merely ‘the plaything of a few cranks’ – now counted its supporters in the 
hundreds of thousands.2
 
 The changes observed by the author on the global stage were also 
paralleled by changes in the domestic political environment. As chapter two showed, the 
Depression had witnessed the rise of a variety of ‘unorthodox’ economic ideas and theories in 
New Zealand. The chief notion that linked these often contradictory theories was that the 
Depression had caused, or exposed, a crisis of consumption: goods were still being produced 
in vast quantities, but consumers lacked the money to purchase them. The solution to 
‘overproduction’ and ‘underconsumption’ required some form of wealth redistribution, but 
the proponents of unorthodox economics differed widely on how that might be achieved. 
Some favoured the inflationary approach of borrowing or printing money to stimulate 
demand, whereas others sought to nationalise the banking system so that the state could exert 
greater control over monetary policy. 
The New Zealand Legion was influenced by two broad schools of ‘unorthodox’ economic 
thought. The first was the growing global trend of greater economic intervention and 
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planning, which in 1933 had yet to fully mature into the Keynesian consensus that would 
eventually become the new orthodoxy across the Western world. The chief proponent of this 
school of thought in New Zealand was the Labour Party, who promoted the nationalisation of 
key industries, large public works programs, increased wages, and guaranteed prices for 
certain primary exports. The second was monetary reformism, in particular Douglas social 
credit, whose adherents sought to ‘fine-tune’ the capitalist economic system by rectifying the 
supposed imbalance between production and consumption. Their principal strategy for 
achieving this involved nationalising the banking system and issuing some form of credit 
scrip or ‘dividend’ to embattled consumers in order to bring consumption in line with 
production. Monetary reformists were also generally preoccupied with the conspiratorial (and 
often anti-Semitic) belief that the Depression crisis had been engineered by a secret cabal of 
international financiers and bankers who controlled the world’s currencies. 
 
The tensions between these two schools of thought were originally played out amongst the 
leadership of the Legion. Chapter three distinguished the leaders of the citizens’ movements 
as those who actively participated by joining committees and attending conventions. By 
doing so, these individuals held a disproportionate amount of power over the ideology and 
policy of the movements. Whilst Legion policy was supposed to be proposed by front-line 
members, in practice the ‘centres’ typically looked for guidance to the National Executive, a 
small body appointed by Robert Campbell Begg to manage the everyday business of the 
movement. To assist in the production and dissemination of discussion material, the 
Executive appointed research committees in Wellington to study topics such as central 
government, local government, economics, unemployment, and land. The Economic 
Research Committee was by far the most prolific: its members published several pamphlets, 
wrote extensive articles in National Opinion, and circulated dozens of articles and reading 
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lists on economics to front-line members. Being Wellington-based, they were also able to 
directly influence the Executive and the quarterly meetings of the National Council that were 
attended by delegates from across the country. This influence over individuals and printed 
material allowed the Economic Research Committee to frame the debate between the 
competing schools of thought. 
 
The leading proponent of the ‘economic planning’ school was the Chairman of the Economic 
Research Committee, Evan Sydney Parry. Parry was the son of the renowned electoral 
engineer of the same name and a partner in the law firm Buddle, Anderson, Kirdcaldie and 
Parry.3
 
 From his work with the Legion, it is clear that he was very much a man of his time. 
Aged just 32 in 1933, he was more than ten years younger than the average Legionnaire. He 
was also thoroughly disappointed with the economic orthodoxy of his elders and had become 
enamoured with Roosevelt’s proto-Keynesian ‘New Deal’ as an alternative. This led him to 
believe that the only answer to the Depression was for New Zealand to reject free markets in 
favour of an ‘adapted Roosevelt plan’: 
There are still quite a number of well-meaning people who go about their daily 
business, if any, in the comfortable belief that in some miraculous manner the 
world depression will right itself ... the public should face the truth and 
recognise the fact that the trade depression cannot and will not right itself 
upon the old basis, and that the only hope of a return to prosperity lies in a 
consciously-planned economic system.4
 
 
Drawing upon this proto-Keynesian discourse, Parry claimed that the crisis was caused by 
‘over-production and under-consumption’, and that governments should focus on increasing 
the purchasing power of consumers at home before expanding their export markets or 
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investing funds overseas.5 In order to accomplish this, the state needed to enact a deliberate 
plan for economic rehabilitation that involved increased wages, shorter working hours, and 
job creation for the unemployed.6 These measures were not only essential to recovery, but to 
long-term peace and stability – the alternatives, Parry believed, were revolution or war.7
 
 
Parry’s position amongst the Legion’s leadership allowed him to disseminate material on 
economic planning across the movement. The reading list he compiled for the Economic 
Research Committee included works by J. M. Keynes, Fabian socialists Sir William 
Beveridge and G. D. H. Cole, and the Australian social crediter Arthur E. Powell.8 This list 
was also circulated to centres as recommended economic study material, along with a reprint 
from the British Fortnightly Review praising the ‘sane planning or State collectivism’ of 
Fascist Italy and calling for ‘the overthrow of laisser-faire’.9 Parry also had a hand in 
developing the Legion’s constitution and was part of the committee that established its 
journal, which subsequently published several of his articles on planned economics.10
 
 
Parry’s ideas proved persuasive amongst the Legion’s leadership, due perhaps in part to his 
legal background, and he was able to wield considerable influence over the movement’s 
policy. When the Legion released a ‘Statement of Principles’ in June 1933 it included an 
entire section on ‘political economy’ that called for a ‘bold reorganisation of our economic 
life’ along the lines advocated by Parry: 
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[T]he basic idea directing such reorganisation must be that all industry should 
be the servant of the consumer, and that production, distribution and finance 
are simply means to an end ... economic recovery will not be automatic and 
cannot be looked for solely as the result of occurrences overseas.11
 
 
Planned economics soon spread to almost every aspect of the Legion’s policy. Begg himself 
became one of its staunchest supporters, calling on the nation to ‘throw off ... the laissez faire 
of the past and deal boldly with the reconstruction of New Zealand’.12 In order to facilitate 
domestic consumption, the Legion proposed putting the unemployed to work on extensive 
public works programs at full wages. For those who still could not find work, new 
employment bureaus would be established to connect them with employers ‘willing to give 
employment at adequate wages’.13 Begg also developed an ambitious proposal to absorb one 
million of Britain’s unemployed in exchange for the British government taking over New 
Zealand’s foreign debt. The new arrivals would be put to work on the land, thus creating ‘an 
economic internal market for the products of land and industry’.14 The Legion even toyed 
with proto-corporatist reforms, including one suggestion that local body government should 
be reconstituted on a vocational rather than geographical franchise.15 The culmination of this 
new direction was the Legion’s proposal for an Economic Advisory Council comprised of 
representatives from various business organisations and trade unions that would be 
responsible for issuing policy recommendations on all economic and industrial matters.16
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The second school of thought that influenced Legion policy was monetary reform. As chapter 
two discussed, monetary reformism – in particular Douglas social credit – had attracted 
significant public attention in New Zealand by mid-1933, and many adherents joined the New 
Zealand Legion in the hope that it could be used to achieve their goals. For instance, whilst 
the Douglas social credit movement was generally hostile towards the Legion, several 
members of the Wellington branch joined so that they might ‘influence it towards 
Douglasism’. They also claimed that one of their members served on ‘the Central Executive 
of the Legion’, but it is not clear if this was the case.17 One such monetary reformer within 
the Legion was C. R. C. Robieson, who had previously been involved with minor 
conspiratorial and millenarian groups such as the New Economic Research Association and 
the British-Israel League.18
 
 Robieson wrote several articles for National Opinion, including 
one in response to a proposed Reserve Bank Bill claiming that it was the work of a small 
clique of international financiers seeking to control the nation’s economy: 
Currency and credit are the vehicles of production, distribution and exchange, 
and whoever controls those controls the very basis of a nation’s existence. 
There was a time when an attempt made to deprive a people of their sovereign 
rights would have been regarded as high treason; but to-day the sovereign 
rights of a people are sought to be made the playthings of the international 
financiers.19
 
 
This conspiratorial talk became popular amongst some of the Legion’s leaders, although its 
purpose appears to have mainly been to resolve an uncomfortable contradiction between 
imperial patriotism and dissatisfaction with the colonial financial system. The target for this 
conspiratorial rhetoric was ‘Tooley Street’ in London, the funnel through which Antipodean 
dairy produce and British capital flowed. This caricature represented the anxieties of New 
                                                     
17 Farming First, 10 April 1933, 18-19; Wellington Douglas social credit Association, 8th Newsletter, 15 April 
1933, Inward correspondence, 1930-1958, Raymond Ernest Hansen papers, 84-204-74, ATL. 
18 Evening Post, 16 July 1931, 8; Auckland Star, 6 September 1932, 3; Evening Post, 20 October 1932, 20. 
19 National Opinion 1:3 (7 September 1933): 2. 
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Zealand primary producers over the financial power that Tooley Street wielded over Empire 
suppliers. Indeed, Tooley Street had attracted similar criticism from elements of the rural 
community in the 1920s in response to its perceived role in the torpedoing of the Dairy 
Board’s attempts to establish guaranteed prices for its exports. There was little anti-Semitism 
evident in this criticism: the financier they caricatured was more reminiscent of John Bull 
than Shylock (see figure 16). This allowed Legionnaires to lay the blame for the crisis on a 
small band of constructed ‘others’ rather than the broader imperial system or the dependence 
of the colonies on Britain for capital investment. The Legion could thus aspire to forge a 
closer relationship with the ‘mother country’ whilst arguing that this would require New 
Zealand to shed its reliance on British financiers.20
 
 By separating the negative elements of the 
metropole-colony relationship from the broader community of Empire, the Legion was able 
to preserve its sense of imperial patriotism. 
                                                     
20 National Opinion 1:5 (5 October 1933): 2. 
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Figure 16: New Zealand Legion cartoon criticising the control of British financiers over the 
New Zealand economy. Source: National Opinion 1:1 (10 August 1933): 4. 
 
The economic aspects of monetary reformism had less impact on Legion policy. A ‘Stamped 
Scrip’ scheme produced by the Economic Research Committee in 1933 was vaguely 
reminiscent of social credit ideals. It envisioned the issue of temporary ‘scrip stamps’ to the 
unemployed by a State Credit Board to stimulate consumption;  however, its main inspiration 
was a similar policy employed in several American cities rather than Major Douglas’ 
‘National Dividend’.21
                                                     
21 Ref. 6/2/70, 12 September 1933, file 1 folder 2, NZL papers; Evening Post, 5 May 1933, 7. 
 Furthermore, its author A. W. Free was more inclined to favour 
economic orthodoxy, and one of the circulars he distributed explicitly rejected the social 
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credit explanation of the causes of the Depression.22 It was not until Major Douglas’ visit to 
New Zealand in early 1934 for the Monetary Commission that the Legion began to seriously 
consider the economic aspects of monetary reformism. However, its approach was one of 
cautious open-mindedness rather than the blatant appropriation of social credit doctrine 
suggested by Robin Clifton.23 Begg met with Douglas twice during his time in New Zealand, 
and attended a speech he gave in Wellington.24
 
 His rhetoric was supportive but 
noncommittal: 
With the knowledge that Lister, Simpson and Pasteur in my own profession 
were opposed as cranks by the orthodox school, I am willing to believe that 
the same error may be made in the sacred realms of economics ... That 
Douglas is opposed by the so-called orthodox school makes the pleasure of 
listening to him more attractive.25
 
 
The Legion subsequently adopted a commitment to state control of currency, although this 
was more influenced by proto-Keynesianism than social credit. Begg, for instance, claimed 
that his inspiration came from ‘Roosevelt’s dictum of the inherent right of the government to 
issue currency’.26 The Legion maintained that it held ‘deep suspicions of the A+B theorem’, 
and when one member expressed concern that the movement was adopting Major Douglas’s 
proposals its response was blunt: ‘Of course the Legion does not advocate Douglas Credit.’27 
It was also critical of Douglas’s submission before the Monetary Commission, claiming that 
he had ‘sidestepped and twisted and bluffed’ and ultimately ‘crashed’.28
 
 
                                                     
22 Circular No. 1, 2 August 1933, file 1 folder 4, NZL papers. 
23 Clifton, "Douglas Credit and the Labour Party," 128. 
24 Pugh, "The New Zealand Legion and Conservative Protest," 128-129; Clifton, "Douglas Credit and the Labour 
Party," 91. 
25 National Opinion 2:13 (15 February 1934): 15. 
26 National Opinion 2:13 (15 February 1934): 14. 
27 National Opinion 2:12 (1 February 1934): 3; National Opinion 2:20 (24 May 1934): 12. 
28 National Opinion 2:24 (19 July 1934): 7, 15. 
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A third school of economic thought that influenced the Legion was single tax theory. 
Proponents of single taxism considered land to be the fundamental resource upon which all 
economic activity was based, and they argued that the entire tax system should be scrapped in 
favour of a single tax on the unimproved value of land in order to ensure its maximum utility. 
The leading single tax supporter within the Legion was E. W. Nicolaus. In 1931 Nicolaus had 
founded a group named the Citizens’ National Movement with several other Henry George 
supporters and single tax veterans to contest the Wellington Central electorate. When this 
proved unsuccessful, the group briefly reformed itself as a local branch of the 
Commonwealth Land Party of England.29 Nicolaus joined the Legion in the first half of 1933 
and became a member of the Economic Research Committee, where he was able to 
disseminate ideas on single tax theory to front-line members. Whilst his ideas did not gather 
widespread support within the Legion, they contributed to a general policy to effect ‘the 
maximum development and settlement of land’.30
 
 However, closer settlement of land had 
attracted bipartisan support since the heyday of the Liberal Party in the 1890s, so the 
Legion’s policy was hardly a radical departure from the norm. Nevertheless, Nicolaus’ 
position on the Economic Research Council still allowed him to export his ideas to a wider 
milieu, adding further to the confused mix of different economic ideas being espoused within 
Legion publications and circulars. 
EXPOSING THE INHERENT CONTRADICTIONS 
The fractures between these various schools of thought first manifested when the Economic 
Research Council presented a plan for economic recovery to the meeting of the National 
                                                     
29 Manifesto of the Citizens’ National Movement to the Coalition Government (Wellington: Citizens’ National 
Movement, 1932); Evening Post, 16 December 1932, 13; Letter from R. A. Gosse, 20 December 1932, series 2 
item 157, Sir George Fowlds papers, MSS & Archives A-17, AUL. 
30 1934 Circular No. 2, 8 February 1934, file 1 folder 4, NZL papers. 
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Council in July 1933. The difficulty in reconciling the radical economic ideas of Parry and 
Nicolaus with the more orthodox ideas of other committee members was hinted at by Parry 
when he presented the plan to the Council: 
 
He made it clear that the scheme endeavoured to reach a compromise which 
would meet the conflicting views of those comprising the Committee. The 
main difficulty they had encountered was that of overcoming the various lines 
of conflicting thought and opinion and moulding them into a common plan.31
 
 
As a result, the plan was a hodgepodge of different economic principles and policies. It began 
in a rather orthodox fashion by referring to the intolerable burden of debt and interest that 
previous governments had amassed by excessive borrowing. However, it then argued that the 
Depression had been worsened by banks whose interests in preserving their stakeholders’ 
profit margins were incompatible with the national interest. The solution to this problem, 
according to the plan, was the resumption of sovereign authority over currency via a State 
Credit Board which would stimulate the economy through interest-free loans to public and 
private enterprise. The Board would also be granted sole control of importing and exporting 
in order to maintain a stable internal price level independent of fluctuations in the global 
market. The plan also referred to land as the ‘foundation of the nation’s economic life’, and it 
recommended that the Crown ‘reassert sovereignty over land’ by taxing its unimproved value 
to prevent speculation.32
 
 This demonstrated a mix of economic planning and single tax theory 
with language that was reminiscent of the anti-banking conspiracy favoured by monetary 
reformers. 
                                                     
31 Minutes of Meeting of National Council of the New Zealand Legion, 19-21 July 1933, file 1 folder 1, NZL 
papers. 
32 Evening Post, 24 July 1933, 8. 
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Parry was doubtful that the National Council would approve the ambitious Economic Plan: 
he simply hoped that it would be circulated amongst the various centres for discussion. What 
he got was much more. Whilst the Council did not agree with the specifics of the report, it 
nevertheless resolved that ‘the Legion is convinced that a planned economic system is 
necessary for the purpose of co-ordinating consumption and production, with a view to 
increasing consumption.’33
 
 For a movement that was so heavily focused on individualism and 
decentralised government, this was a radical stance – especially given the fact that policy was 
supposed to be vetted by all centres before being adopted. The minutes of the National 
Council meeting do not reveal why the Legion’s leadership took such a dramatic step, but it 
is possible that the apparent failure of New Zealand’s mainstream conservative parties to deal 
with the Depression made the Legionnaires more willing to consider drastic alternatives. The 
Depression had entered its fourth year in 1933, and discontented conservatives in New 
Zealand did not have a Labour bogeyman in power against whom they could direct their 
frustrations. Conversely, Australia in 1931 was dominated by the Labor Party, which meant 
that there was less need for discontented conservatives to experiment with alternate economic 
remedies. In addition, Parry’s vaguely-worded resolution could easily be interpreted by 
moderate conservatives as being compatible with their worldview. Increased state control 
may have been anathema to free markets, but the relatively pragmatic boundaries of 
Australasian conservatism readily encouraged such interventions when they were seen as 
serving the national interest. So whilst it was a radical new direction, it was still nominally 
within the boundaries of the nineteenth century developmentalist tradition. 
                                                     
33 Minutes of Meeting of National Council of the New Zealand Legion, 19-21 July 1933, file 1 folder 1, NZL 
papers; Evening Post, 24 July 1933, 6. 
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This confused mix of different economic ideas was repeated in the Legion’s twelve point 
policy in March 1934. On the one hand, it called for the reduction in size and cost of 
parliament and the decentralisation of power to semi-autonomous ‘Shire Councils’; on the 
other, it called for the establishment of new government departments such as the Economic 
Advisory Council and the creation of a ‘Unity Government’ to carry out aspects of economic 
planning such as public works, vocational training and employment bureaux for the 
unemployed. A separate plank for the state control of currency was reminiscent of monetary 
reformism, whilst a commitment to land settlement and the prevention of speculation was 
included to appease the single taxers.34
 
 In effect, the twelve point policy represented an 
attempt to corral a series of contradictory ideas into a single platform. 
The expression of such divergent schools of thought within Legion policy and literature 
exposed the inherent contradictions within the movement. The chief division lay between the 
proponents of the new radical alternatives and the supporters of the economic status quo that 
formed the backbone of the movement. One of the places where this was most evident was 
the letters’ pages of National Opinion, where members expressed their frustrations with the 
different ideas being floated by the Legion’s leadership. In the very first volume one member 
wrote a letter protesting against Nicolaus’ proposal regarding Crown ownership of all land; in 
a following volume, two replies were published defending Nicolaus.35 This set off a debate 
that spanned several issues in 1933 between Nicolaus himself and A. W. Free, a more 
orthodox member of the Economic Research Committee.36
 
  
                                                     
34 National Opinion 2:14 (1 March 1934): 1, 5. 
35 National Opinion 1:1 (10 August 1933): 4; National Opinion 1:3 (7 September 1933): 4. 
36 National Opinion 1:4 (21 September 1933): 4; National Opinion 1:5 (5 October 1933): 4; National Opinion 1:6 
(19 October 1933): 4; National Opinion 1:7 (2 November 1933): 4; National Opinion 1:8 (16 November 1933): 
9; National Opinion 1:9 (30 November 1933): 7; National Opinion 1:10 (14 December 1933): 8. 
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Mr. Nicolaus’s views on Credit and Currency prove again that shoemakers 
should stick to their lasts ... Practical observation by a layman would lead to 
the conclusion that the sun moves around the earth. I rely upon the authorities 
who assure me that the reverse is true. So with money – the analyses of the 
experts are more important than the conclusions of the amateur observer.37
 
 
Similarly, Parry’s articles on planned economics attracted letters in support and opposition: 
one member praised his attempt to ‘evolve a system of finance whereby consumption can be 
made to equate with production’, whilst another believed that all other options needed to be 
exhausted before resorting to ‘the desperation of “planning”’.38
 
 
The Legion’s flirtation with monetary reformism provoked the most significant debates in 
National Opinion. One orthodox member criticised Robieson’s conspiratorial approach to the 
Reserve Bank Bill as ‘heavy-handed’, whilst another outright condemned the Economic 
Research Council’s stamped scrip plan.39 As social credit doctrine became more prominent in 
1934, so too did the letters for and against it. A lengthy debate between the poet and 
dedicated social crediter A. R. D. Fairburn and a supporter of orthodox economics named E. 
Keating spanned several months, with many other Legion members contributing to each side 
of the debate. The closest the debate came to a conclusion was Fairburn’s accusation that 
Keating was secretly an economist or a banker in disguise.40
                                                     
37 National Opinion 1:5 (5 October 1933): 4; National Opinion 1:7 (2 November 1933): 4. 
 Other members disagreed over 
whether the Legion had adopted too much, or not enough, social credit doctrine. E. Manoy 
argued that social credit had been ‘proved a fallacy by leading economic authorities 
throughout the world’ and hoped that the Legion was not ‘advocating such a disastrous 
38 National Opinion 1:5 (5 October 1933): 4; National Opinion 2:12 (1 February 1934): 12. 
39 National Opinion 1:5 (5 October 1933): 4; National Opinion 1:6 (19 October 1933): 4. 
40 National Opinion 2:11 (18 January 1934): 11-12; National Opinion 2:12 (1 February 1934): 12; National 
Opinion 2:14 (1 March 1934): 12; National Opinion 2:16 (29 March 1934): 12; National Opinion 2:21 (7 June 
1934): 12; National Opinion 2:22 (21 June 1934): 13; National Opinion 2:23 (5 July 1934): 13; National Opinion 
2:25 (2 August 1934): 12-13; National Opinion 2:26 (1 September 1934): 15-16. 
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proposal’.41 In contrast, a ‘Disgusted Subscriber’ lamented that the Legion was spending too 
much time talking about reducing government expenditure and not enough on monetary 
reform.42 Another member, E. F. Rothwell, argued that state control of currency should be 
given central importance rather than being ‘relegated to a position among the “odds and bits”’ 
of the twelve point platform.43
 
 
Once the inherent contradictions between reactionary and radical economic ideas had been 
exposed, widespread resignations soon followed. The majority of those who resigned were 
supporters of traditional conservative dicta who believed that the Legion had betrayed its 
founding values by veering towards radical economics. One subscriber to National Opinion 
wrote that the Legion’s refusal to believe that Britain’s orthodox economic policies were 
causing a recovery was ‘criminal’ because it was ‘kill[ing] the spirit of confidence’.44 The 
Secretary of the Christchurch centre resigned ‘when it became apparent control had passed in 
Wellington to an extreme Left Wing group whose aims were directly contrary to our own’, 
and even took the extreme measure of destroying the centre’s membership lists out of fear 
that they would be misused.45
 
 The Chairman of the Hastings centre listed a long line of 
grievances that had led him to quit the movement: 
[T]he movement has not come up to my expectations, that I do not agree with 
the system of local organisation that has been adopted, that I cannot see any 
hope of success on present lines and that I believe I can make better use of 
myself in the ordinary political sphere as we know it.46
 
 
                                                     
41 National Opinion 2:20 (24 May 1934): 12. 
42 National Opinion 2:25 (2 August 1934): 12-13. 
43 Legion 1:3 (29 November 1934): 4. 
44 National Opinion 1:10 (14 December 1933): 8-9. 
45 Letter from J. D. Hall, 24 August 1972, Simpson papers. 
46 Letter from Ald. Harrison to Tonkin 5 September 1933, file 5 folder 1, NZL papers. 
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That the Chairman had been driven back into the fold of mainstream conservatism further 
demonstrates that it was the reactionary wing of the Legion that was most alienated by its 
policies. They had joined out of a growing perception of crisis and a desire to do something 
about it, but their sense of civic duty did not extend to abandoning their faith in limited 
government, free markets and individual self-reliance. Whereas the Legion’s leadership 
appeared to be obsessively looking forward to new and modern ideas on how to combat the 
Depression, they preferred to look backwards to the tried and tested methods of their 
forefathers in the nineteenth century. 
 
Those supporters of orthodox economics who remained in the movement advised the 
leadership to distance itself from its radical policies. The Secretary of the Otane centre 
suggested that they avoid expressing any ‘ambitious & rather vague (to the rank and file) 
views’ that might ‘frighten some members away’.47
 
 The Wilder centre proposed that the 
Legion should focus on the reform of parliament rather than the more contentious question of 
economics: 
[T]here exists an urgent need, in order to attract to the Legion a greater and 
wider measure of public support, to delete, for the time being at least, from the 
Legion’s published programme all controversial matters such as managed 
currency, the question of community created values etc., and to place before 
the public with more prospect of endorsement, a short and simply worded 
programme with reform of the Parliamentary system as the Prime objective.48
 
 
To these members, parliamentary reform met the definition of non-partisanship where 
‘managed currency’ did not. This demonstrated their perception of conservative values as 
being natural and therefore non-partisan. Parliamentary reform, in their worldview, meant the 
rationalisation and standardisation of the government in order to rid the public sector of 
                                                     
47 Letter from J. A. S. Logan to the General Secretary, 6 January 1934, file 2 folder 3, NZL papers. 
48 Remit from Wilder Branch N. Z. Legion [undated], file 1 folder 5, NZL papers. 
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services deemed frivolous or unnecessary. Economics of this sort were a natural, and 
therefore uncontroversial, policy, whereas ideas such as a ‘managed currency’ were partisan 
and controversial. 
 
The fractures within the Legion were further exposed during the July 1934 National Council 
when the Legion resolved to field its own candidates for the next election. The move was 
partially a response to the criticisms of the Legion’s confusing and contradictory economic 
policies. In order to overcome this criticism, the Council resolved that candidates would only 
be required to support the reform of local and central government and the establishment of an 
Economic Advisory Council, rather than the more controversial elements of its twelve-point 
policy.49
 
 However, this decision alienated the Legion members who wanted the movement to 
maintain its non-party purity. Several division and centre executives resigned in protest, 
including the one in Dunedin: 
[T]he sole aim of the Legion was the securing of more efficient government, 
central and local, and government based on national and not sectional interests 
... it had become evident that the aims of the Legion had departed from this 
interpretation, and that the Legion was prepared to enter the field as a political 
party. In view of this, the executive felt that it would not, in fairness to the 
members who had been induced to join the Legion on the old understanding, 
remain in office.50
 
 
This reiterated the central importance that moderate members placed on parliamentary reform 
as the core business of the Legion. The decision to support its own candidates, which 
effectively meant rebranding itself as a moderate party, contradicted the non-partisan ideals 
upon which these members believed the movement had been founded. Even worse, it raised 
the spectre of vote-splitting at a time when the New Zealand Labour Party was in the 
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50 Evening Post, 20 September 1934, 12. 
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ascendant and the conservatives needed to retain every vote. The Legion countered that it was 
more likely to split the labour or ‘progressive’ vote, but this was a hollow defence given the 
overwhelmingly conservative nature of its membership.51
 
 
 
Figure 17: ‘Caesar’s Dilemma’ – the divisive effect of the Legion’s policies. Source: 
Auckland Star, 22 September 1934, 10. 
 
By the time the Legion had decided to launch itself as a new political party, it was already 
largely irrelevant. The inherent contradictions exposed by the adoption of controversial 
economic policies had begun to weaken the Legion from the second half of 1933, and by 
October the leadership reported that only seven of the eighteen divisions were fully 
operational. The other eleven were still nominally operating under their original provisional 
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committees, although none of their centres were active.52 In the Hawke’s Bay division, only 
two of six centres were functioning satisfactorily, and of the outlying centres it was reported 
that ‘complete silence reigns’.53 From 1934 the movement struggled to maintain its 
relevance, but it was, for the most part, completely ignored by mainstream conservatives. The 
lofty aspiration to run its own candidates never materialised due to a lack of funds and 
manpower, although a particularly active branch in the Hutt Valley managed to get several of 
its members elected to local government bodies in 1935. J. W. Andrews and E. W. Wise were 
elected unopposed as mayors of Lower Hutt and Eastbourne respectively.54 In May 1935 
Begg resigned as President in favour of Clarence Meachen, a fellow medical professional and 
a pioneer in blood transfusions, although even this failed to reverse the Legion’s flagging 
fortunes.55 The movement disappeared after the general election in November 1935, although 
a few centres in the Hastings division survived into 1936.56 In what might be claimed as one 
of its few lasting successes, eight former members of the Legion were selected as National 
Party candidates in 1938.57
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Like its counterparts in Australia, the New Zealand Legion arose in response to a general 
feeling of conservative discontent caused by the Depression. However, where the Australian 
citizens’ movements had a Federal Labor government and a series of left-wing bogeymen 
against whom to direct their frustrations, the New Zealand Legion had only a conservative 
government whose generally orthodox economic policies had neither resolved the crisis nor 
inspired the public. As a result, New Zealand conservatives increasingly turned their attention 
                                                     
52 Ref. 6/2/75, 16 October 1933, file 1 folder 2, NZL papers. 
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to alternative remedies to the Depression. Such remedies abounded when the Legion arose in 
1933, including proto-Keynesian economic planning and monetary reform. As the Legion 
rose to prominence, adherents of these schools of thought were drawn to the movement as a 
potential vehicle for realising their goals. They used the movement’s bureaucratic apparatus 
to influence its leadership and utilised its journal and its mailing list to disseminate their ideas 
amongst the wider membership. In doing so, however, they exposed the inherent 
contradictions between their disparate radical economic theories and the reactionary bulwark 
upon which the foundation of the movement’s ideology and membership lay. Protests, 
fractures and resignations followed suit, and by the end of 1933 the Legion was rapidly losing 
members and money. The leadership’s decision to launch a new political party in 1934 
provoked the final split in an already fractured movement, and the Legion faded into 
obscurity and irrelevance long before its final demise in 1935. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Talking of large families, the Lyons’ visiting card is popular in England. 
Destiny plays her cards in a very peculiar way. Little did Mr. Bagot, of the 
Citizens’ League (now faded into the background), dream that through his 
sponsorship it was made possible for Mr. Lyons to go before the public in the 
Adelaide Exhibition Building. “Lyons hysteria” followed, and the other States 
fell into step at once. All parties then sank their differences, the emergency 
committee was formed, and now Mr. Lyons is the constant guest of the King! 
So far, Mr. Bagot has been unable to secure a seat even in Parliament. The 
public soon forgets.1
 
 
As the citizens’ movements faded from the political scene, so too did they fade from the 
public consciousness. By 1936, the only time they were mentioned in the press was in the 
obituaries section, where the families of former members dutifully recognised the deceased’s 
service with the citizens’ movements well down their long lists of personal achievements. 
This rather ironic form of remembrance – or lack thereof – may partially explain why the 
citizens’ movements have attracted so little scholarly attention. This thesis has aspired to fill 
that gap. In doing so, it implicitly argues not only that the citizens’ movements are worthy of 
study, but that they were an important social and political force that contributed more to 
Australasian conservatism than a mere blip in an otherwise uninterrupted radar. This 
proposition – the so-called ‘so what’ justification – is in contradistinction to the popular 
obituaries that belie the movements’ lasting impact. 
 
This thesis demonstrates the importance of the citizens’ movements in three ways. Firstly, as 
the title and core argument suggest, it argues that the citizens’ movements were a 
contradictory blend of reactionary and radical ideas which threatened the electoral and 
ideological hegemony that mainstream conservatives held over the right-minded section of 
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the populace. Chapter one analysed the origin of the movements in the long tradition of 
Australasian conservatism and right-wing organisation. This tradition was heavily steeped in 
reactionary conservative values concerning society, politics and the economy, and it relied on 
the tropes of ‘good citizenship’ and ‘non-party’ political endeavour to enforce those values. It 
subsequently became radicalised during the Depression as some conservatives began to seek 
alternate political and economic solutions to the crisis. As chapter two demonstrated, the 
main component of this radicalisation was a form of ‘anti-political political thought’ that laid 
the blame for the crisis on political parties and their supposedly self-serving and parochial 
party politicians. In New Zealand, where the government remained in the hands of 
conservative parties throughout the Depression, discontented conservatives also turned to 
radical economic theories such as Douglas social credit which presented simple ‘tweaks’ to 
the capitalist mode of production that would supposedly return prosperity. 
 
The citizens’ movements sat at the peak of this process of conservative radicalisation. 
Chapter three demonstrated that the founders envisioned their new creed as a nation-wide 
form of mass protest that would force their governments to take action: thus, they actively 
encouraged the recruitment of mass memberships through novel organisational and 
promotional techniques which stressed the underlying messages of size and direct 
participation. Their ideology was a populist blend of reactionary and radical tropes that pitted 
the citizenry against an elite and malevolent ‘other’ in the form of party politicians and the 
political ‘machines’ which supported them. As chapter four showed, this contradiction 
between looking backward to a mythical pioneering past and looking forward to new and 
modern ways of reshaping the nation’s political machinery was temporarily obscured by 
high-level ideals that supposedly transcended the political process entirely. Their aim, the 
movements stressed, was nothing less than the transformation of the nation’s political system 
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and the reinvigoration of an apathetic electorate. Whilst their membership was drawn 
primarily from the professional, business and commercial fraction of the capitalist class, the 
huge numbers that joined suggested that they were at least partially successful in the latter 
objective. This thesis has suggested that the citizens’ movements could therefore be 
considered a form of ‘conservative populism’, much like One Nation and the recent Tea Party 
protests in the United States. 
 
It was their populism and their anti-partyism that made the citizens’ movements both radical 
and unique. Whilst previous right-wing movements may have occasionally questioned the 
merits of machine politics, the citizens’ movements transformed this into a large-scale 
challenge against the political status quo. Despite their ideological affinity with mainstream 
conservatives, their anti-partyism was so deeply ingrained in their worldview that they were 
compelled to reject political parties on both sides of the spectrum with equal fervour. As a 
result, they directly challenged the electoral base of these parties by promoting independent 
candidates of all shades who were willing to pledge themselves to upholding the movements’ 
broad ideals. This challenge was particularly strong in Australia, where mainstream 
conservatives went to great lengths to contain it. Chapter five discussed the convoluted 
attempts of Joseph Lyons and the Nationalists to rein in the citizens’ movements and the 
tortured ideological explanations which the movements developed to justify their cooperation 
with mainstream conservative parties. Whilst the New Zealand Legion did not pose a similar 
threat to the United and Reform parties, it still managed to recruit a large number of 
members. Nevertheless, it was similarly affected by inherent contradictions when it came to 
controversial, non-orthodox economic ideas such as proto-Keynesianism and monetary 
reform. The end result was the same – once the citizens’ movements attempted to transform 
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their ideals into formal policy, they exposed the inherent contradictions that had previously 
been concealed. The ruptures that followed ultimately caused their downfall. 
 
Whilst this thesis has argued that the exposure of the inherent contradictions between radical 
and reactionary ideas was the primary reason for the decline of the citizens’ movements, 
there were other contributing factors. In Australia, Lyons’ appropriation of non-party rhetoric 
and his success at bringing the citizens’ movement under the aegis of the United Australia 
Party effectively undercut the reason for the movements’ existence, especially after his 
victory in the December 1931 Federal election. Similarly, the New Zealand Legion’s 
confused mix of unorthodox economic ideas could never compete with the clearly enunciated 
reformist program of the New Zealand Labour Party. As Labour grew in strength and its 
policies became more popular, the Legion’s lofty ideas appeared increasingly hollow by 
comparison. However, these issues arose after the movements had decided on policies that 
exposed their inherent contradictions – the choice of political expediency or anti-political 
purity by the Australian movements, and the adoption of various unorthodox economic ideas 
by the New Zealand Legion. As this thesis has shown, exposing this contradiction caused a 
chain reaction of protests and resignations that weakened the movements to the point that 
they struggled to remain in existence. Lack of funding was an additional factor that plagued 
all four movements, although this did not prevent the Legion and the Citizens’ League of 
South Australia from limping on until well after their heyday had passed. 
 
The decline of the New Zealand Legion was also hastened by the increasingly divided nature 
of right-wing politics in New Zealand during the Depression. Unlike in Australia where 
conservatives were brought together under the United Australia Party, the political right in 
New Zealand continued to splinter up until the November 1935 election. The main splinter 
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group was the Democrat Party, a laissez-faire group formed by the well-known political 
campaigner Albert Davy. Whilst the Democrats did not win any seats in 1935, they received 
around 7.8% of the total votes cast. This vote-splitting appears to have been a factor in at 
least eight of the seats won by Labour.2
 
 A further 10.5% of the vote was received by 
independent candidates. In a sense, then, the Legion went down with the ship of a divided 
right wing, although by the time of the 1935 election it was already largely defunct. 
The second, and more far-reaching, reason for the relevance of the citizens’ movements is 
their position within long-term trends and processes in Australasian conservative thought. 
Whilst the movements themselves soon faded into the obituaries pages, their novel methods 
of political mobilisation and ideological expression contributed to the consolidation of the 
conservative parliamentary forces in Australia and New Zealand in subsequent decades. One 
of the ways in which this occurred was through ex-members who subsequently went on to 
have political careers within the mainstream conservative establishment, in particular from 
the Australian Citizens’ League and the New Zealand Legion. Much like the individuals of 
the pre-Depression right who were involved with multiple right-wing leagues, these ex-
members of the citizens’ movements brought their ideological baggage with them, which in 
turn shaped the ways in which they interacted with, and influenced, mainstream 
conservatism. A trans-national parallel can be drawn between the two biggest success stories 
of the citizens’ movements – Robert Menzies in Australia, and Sid Holland in New Zealand. 
The latter was an enthusiastic member of the Christchurch centre of the New Zealand Legion, 
whilst the former had worked closely with the Australian Citizens’ League through his 
involvement with the Victorian Young Nationalists Organisation and the ‘Group of Six’. 
                                                     
2 Michael C. Pugh, “Doctrinaires on the Right: The Democrats and Anti-Socialism, 1933-36,” New Zealand 
Journal of History 17:2 (October 1983): 115. 
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Both subsequently became leading figures in the consolidation of mainstream conservatism 
in Australia and New Zealand. They oversaw, to varying degrees, the creation of the Liberal 
and National Parties and their transformation into mass organisations based on permanent 
hierarchical branch structures similar to their Labor opponents. As the vanguard of a younger 
generation of conservative politicians, they also oversaw a shift away from the tempered, 
patrician rhetoric of their predecessors to a more populist style aimed at colonising the 
electoral middle ground with conservative ideas and tropes. They sought to turn their new 
political organisations away from elite financial backers towards the middle class, which they 
portrayed as the backbone of the nation’s economic prosperity and social stability. Menzies’ 
new approach was summed up in his 1942 radio address to ‘the forgotten people’ who 
comprised this middle class, whilst Holland’s came a year later in his ‘passwords to 
progress’.3
 
 This suggests that, despite their failure, the citizens’ movements had a lasting 
impact through the new, populist style of mass conservative politics pioneered by their 
former members. However, the extent to which the experiences of Menzies and Holland with 
the citizens’ movements influenced their long-term political outlook must remain a subject 
for further study. 
The citizens’ movements also demonstrated the persistence of classical liberalism in 
Australasia during the twentieth century. This tradition was recently explored by Frank 
Bongiorno in the Australian context, who argued that the claim – so frequently expressed by 
neoliberals – that free trade was banished to the political wilderness after the ‘Australian 
Settlement’ was an oversimplification: 
                                                     
3 Sid Holland, Passwords to Progress: a plan for post-war security, freedom and prosperity (Christchurch: 
Whitcombe & Tombs, 1943). For a thorough analysis of Menzies’ appeal to the middle class (including a copy 
of the ‘forgotten people’ speech itself), see Judith Brett, Robert Menzies' Forgotten People  (Sydney: Pan 
Macmillan, 1992). 
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[A]ny suggestion that Free Trade liberalism was eclipsed between Federation 
and the 1980s requires some qualification, for there are some obvious 
continuities in ideology and rhetoric between the Free Traders of the 
Federation era, and non-Labor political discourse of the middle decades of the 
twentieth century.4
 
 
One minor caveat to Bongiorno’s approach is that, if Australasian conservatism is viewed 
within the framework of the nineteenth century developmentalist ethos, then the progression 
from free trade to neoliberalism, along with the intervening period of the Australian 
Settlement, was merely part of a continuum of greater or lesser state economic activity. 
Nevertheless, there is clearly an ideological ‘low point’ for classical liberalism during the 
middle portion of the twentieth century, which was marked especially in Australia and New 
Zealand by the advent of Keynesian economics in the post-war period. The citizens’ 
movements are a clear example of how the ideology and rhetoric of liberalism persisted 
during those years. It was of particular relevance to their largely professional, business and 
commercial membership base, for whom the temptations of protection and price guarantees 
were largely irrelevant. 
 
The third reason for the relevance of the citizens’ movements is their position within the 
global right-wing ascendance that occurred during the interwar years. The phenomenon of 
mass conservative mobilisation, which arose in a number of forms across Australia and New 
Zealand during the Depression, was by far the largest and most significant right-wing 
reaction that occurred in the Antipodes. A growing body of scholarly work has sought to 
place these movements within a global framework, which this thesis has contributed to. 
Whilst chapter four demonstrated that the citizens’ movements had much more in common 
with conservatism than European fascism, a more ambitious argument can be made about 
                                                     
4 Frank Bongiorno, "Whatever Happened to Free Trade Liberalism?" in Confusion: The Making of the Australian 
Two-Party System, ed. Paul Strangio and Nick Dyrenfurth (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2009), 250. 
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their position at the crossroads between pre- and post-war right-wing mobilisation in 
Australasia. Prior to the rise of the citizens’ movements, the majority of right-wing leagues 
were decidedly reactionary in outlook – they were conservative in their ideals and imperial in 
their loyalties. In contrast, the post-war far right tradition in Australasia was radical, 
xenophobic, and feverishly nationalistic to the point of rejecting British imperialism. This 
tradition was incubated amongst the conspiratorial and anti-establishment circles of monetary 
reform and social credit during the 1930s which had little involvement with the citizens’ 
movements, apart from the New Zealand Legion. However, whilst the citizens’ movements 
remained loyal to Britain, their focus on national issues and their lack of international 
connections demonstrated a shift in geographical locus from their predecessors. They arose in 
response to specific crises of a national nature, and their enemies were tangible and 
nationally-based. The nation was also the rhetorical unit for recovery, inasmuch as recovery 
required national unity and self-sacrifice in the service of the national interest. Eschewing 
strong international ties was therefore one way for the citizens’ movements to reinforce their 
exclusively ‘national’ credentials, despite the imperial focus of their patriotism. This shift 
from imperial to national loyalties was symptomatic of the changing priorities of the right in 
Australia and New Zealand. 
 
A final word can be said about the wider applicability of the framework outlined by this 
thesis to Australasian conservatism. Like most ideologies, conservatism is a broad school of 
thought containing many inherent contradictions. Some contradictions, like those of the 
citizens’ movements, lay between the reactionary and radical fringes of conservative opinion; 
others, however, are structural in nature, such as those that divide the interests of farmers, 
manufacturers, and professionals, businessmen and commercial interests. The constant splits 
and consolidations of the non-labour parties in Australia and New Zealand during the first 
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half of the twentieth century demonstrate how divisive these contradictions could be. This 
thesis has suggested that, rather than ironing out these contradictions in the interests of 
narrative consistency, they must be embraced if a deeper historical understanding is to be 
achieved. Contradictions can reveal how alliances are forged and broken, how consensus is 
built around common issues without causing splits on more divisive ones, and how ideas and 
movements rise and fall by their ability to achieve this consensus. By exploring the antithesis 
– and occasionally the synthesis – of inherent contradictions, a fuller understanding of 
Australasian conservatism might be achieved. 
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APPENDIX A: GEOGRAPHICAL DATA 
 
The data contained in appendix A was used to inform the discussion on the geographical 
spread of the citizens’ movements in chapter 3, in particular through figures 8-11. It is 
provided in Excel spreadsheet form on the attached CD. 
 
Where it was possible to ascertain the leaders of branches/sub-divisions, their names were 
included in the quantitative membership studies in appendix B. The branches/sub-divisions 
included in the membership studies are also marked with an ‘X’ in figures 8-11. 
 
Specific methodological information on the data for each movement is noted below. This 
information is also provided in the associated Excel spreadsheets. 
 
A1: THE ALL FOR AUSTRALIA LEAGUE 
The All for Australia League was split into divisions and sub-divisions, with sub-divisions 
representing the lowest level of organisation for the movement. 
 
The list of sub-divisions used was drawn from the All for Australia League’s ‘Locality 
Layout for Metropolitan campaign’, item 70, Mutch papers. Some of these sub-divisions may 
not have existed, as this may have only been a planned organisational structure. Where more 
than one city is mentioned in a sub-division, they have been plotted as separate sub-divisions 
(where possible or appropriate) on the geographical distribution in figure 9. 
 
There were originally intended to be ten metropolitan and ten country divisions; however, in 
practice there were only a handful of sub-divisions outside of the Sydney metropolitan area 
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(15 country sub-divisions reported in March 1931).  Several of these have been identified and 
highlighted in blue in the spreadsheet. 
 
A few additional metropolitan subdivisions have also been identified and highlighted in red. 
 
A2: THE AUSTRALIAN CITIZENS’ LEAGUE 
The Australian Citizens’ League was split into branches and sub-branches, with sub-branches 
representing the lowest level of organisation for the movement. 
 
The list of branches and sub-branches used was published at the height of the Australian 
Citizens’ League in 1931 in a pamphlet titled All for Australia League shows the way to 
prosperity. The list did not distinguish between branches and sub-branches, although it stated 
that there were 147 branches and 172 sub-branches. The pamphlet also mentioned that thirty 
more branches were in the process of formation – those additional branches that could be 
found in newspaper sources are highlighted in blue in the spreadsheet. 
 
A3: THE CITIZENS’ LEAGUE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
The Citizens’ League of South Australia was split into districts and branches, with branches 
representing the lowest level of organisation for the movement. 
 
The list of branches used was compiled from two sources: a full list of branches presented at 
the League’s second convention in March 1931 (Attendance Book for Second Convention, 16 
March 1931, box 2 item 20, CLSA papers), and a list of country branches presented at the 
third convention in June (Report of Executive Committee presented at Third Convention of 
Delegates, 10 June 1931, box 1 item 1, CLSA papers). At the third convention it was 
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announced that there were 93 metropolitan branches and 40 country branches of the League, 
with 17 more country branches in formation. As there were more than 93 metropolitan 
branches in March, this suggests that some of the metropolitan branches did not last. 
Conversely, only three country branches were listed in March, which suggests that the 
majority must have been formed between March and June 1931. 
 
The branches for District 3: East Torrens were not listed in the report to the second 
convention. 
 
A4: THE NEW ZEALAND LEGION 
The New Zealand Legion was split into divisions and centres, with centres representing the 
lowest level of organisation for the movement. 
 
A complete list of centres could not be found by the present writer. Consequently, the list 
used was extracted from Gerard Campbell’s thesis on the Legion in Otago, which covers the 
Otago, North Otago and South Otago divisions only. 
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APPENDIX B – MEMBERSHIP DATA 
 
The data contained in appendix B was used to inform the discussion on the membership of 
the citizens’ movements in chapter 3, in particular through tables 1-2 and graphs 1-4. It is 
provided in Excel spreadsheet form on the attached CD. 
 
Along with the original membership data, separate tables are provided demonstrating how the 
present author divided occupations into the categories of farming, manufacturing, 
professional/business/commercial, working class, and other. 
 
Specific methodological information on the data for two of the movement is noted below. It 
is also mentioned in the associated Excel spreadsheets. 
 
B3: THE CITIZENS’ LEAGUE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
Electoral rolls for South Australia were not available electronically when this study was 
undertaken. As a result, the leadership analysis relies on the occupational data listed in 
Stephen James, ‘“The Big Hand of Service”: The Citizens' League of South Australia, 1930-
1934; Origins, Ideology and Policy’ (BA Hons diss., University of Melbourne, 1986), 
appendix G; and John Lonie, ‘Conservatism and Class in South Australia During the 
Depression Years, 1929-34’ (PhD diss., University of Adelaide, 1973), 213-214. 
 
The list of front-line members for the North Adelaide branch was located in box 3 item 10, 
CLSA papers. As the electoral rolls were unavailable, no data could be gathered on 
occupation, age or military history. It was, however, useful in determining the gender balance 
of the branch. 
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B4: THE NEW ZEALAND LEGION 
The list of front-line members for the Hawkes Bay division was located in file 2 folder 1, 
NZL papers. 
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